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54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after hearing. 
(1) (a) The commission shall take an action described in Subsection (l)(b), if the commission finds 
after a hearing that: 
(i) the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications demanded, observed, charged, or collected 
by any public utility for, or in connection with, any service, product, or commodity, including the rates 
or fares for excursion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices, or contracts 
affecting the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications are: 
(A) unjust; 
(B) unreasonable; 
(C) discriminatory; 
(D) preferential; or 
(E) otherwise in violation of any provisions of law; or 
(ii) the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications described in Subsection (l)(a)(i) are 
insufficient. 
(b) If the commission makes a finding described in Subsection (l)(a), the commission shall: 
(i) determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, 
rules, regulations, practices, or contracts to be thereafter observed and in force; and 
(ii) fix the determination described in Subsection (l)(b)(i) by order as provided in this section. 
(2) The commission may: 
(a) investigate: 
(i) one or more rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts, or 
practices of any public utility; or 
(ii) one or more schedules of rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, 
contracts, or practices of any public utility; and 
(b) establish, after hearing, new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, 
contracts, practices, or schedules in lieu of them. 
(3) (a) If in the commission's determination of just and reasonable rates the commission uses a test 
period, the commission shall select a test period that, on the basis of evidence, the commission finds best 
reflects the conditions that a public utility will encounter during the period when the rates determined by 
the commission will be in effect. 
(b) In establishing the test period determined in Subsection (3)(a), the commission may use: 
(i) a future test period that is determined on the basis of projected data not exceeding 20 months from 
the date a proposed rate increase or decrease is filed with the commission under Section 54-7-12; 
(ii) a test period that is: 
(A) determined on the basis of historic data; and 
(B) adjusted for known and measurable changes; or 
(iii) a test period that is determined on the basis of a combination of: 
(A) future projections; and 
(B) historic data. 
(c) If pursuant to this Subsection (3), the commission establishes a test period that is not 
determined exclusively on the basis of future projections, in determining just and reasonable rates the 
commission shall consider changes outside the test period that: 
(i) occur during a time period that is close in time to the test period; 
(ii) are known in nature; and 
(iii) are measurable in amount. 
(4) (a) If, in the commission's determination of just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, the commission 
considers the prudence of an action taken by a public utility or an expense incurred by a public utility, 
the commission shall apply the following standards in making its prudence determination: 
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility in this state; 
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the public utility judged 
as of the time the action was taken; 
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or reasonably should have 
known at the time of the action, would reasonably have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in 
taking the same or some other prudent action; and 
(iv) apply other factors determined by the commission to be relevant, consistent with the standards 
specified in this section. 
(b) The commission may find an expense fully or partially prudent, up to the level that a reasonable 
utility would reasonably have incurred. 
Amended by Chapter 11, 2005 General Session 
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54-4-26. Contracts calling for expenditures - Commission to approve. 
Every public utility when ordered by the commission shall, before entering into any 
contract for construction work or for the purchase of new facilities or with respect to any other 
expenditures, submit such proposed contract, purchase or other expenditure to the commission 
for its approval; and, if the commission finds that any such proposed contract, purchase or other 
expenditure diverts, directly or indirectly, the funds of such public utility to any of its officers or 
stockholders or to any corporation in which they are interested, or is not proposed in good faith 
for the economic benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withhold its approval of 
such contract, purchase or other expenditure, and may order other contracts, purchases or 
expenditures in lieu thereof for the legitimate purposes and economic welfare of such public 
utility. 
54-7-1. Settlement - Limitation of issues. 
(1) Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of matters before the commission is encouraged 
as a means to: 
(a) resolve disputes while minimizing the time and expense that is expended by: 
(i) public utilities; 
(ii) the state; and 
(iii) consumers; 
(b) enhance administrative efficiency; or 
(c) enhance the regulatory process by allowing the commission to concentrate on those issues that 
adverse parties cannot otherwise resolve. 
(2) (a) The commission may approve any agreement after considering the interests of the public and 
other affected persons to use a settlement proposal to resolve a disputed matter. 
(b) The commission shall reserve to the parties the right to maintain appropriate confidentiality in the 
negotiation process even when the commission uses a settlement proposal to resolve a disputed matter. 
(3) (a) At any time before or during an adjudicative proceeding before the commission, the parties, 
between themselves or with the commission or a commissioner, may engage in settlement conferences 
and negotiations. 
(b) In accordance with this Subsection (3), the commission may adopt any settlement proposal 
entered into by two or more of the parties to an adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) The commission shall notify all parties to an adjudicative proceeding of the terms of any 
settlement proposal related to the adjudicative proceeding. 
(d) (i) The commission may adopt a settlement proposal if: 
(A) the commission finds that the settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result; and 
(B) the evidence, contained in the record, supports a finding that the settlement proposal is just and 
reasonable in result. 
(ii) When considering whether to adopt a settlement proposal, the commission shall consider the 
significant and material facts related to the case. 
(e) (i) The commission may adopt a settlement proposal related to an adjudicative proceeding at any 
stage of the adjudicative procedure. 
(ii) The commission shall conduct a hearing before adopting a settlement proposal if requested by: 
(A) any party initiating the adjudicative proceeding; 
(B) any party against whom the adjudicative proceeding is initiated; or 
(C) an intervening party to the adjudicative proceeding. 
(f) The commission shall accept or reject a settlement proposal within a reasonable time. 
(4) In cases or procedures involving rate increases as defined in Section 54-7-12, the commission 
may limit the factors and issues to be considered in its determination of just and reasonable rates. 
Amended by Chapter 200, 2003 General Session 
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54-7-14. Orders and decisions conclusive on collateral attack. 
In all collateral actions or proceedings the orders and decisions of the commission which 
have become final shall be conclusive. 
54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission - Application - Procedure - Prerequisite to 
court action — Effect of commission decisions. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder, bondholder, or 
other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the 
commission shall meet the requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the action or 
proceeding, any stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility 
affected may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding. 
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to 
any court. 
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 20 days is denied. 
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without suspending the order involved, 
the commission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after final submission. 
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing within 20 days, the order involved is 
affirmed. 
(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or postponed, an application for 
review or rehearing does not excuse any corporation or person from complying with and obeying any 
order or decision of the commission. 
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies an original order or 
decision has the same force and effect as an original order or decision, but does not affect any right, or 
the enforcement of any right, arising from the original order or decision unless so ordered by the 
commission. 
(4) An order of the commission, including a decision on rehearing: 
(a) shall have binding force and effect only with respect to a public utility that is an actual party to 
the proceeding in which the order is rendered; and 
(b) does not determine any right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with 
respect to a public utility that is not a party to the proceeding in which the order is rendered unless, in 
accordance with Subsection 63-46a-3(6), the commission makes a rule that incorporates the one or more 
principles of law that: 
(i) are established by the order; 
(ii) are not in commission rules at the time of the order; and 
(iii) affect the right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with respect to 
the public utility. 
Amended by Chapter 200, 2003 General Session 
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54-17-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Energy Resource Procurement Act." 
54-17-404, Order to proceed. 
(1) (a) In the event of a change in circumstances or projected costs, an energy utility may seek a 
commission review and determination of whether the energy utility should proceed with the 
implementation of an approved resource decision. 
(b) In making a determination under this Subsection (1), the commission shall use the standards 
identified in Subsection 54-17-402(3)(b). 
(c) Before making a determination under this Subsection (1) the commission: 
(i) may hold a public hearing; and 
(ii) shall provide an opportunity for public comment. 
(2) Unless the commission determines that additional time is warranted and is in the public interest, 
within 60 days of the day on which the energy utility files a request for commission review and 
determination under this section, the commission shall: 
(a) issue an order: 
(i) determining that the energy utility should proceed with the implementation of the resource 
decision; 
(ii) making findings as to the total projected costs of the approved resource decision; and 
(iii) stating the basis upon which the findings described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii) are made; or 
(b) issue an order determining that the energy utility should not proceed with the implementation of 
the resource decision. 
(3) If the commission determines that the energy utility should proceed with the implementation of 
the approved resource decision, the commission shall, in a general rate case or other appropriate 
commission proceeding, include in the energy utility's retail rates the state's share of costs: 
(a) relevant to that proceeding; 
(b) incurred by the energy utility in implementing the approved resource decision; and 
(c) up to the projected costs as specified in the commission's order issued under Subsection (2)(a). 
(4) If the commission determines that the energy utility should not proceed with the implementation 
of the approved resource decision, the commission shall, in a general rate case or other appropriate 
commission proceeding, include in the energy utility's retail rates the state's share of costs: 
(a) relevant to that proceeding; and 
(b) incurred by the energy utility in implementing the approved resource decision before issuance of 
a determination not to proceed, including any prudently incurred costs of terminating the approved 
resource decision. 
(5) A commission order under this section not to proceed with the implementation of a resource 
decision may not prejudice: 
(a) the right of an energy utility to: 
(i) continue to implement the resource decision; and 
(ii) seek recovery of costs incurred after a determination not to proceed in a future rate proceeding; or 
(b) the right of any other party to support or oppose the recovery sought under Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(6) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
commission shall make rules regarding the process for the commission's review and determination on a 
request for an order to proceed under this section. 
Enacted by Chapter 11, 2005 General Session 
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63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings 
shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by persons other than the 
agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the following 
requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding officer, and 
shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being given by the 
presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of any attorney or employee who has 
been designated to appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally 
according to the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-l 1; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each respondent must 
file a written response within 30 days of the mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required by statute or 
rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for 
which the hearing is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in 
the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time provided by 
the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the adjudicative 
proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer; and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the extent known 
by the presiding officer, the questions to be decided. 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a right to notice under 
statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to 
initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for agency action shall be in writing and 
signed by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the agency, or by that person's representative, 
and shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the request for agency 
action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which agency action is 
requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the agency and shall 
mail a copy to each person known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms eliciting the information 
required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed and filed 
by the person requesting agency action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted and that the 
adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied and, if the proceeding 
is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the party may request a hearing before the agency to 
challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the 
agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information required 
by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii). 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, except 
that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) may be published when publication is required 
by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation 
to the applicable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to Sections 63-46b-6 to 
63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where respondent parties are 
known, state that a written response must be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's 
notice if mailed, or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in an 
informal adjudicative proceeding, state the time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose 
for which the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or participate in a 
scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hearing is required by statute or 
rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing and the time within which a hearing 
may be requested under the agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this chapter, but 
agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions are subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking review must be filed with the agency within 
the time prescribed by the agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by rule, provide 
for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may provide for a shorter response 
time if required or permitted by applicable federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, an application for a package 
agency, license, permit, or certificate of approval filed under authority of Title 3 2A, Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, is not considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or other privilege 
as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency may, by rule or order, conduct a 
single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or privilege. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, 
a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant 
facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt 
contains all pertinent portions of the original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within 
the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity 
to present oral or written statements at the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of 
the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect 
confidential information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary 
to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative 
proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each 
party. The petition shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights or interests are substantially 
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any 
provision of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the presiding officer determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding; 
and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will 
not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in writing and mailed to the 
petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervenor's participation in the 
adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceeding. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where 
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, 
except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any 
other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the 
date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued 
under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet 
the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, 
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the 
form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on 
its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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managing the heat content of the gas supplies delivered to its system commencing February 1, 
2005. 
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By The Commission: 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Over the past seven years, this Commission has repeatedly addressed issues 
associated with changes in the heat content of natural gas supplies delivered to Questar Gas 
Company ("Questar Gas" or "Company") by affiliate Questar Pipeline Company ("Questar 
Pipeline") resulting from the increasing presence on the pipeline system of gas produced from 
coal seams ("coal bed methane") in the Ferron area of Emery County, Utah. Our Order of 
August 30, 2004 ("2004 Order"), in Docket Nos. 03-057-05, 01-057-14, 99-057-20, and 99-057-
12, reviewed the prudence of the Company's decision to manage heat content by removing C02 
from coal bed methane at a plant located in Castle Valley, Utah ("C02 Removal Plant") that is 
owned and operated by affiliate Questar Transportation Services Company ("Questar 
Transportation"). 
The 2004 Order concluded Questar Gas failed to prove its decision was prudent. 
We therefore rejected the carbon dioxide stipulation ("C02 Stipulation") entered into by the 
Company and the Division of Public Utilities ("Division") and denied Questar Gas's request for 
C02 Removal Plant rate recovery. As a result of our decision, Questar Gas refunded 
approximately $29 million ($25 million plus interest) to Utah ratepayers and reduced its rates by 
$5 million annually on a going-forward basis effective September 1, 2004. The 2004 Order also 
indicated our intent to open a separate docket to identify a long-term solution to the concerns 
raised by increasing volumes of coal bed methane on the Questar Gas system. 
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A. Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-11 and 04-057-13 
During 2004, Questar Gas filed applications for adjustments to the commodity 
portion of the Company's rates through the 191 Account in Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-11 
and 04-057-13. Each of these applications noted Questar Gas was seeking rate recovery of costs 
incurred under its contract with Questar Transportation for operation of the C02 Removal Plant. 
B. Docket Nos. 04-057-09 and 05-057-01 
On September 8, 2004, the Commission initiated Docket No. 04-057-09 by 
scheduling a hearing "to set dates for technical conferences to discuss the long-term solution to 
Questar Gas Company's gas quality." A scheduling conference was held on September 16, 
2004, wherein interested parties agreed to a procedural schedule and issues to be discussed. 
Pursuant to notice, six formal public technical conferences were subsequently 
held from October 2004 through January 2005. The topics of these conferences included: 
(1) the changing heat content of gas on the Questar Gas system; (2) the potential for Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") resolution of issues related to Questar Pipeline's 
tariff and gas quality specifications; (3) possible alternatives to address the changing heat content 
of natural gas; (4) the Green Sticker Program; (5) participants' positions on possible alternatives; 
and (6) an in-depth review of the three preferred alternatives for managing heat content. 
On January 31, 2005, in Docket No. 05-057-01, Questar Gas filed an application 
for recovery of gas management costs in its 191 Account. On March 1, 2005, the Commission 
conducted a scheduling conference at which Questar Gas, the Division, the Committee of 
Consumer Services ("Committee) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the •Tarties") and other 
interested persons discussed scheduling issues in the above dockets and determined filing and 
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hearing dates for Commission consideration of the issues. Pursuant to the scheduling order, 
Questar Gas filed its direct testimony on April 15, 2005. 
As a result of on-going discovery, investigation, and settlement discussions, the 
Parties entered into a Gas Management Cost Stipulation ("Stipulation") filed with the 
Commission on October 11, 2005. The Stipulation resolves ail issues in the pending dockets. 
As part of the Stipulation, the Parties request the Commission take administrative notice of the 
information presented in the technical conferences in Docket No. 04-057-09 and admit and 
incorporate the facts asserted in Questar Gas's application and written testimony filed in these 
dockets into the record in support of the Stipulation. 
Pursuant to public notice issued on October 11, 2005, an evidentiary hearing was 
held on the Stipulation on October 20, 2005. At the hearing, Questar Gas, the Division and the 
Committee each presented expert testimony in support of the Stipulation and responded to 
questions from the Commission. No one opposed approval of the Stipulation during this 
hearing. Absent objection, the Commission admitted the Company's written testimony filed in 
these dockets, as well as the facts asserted in the Company's application, as requested in the 
Stipulation. 
Pursuant to the same public notice, a public witness hearing was also held on 
October 20, 2005. Two witnesses testified during the public witness hearing, one of whom 
opposed the Stipulation's allocation of a portion of C02 removal costs to industrial customers. 
On November 4, 2005, Claire Geddes and Roger Ball filed statements opposing 
the Stipulation styled Affidavit and Public Testimony of Claire Geddes and Affidavit and Public 
Testimony of Roger J. Ball, respectively. On November 10, 2005, Questar Gas filed a 
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memorandum arguing these statements should not be admitted into evidence but noting Questar 
Gas does not object to their consideration as unsworn public witness statements. 
On November 17, 2005, Ms. Geddes and Mr. Ball ( hereinafter referred to as 
"Petitioners") jointly filed a Request to Intervene. This Request was accompanied by supporting 
form letters from 188 individuals identifying themselves as customers of Questar Gas. On 
November 22, 2005, Questar Gas filed its Opposition to Request to Intervene. That same day 
the Division also filed its Opposition to Request to Intervene. On November 29, 2005, the 
Committee filed its Response of the Utah Committee of Consumer Services to Request to 
Intervene, opposing Petitioners' Request. On December 13, 2005, Petitioners filed their 
Response to Opposition of Questar Gas Company, the Division of Public Utilities, and the 
Committee of Consumer Services to Request for Intervention. This Response was accompanied 
by 146 form letters of support from Questar Gas customers. On December 29, 2005, Petitioners 
filed Additional Statements in Support of Petitioners' Request to Intervene, bringing to 712 the 
number of customer form letters submitted on their behalf. Today, in conjunction with issuance 
of this Order, we issue our Order on Request to Intervene denying Petitioners' request. 
II. STIPULATION 
In the Stipulation, Questar Gas, the Division and the Committee agree Questar 
Gas is legally obligated to provide safe and reliable gas service to its customers and to: 
"maintain the heating value established in [its] . .. tariffs and [to] . .. regulate the chemical 
composition and specific gravity of the gas so as to maintain satisfactory combustion in 
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customers' appliances without repeated adjustment of the burners."1 The Parties further agree 
Questar Gas must currently manage the heat content of its gas supply within a range representing 
the overlap between its current and prior tariffed ranges in order to allow customers a transition 
period in which their appliances can be inspected and, if necessary, adjusted for the different 
composition of gas that will enter Questar Gas's system once that transition period is over. The 
Parties agree approval of the Stipulation is in the public interest, is consistent with just and 
reasonable rates, and will help ensure customer safety. The Parties further agree the operation of 
the C02 Removal Plant, with cost recovery as set forth in the Stipulation, is a reasonable means 
of accomplishing the necessary heat-content management. 
The Parties agree Questar Gas should be granted cost recovery for the 
management of its gas supplies as follows: 
A. Past Costs 
Contingent upon approval of the Stipulation and receipt by Questar Gas of the 
recovery agreed in the Stipulation, Questar Gas will not seek recovery of approximately $15 
million of gas-management costs incurred from January 1, 2003, through January 31, 2005. Due 
to the $29 million refund we ordered in 2004, Questar Gas has not recovered any C02 removal 
costs to date. Therefore, approval of the Stipulation would result in zero recovery for all C02 
removal costs incurred prior to January 31, 2005. 
1
 Utah Administrative Code R746-320-2.B.2 (2005). 
DOCKET NOS. 04-057-04, 04-057-11. 04-057-13, 04-057-09 & 05-057-01 
-6-
B. Cost Recovery Beginning February 1, 2005 
Rate recovery should be allowed for costs incurred after January 31, 2005. Non-
fuel costs are defined as all costs billed to Questar Gas from Questar Transportation (e.g., labor, 
overhead, materials, supplies, taxes other than income, power, return, depreciation, etc.), except 
fuel gas costs. Non-fuel costs incurred by Questar Gas to manage the heat content of gas 
supplies using the C02 Removal Plant, with available blending by Questar Pipeline, are 
approximately $4 million annually. Questar Gas should recover in rates 90% of the actual non-
fuel costs. The fuel needed to operate the C02 Removal Plant for Questar Gas will be provided 
in-kind by Questar Gas and will be passed through to customers on a dollar for dollar basis in the 
191 Account. Cost recovery will be for the longer of three years or the date in 2008 when 
Questar Gas's original ten-year transition period is scheduled to end, but in no event longer than 
operation of the C02 Removal Plant is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the transition 
period. Any extension of recovery will be contingent upon a Commission order to extend the 
deadline for the transition period. Parties will work together to present recommendations to the 
Commission about the ultimate duration of the transition period. Any proposed extension shall 
be presented to the Commission upon the same terms and conditions provided in the Stipulation. 
C. Fuel Gas Charges 
1. Questar Gas Fuel. Rate recovery for fuel gas used at the C02 Removal Plant to 
process gas for the Company will be the lesser of 360,000 Dth/year or the actual fuel gas used. 
2. Third Party Fuel. All fuel provided by third parties for processing at the C02 
Removal Plant will be used to keep fuel charges at or below 360,000 Dth/year. 
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D. Third-Party Revenues 
If Questar Transportation should contract with a third-party to process gas at the 
C02 Removal Plant, Questar Transportation will be allowed to keep 100% of the revenues 
credited to its account from such third-party processing, up to $400,000 annually. Revenue 
received by Questar Transportation for third-party processing at the C02 Removal Plant that 
exceeds $400,000 annually will be credited 50% to Questar Transportation and 50% to Questar 
Gas. Any such credit to Questar Gas will be recorded in the 191 Account as an offset to costs 
recoverable from customers. 
E. Additional Plant Facilities 
The costs of additional C02 Removal Plant or pipeline facilities required by 
Questar Gas or third parties to remove C02 from gas supplies will not be borne by Questar Gas's 
customers. 
F. HEAT Customers 
Questar Gas will take all commercially reasonable measures to inform low-
income customers who qualify for Home Energy Assistance Target ("HEAT") of the necessity to 
have their appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted for the change in gas supply. Questar 
Gas agrees to provide free furnace inspection and adjustment services and to waive additional 
rate recovery of its costs to provide such services, for up to 2,000 HEAT or other qualifying 
customers per year, in addition to the approximately 1,000 customers whose appliances are 
inspected and/or adjusted annually by the Utah Weatherization Program ("UWP'"), for each full 
year the Stipulation is in effect. 
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G. Allocation of Gas Management Costs 
The costs associated with the C02 Removal Plant as provided in the Stipulation 
will be allocated between sales and transportation customer classes using the non-gas revenue 
requirement identified in Questar Gas's Barrie L. McKay - Rate Design - Exhibit 1, lines 1 and 
2, in Docket No. 02-057-02. If the Commission, in a general rate case, changes the allocation of 
the final revenue requirement between the sales and transportation classes as provided in this 
Stipulation, the Parties agree that the new class allocation will be used. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Testimonial Evidence 
At the evidentiary hearing on the Stipulation on October 20, 2005, three expert 
witnesses, one each from the Company, the Division, and the Committee, testified in support of 
the Stipulation. No party or person appeared in opposition to the Stipulation. 
In its testimony, Questar Gas provided information regarding the process 
throughout the 1990s resulting in increasing volumes of coal bed methane on the Questar Gas 
system. The Company noted its intent throughout the process leading to the Stipulation was to 
follow a decision-making framework that it believed the Commission had promulgated in 
previous Orders relating to coal bed methane. 
The Company stated its objective was to reliably manage the heat content of the 
gas on its system within a customer-safe range at the least cost. Questar Gas noted the 
Commission's prior concern that Questar Gas may not have explored various alternatives and 
therefore set about through the technical conference process, in cooperation with the other 
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participants, to identify and evaluate fourteen different alternatives. Mindful of the 
Commission's prior concerns about affiliate interests, the Company engaged in a process 
intended to show that it recognized potential affiliate conflicts, minimized them, and placed the 
customers first in its decision-making. In working through this process, the Company responded 
to over 23 sets of data requests from the Division and Committee totaling over 400 questions and 
producing nearly 1,000 pages of studies, analysis and information comparing the various 
alternatives. 
Questar Gas noted that at the time of filing its application the Company supported 
what it believed to be the most cost-effective alternative identified during the technical 
conferences: precision blending with C02 Removal Plant backup for seven months of the year. 
This and a second alternative, year-round operation of the C02 Removal Plant, were identified in 
the technical conferences as the preferred alternatives having essentially identical costs over the 
anticipated transition period.2 During a period of four to five months after the filing of Questar 
Gas's direct testimony, the Parties engaged in vigorous, difficult and prolonged discussions in 
which the outside experts retained by the Division and Committee participated. As these 
discussions continued, Questar Gas realized that, due to the opportunity for revenue credits and 
receipt of fuel gas in-kind, the least cost approach would be to operate the C02 Removal Plant 
year-round with increased processing of gas for third parties. Therefore, the Company adopted 
this approach as its preferred alternative. Questar Gas communicated its position to the Division 
^The Commission notes that both of these alternatives would require customers to inspect their gas appliances and 
adjust them as necessary. Indeed, all but a few of the fourteen different alternatives analyzed by participants would 
have required such inspection and adjustment. 
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and Committee, and the Parties eventually settled on the Stipulation currently before the 
Commission. 
In written testimony filed with the Commission on April 15, 2005, and admitted 
into evidence without objection at hearing, Questar Gas states the changes in gas supplies 
entering its system were beyond both the Company's and its affiliates' control. Coal bed 
methane supplies represent a major new source of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain region. 
This gas is needed to replace declining supplies of more traditional gas. Although the region's 
pipeline system developed as a closed system, the Natural Gas Policy Act and the FERC's open 
access policies have transformed the entire interstate pipeline system, fully integrating the Rocky 
Mountain region into the national market. 
According to the Company, this interconnectedness means the sources of coal bed 
methane within the Rocky Mountain region are now served by the same interstate natural gas 
pipeline grid that delivers gas to the Questar Pipeline system. This grid is operated by multiple 
pipeline companies and is expanding to transport gas from new coal bed methane wells. As this 
expansion continues, the likelihood of additional coal bed methane reaching Questar Pipeline's 
system, and thus Questar Gas's system, is very high. Due to large proven reserves in the area, 
coal bed methane will likely provide a significant portion of the gas Questar Gas receives from 
both Kern River and Questar Pipeline in the future; without these reserves, the price Questar Gas 
pays for natural gas would increase significantly. 
Questar Gas notes the development of large quantities of coal bed methane 
geographically near Questar Gas's system has reduced the market price of all gas supplies 
purchased by the Company, saving customers approximately $30 million in purchased gas costs 
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from October 1998 through December 2004, and $12 million from January 2003 through 
December 2004. In addition, the availability of coal bed methane and the construction of 
Mainline 104, which resulted from the development of coal bed methane, allowed Questar Gas 
to realize additional savings of approximately $3 million per year. Furthermore, Questar Gas's 
decision not to go to the FERC in an attempt to keep coal bed methane off of Questar Pipeline 
has avoided costs of from $8 to $18 million per year that would have been required to process 
Company-owned gas to allow it to be transported on Questar Pipeline with new gas quality 
requirements. Because all of these identified savings continue into the future, it would be 
imprudent for Questar Gas not to plan to accept increased quantities of coal bed methane. 
Due to the safety concern raised by the change in the heat content of gas supplies 
being delivered to Questar Gas, the Company, in concert with the Division and the Committee, 
initially identified and analyzed fourteen alternatives to provide safe, reliable service to 
customers at the lowest reasonable cost. The Company's decision-making matrix evaluated each 
alternative on the basis of safety, reliability, implementation, cost, and potential affiliate 
conflicts. Precision blending of gas streams on Questar Pipeline's southern system with C02 
removal as a backup, year-round C02 removal, and precision blending with Kern River supplies 
as a backup were identified by technical conference participants as the three alternatives most 
worthy of additional consideration. However, reliance on Kern River backup was ultimately 
rejected due to the unavailability of no-notice service from Kern River, which would undermine 
the Company's ability to provide sufficient gas supplies to customers in the event precision 
blending failed. 
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The Company believes it addressed the Commission's affiliate relationship 
concerns by identifying the potential conflict raised by Questar Transportation's ownership and 
operation of the C02 Removal Plant and then mitigating any conflict by requiring that Questar 
Gas's costs under its contract with Questar Transportation be no higher than if it owned and 
operated the plant itself. Questar Gas noted these costs are in fact lower than if the plant were 
owned and operated by an unaffiliated third party, an assertion no other party controverted. 
In testimony at hearing, the Division stated its belief that the Stipulation 
represents a reasonable compromise among the Parties, produces just and reasonable rates, and 
equitably balances the interests of ratepayers and Questar Gas's shareholders. As such, the 
Division concludes the Stipulation is in the public interest. The Division believes Questar Gas 
has met the requirements outlined in the 2004 Order to identify its objective and alternatives to 
meet that objective, to define the method and criteria by which it would evaluate those 
alternatives, and to properly document the process by which it reached its ultimate decision. 
The Division believes gas supply safety is a legitimate concern and concurs with 
the Commission's prior conclusion that operation of the C02 Removal Plant protects Questar 
Gas customers. Based on its own extensive analysis and participation in the technical 
conferences, the Division concludes operation of the C02 Removal Plant with recovery of 
associated processing costs as specified in the Stipulation is warranted. 
In evaluating the process by which Questar Gas determined its preferred 
alternative, the Division noted that Questar Gas proposed its decision-matrix of conditions and 
criteria to compare and evaluate each alternative. This matrix was discussed and modified over 
the course of several of the technical conferences such that the Division believes it represents a 
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reasonable method of evaluation. Similarly, the Division conducted its own analysis of the 
alternatives and engaged an independent consultant to assist in that evaluation. The Division's 
analysis failed to identify any alternatives that provided the same level of safety and reliability at 
a lower cost than the C02 Removal Plant. This led the Division to conclude that operation of the 
C02 Removal Plant during the transition period was a reasonable way to meet the defined 
objectives of providing safe, reliable gas service to Questar Gas customers. Because of the 
safety concerns raised by the presence of coal bed methane in the system, and the analytical 
process undertaken by Questar Gas and all of the participants, the Division believes operation of 
the C02 Removal Plant in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation is a reasonable solution 
that achieves the objective of safe, reliable gas service and is in the public interest. 
At hearing, the Committee noted that its own retained expert concluded the 
presence of coal bed methane on Questar Gas's system results in an increased safety risk for 
customers using gas furnaces and water heaters. The Committee participated in the technical 
conferences and, along with its retained expert, in negotiations leading to the Stipulation. 
Following negotiations, the Committee held three meetings at which it deliberated on the 
Stipulation. At the conclusion of its own extensive analysis and deliberations, the Committee 
concluded the Stipulation results in a fair and reasonable compromise of all the issues in these 
dockets and is in the public interest. 
The Committee identified two factors that led it to conclude that circumstances 
had changed since the prior C02 dockets. First, coal bed methane now represents between 25 
and 40% of Questar Gas's overall market purchases, a significant increase from the less than 5% 
level existing at the time of the Committee's previous opposition to recovery of C02 removal 
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costs. This increasing reliance on coal bed methane to meet customer demand led the 
Committee to re-evaluate its prior view that coal bed methane is transported on the pipeline 
system for the benefit of Questar Pipeline with little corresponding benefit to Questar Gas's 
customers. Second, the Committee notes the compelling evidence submitted by the Company 
showing that a combination of blending and diverting coal bed methane into the Kern River 
system would not entirely eliminate the need to process the gas in order to protect Questar Gas 
customers. The Committee thus concluded that C02 removal is the most effective remedy 
available for dealing with this situation. 
The Committee believes two major features of the proposed settlement are 
important. The first is Questar Gas's abandonment of its claim to past and interim gas 
management costs in return for the ability to recover the majority of its future costs for the next 
three years. Because of continuing concerns about affiliate interests, the Committee believes 
only partial recovery of the Company's gas management costs is justified such that Questar Gas 
must give up all claims to recovery of past C02 processing costs in any settlement in the current 
dockets. Second, under the Stipulation's revenue sharing and in-kind fuel provisions relating to 
processing operations for third parties, customers will save an estimated $1.3 million annually. 
Excluding past and interim gas management costs and including various credits or benefits 
agreed in the Stipulation, the Committee calculates that 59% of the estimated costs associated 
with C02 removal from January 1, 2003 through 2008 will be borne by Questar Gas. 
The Committee also believes the rate allocation across customer classes provided 
in the Stipulation is reasonable. Under the Stipulation, residential and small commercial 
customers will bear approximately 95% of the gas management costs assigned to customers. 
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The Committee believes two factors justify charging the remaining 5% to large industrial and 
commercial customers. First, a significant number of residential and small commercial 
customers have already had their appliances inspected and adjusted as necessary but they, like 
the large industrial and commercial customers, will be required to pay a portion of the C02 
removal costs going forward. Second, given Questar's evidence indicating the availability of 
coal bed methane has had a dampening effect on gas prices in the local market, large and small 
customers alike have derived a benefit from the availability of coal bed methane and so should 
share in the cost of safely bringing that gas to market. 
In response to questions from the Commission, Questar Gas reaffirmed that 
portion of the Stipulation in which Parties agree the alternative of going to the FERC to keep 
coal bed methane off Questar Pipeline is not a viable alternative. The primary reason the Parties 
chose not to pursue this option was the risk that doing so might create additional costs for 
customers and the likelihood that any approach to FERC would not be successful. Questar Gas 
also confirmed its intent under Stipulation paragraph 9(f) to provide, within the terms of the 
Stipulation, any identified low-income customer, not just HEAT customers, free furnace 
inspection and adjustment services, and to provide such services with its current work force at no 
additional cost to ratepayers. 
The Company pointed out the Parties have agreed to procedures to be used to 
extend the terms of the Stipulation and stated its belief that, depending upon progress made 
during the next three years, the Stipulation may have to be extended two years to 2010, The 
Division noted the Green Sticker Accord provides for a series of surveys to permit the Parties to 
determine on an annual basis how many people have yet to have their appliances inspected and 
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to identify any trends in the inspection process. This will enable the Parties in the 2008 time 
frame to recommend to the Commission whether the transition period needs to be extended. 
The Company then addressed the Commission's questions regarding the rate 
allocation procedure outlined in paragraph 9(g) of the Stipulation. The Company provided an 
exhibit that showed how the Utah costs would be allocated between sales and transportation 
customers, noting transportation customers would bear less of the C02 removal costs under the 
proposed Stipulation than would have been the case under the prior C02 Stipulation. Questar 
Gas stated its aim to arrive at simply "two pots", a sales rate and a transportation rate, using the 
non-gas revenue requirement identified in the Questar Gas exhibit referenced in paragraph 9(g). 
The Committee noted there has probably been some migration from the transportation class to 
the sales class since the last rate case and believes the agreed cost allocation is a fair outcome 
given the Committee's aim of allocating the costs under the Stipulation to all customers. 
The Parties explained the benefits anticipated from third-party processing and 
acknowledged that capping the fuel usage to be recovered in rates by Questar Gas for processing 
was a benefit and that revenue from third-party processing was a potential benefit that made this 
alternative preferable to precision blending with C02 removal as a backup. The Division and 
Committee noted the rate recovery provided in the Stipulation was within the range of recovery 
those parties would have recommended had the matter gone to an adversarial proceeding. 
The Company also clarified that the presence of coal bed methane on the Questar 
Pipeline system has created a basis difference between Questar Pipeline's gas prices and those 
on the Kern River and Northwest Pipeline systems. It is this difference that accounts for the 
millions of dollars Questar Gas has identified as savings to Utah customers attributable to the 
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presence of coal bed methane on its system. The Committee noted it is not only this price 
component but also the fact that coal bed methane now represents an additional source of supply 
adjacent to the Wasatch Front that led the Committee to conclude that circumstances have 
changed since prior dockets. 
The Company stated that, if approved, the estimated costs of C02 removal under 
the Stipulation would increase a typical customer's bill by approximately 50 cents per month. 
All witnesses testified that customers were not being asked to pay twice to deal with the 
changing heat content of gas on Questar Gas's system, once through appliance adjustments and 
once through increased rates. Customers should have their appliances inspected and adjusted 
periodically anyway and customers had already received a benefit of lower cost gas through the 
development of coal bed methane near Questar Gas's distribution area. 
Questar Gas also confirmed that its inspectors are finding substantial safety issues 
during their inspections of customer appliances. The Company also noted the required 
inspection, and adjustment if necessary, is a small part of what Questar Gas already asks their 
customers to do; namely, to have their appliances inspected every year or every other year 
because that is when many safety issues are identified. 
B. The Technical Conferences 
As detailed in the Company's testimony, as well as in it's application filed 
January 31, 2005, and admitted into evidence without objection at hearing, Questar Gas, the 
Division, Committee, Commission staff and other interested persons engaged in a series of 
technical conferences intended to identify, evaluate, and select a preferred alternative to address 
the safety concerns caused by the presence of coal bed methane on the Questar Gas system. 
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The first technical conference focused on the changing heat content of gas on the 
Questar Gas system. The agenda included the following discussion items: (1) evolution of the 
changing heat content of gas on the Questar Gas system; (2) demonstration of unsafe appliance 
operation when non-interchangeable gas is burned; (3) set point; (4) safety standards; 
(5) changing FERC regulations; (6) cost recovery for management of heat content; and 
(7) participants' positions on the issues. 
During this technical conference, participants reviewed combustion principles; 
the impact on appliance performance of burning non-interchangeable gas; the approximate 
interchangeability ranges; the evolution of the interstate pipeline grid in the Rocky Mountain 
region and its ties to the national market; national pipeline heat-content specifications; Questar 
Pipeline efforts to deliver gas that meets the specifications of interconnecting pipelines and 
Questar Gas; natural gas producing basins and their respective gas compositions; historical basin 
heating values; Price, Utah-area coal-seam production; the Btu ranges of various types of natural 
gas; an explanation of the Wobbe Index and how it is used to determine gas interchangeability; a 
comparison of the composition of coal bed methane, Uintah Basin gas and Northern Gates gas; 
the interchangeable range for Questar Gas's transition from pre-1998 to post-1998 appliance set 
points; Btu ranges for producing basins serving Questar Pipeline; the historical Btu trends for 
Salt Lake City; the Btu delivery ranges for Questar Gas from 1995 to the present; the heat 
content of Kern River gas delivered to Questar Gas from 1999 to September 2004; and a 
comparison of Questar Gas's new Btu set points to 26 urban areas showing that Questar Gas's 
new set points were well within the set-point range for local distribution companies ("LDC") 
throughout the country while the old set point was significantly higher than the 26 other areas. 
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Questar Gas also provided a demonstration of natural gas appliance safety in 
Questar Gas's lab that showed dangerously elevated levels of carbon monoxide and unstable 
flame conditions resulting from appliance settings that are incompatible with the gas stream. 
Questar Gas then summarized its position regarding the presence of coal bed methane on its 
system as follows: (1) an appliance not properly adjusted for the heat content of natural gas 
supplied to it creates a safety hazard; (2) Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline constantly manage 
the heat content and gas composition of their natural gas supplies to provide safe, reliable gas 
supplies that meet the interchangeability requirement of the overlap between Questar Gas's old 
and new set points; (3) pursuant to FERC regulations issued since 1985, Rocky Mountain 
pipelines have adopted national interstate grid natural gas-quality specifications; (4) Questar 
Gas's two major pipeline suppliers, Questar Pipeline and Kern River, both deliver supplies of 
natural gas with a heat content that is aligned with the national market; and (5) natural gas 
markets beyond the Rocky Mountains have a major influence on natural gas composition and the 
physical flows of Rocky Mountain production. 
The technical conference concluded with a discussion of FERC's policy favoring 
competition that prohibits discrimination by a pipeline in favor of any customer, including 
affiliates; an overview of the FERC orders that over time have led to a more competitive open-
access environment on interstate pipelines; pipeline regulation pre-1985 when pipelines were not 
common carriers and typically provided bundled transportation and sales service; and a 
discussion of FERC Order 2004 that reiterated pipelines could not wield market power over gas 
markets and give undue preference to any customer, including the pipeline's affiliated LDC. 
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At the second technical conference, the topics for discussion included possible 
FERC resolution of issues related to Questar Pipeline's tariff and gas quality specifications, 
additional review of heat-content specifications, and a framework for analysis of alternatives for 
managing the heat content of natural gas delivered to the Company's customers. Questar Gas 
summarized the FERC's natural gas interchangeability docket and the Natural Gas Council's 
proposal to study gas quality and interchangeability. This discussion also addressed whether a 
proceeding at the FERC should be initiated to address natural gas heat-content issues on Questar 
Pipeline and if so, by whom. The Company's position was that: (1) there is little likelihood of a 
favorable outcome at the FERC; (2) there is a substantial risk of unintended adverse results, e.g. 
Company-owned production that may not meet Questar Pipeline's tariff specifications may be 
restricted unless processed at great expense to Questar Gas's customers; (3) any FERC action 
should be pursued against both Kern River and Questar Pipeline and the requested relief should 
be an assurance that gas delivered to Questar Gas meets its interim and prospective 
interchangeability ranges; and (4) a party other than Questar Gas should bring any FERC action 
in order to avoid potential affiliate-interest issues. The Company indicated that, despite its 
position, Questar Gas was willing to initiate a proceeding at the FERC to request that Questar 
Pipeline's tariff be changed or enforced in a manner to require that coal bed methane could not 
be transported on the pipeline, if the participants requested that it do so. 
The Company then described the process by which it proposed to determine the 
best alternative for managing the heat content of its gas supplies on a going-forward basis. This 
process was based on the criteria identified in the Commission's 2004 Order and included a 
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Decision-Making Matrix based on the Company's objective to manage gas supplies for safe and 
reliable gas service for customers at the lowest reasonable cost. 
The criteria to be used in evaluating the alternatives included: (1) safety, defined 
as ensuring that gas supplies delivered to customers will burn safely and efficiently; 
(2) reliability, defined as ensuring sufficient supplies and transport capacity are available to meet 
customer demand; (3) implementation, defined as factors that impact the ability to successfully 
implement the alternative; and (4) cost. Additionally, if an affiliate is involved, then the 
Company must recognize the potential affiliate conflict, minimize the conflict, prioritize 
customers' interests first, and demonstrate that there has been no undue influence. 
At the third technical conference, the topic of discussion was possible alternatives 
to address the changing heat content of natural gas. These alternatives included: (1) taking no 
action; (2) FERC action; (3) shutting in city gates; (4) appliance adjustment; (5) paying 
producers to shut in their gas supplies; (6) gross blending; (7) precision blending; (8) propane 
injection; (9) C02 removal using the existing C02 Removal Plant; (10) four alternatives 
involving service from Kern River; and (11) other (which was an invitation for any other 
alternatives from any of the other parties). The Company presented its analysis of each of these 
fourteen alternatives using the criteria outlined above. Included for each alternative was a 
physical and business description, a list of pros and cons, a risk matrix, capital-cost estimates, 
and first-year cost-of-service. 
The Company provided all participants a "Summary of Alternatives" handout that 
analyzed each alternative. Additionally, the Company included the first step in the affiliate-
conflict analysis for each alternative and explained that once the alternatives were narrowed, a 
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complete affiliate analysis would be conducted. The Company invited the input of any 
participant on these or any other alternatives. 
At the fourth technical conference, Questar Gas presented an overview of the 
Green Sticker Program and specifically addressed the responsibilities of the Company in 
connection with heat-content of gas and appliance adjustment, namely: (1) to maintain the heat-
content of gas within the Commission-approved range; (2) to educate customers about the 
approved range; and (3) to encourage customers to periodically have appliances inspected. The 
Rocky Mountain Gas Association ("RMGA") then provided a position statement explaining the 
mission of RMGA; its position on safety of natural gas appliances; and the role of heating 
contractors in assuring that appliances they install, inspect, or repair are adjusted to the heat-
content range specified in the LDC's tariff. Representatives from various municipal building 
inspectors; the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL"); the UWP; and 
individual heating, ventilation and air conditioning ("HVAC") contractors were in attendance. 
Some of them made statements regarding the issues discussed in the conference.3 
The topics for discussion at the fifth technical conference included the positions 
of participants on the alternatives previously outlined by Questar Gas, any other alternatives, the 
narrowing of alternatives, the process for refining the remaining alternatives, and a time line for 
'During the course of the technical conferences, a group was formed to study the Green Sticker Program. This 
group, which included the Company, the Division, the Committee, DOPL, the RMGA, the UWP, municipal building 
code inspectors, and individual HVAC contractors, eventually entered into the Green Sticker Accord. The Accord 
recognized that appliances not properly adjusted for the heat content of gas delivered to Questar Gas's system can 
pose a safety risk and that a transition period during which Questar Gas managed the heat content of its gas supplies 
(so that appliances set to either the prior or new heat-content ranges would operate safely) was necessary for 
customers to get their appliances checked and, if necessary, adjusted to the new range. The signers of the Accord 
agreed to work together to encourage customers to have their appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted by 
qualified heating contractors by the summer of 2008. 
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decision. The Commission asked all participants to provide input on narrowing the alternatives. 
The Division distributed three handouts entitled "Precision Blending Issues," "Need for C02 
Removal Plant," and "Deliveries at Indianola, Payson and Goshen." The Company presented its 
three preferred alternatives which, with some slight variation, were the three alternatives the 
participants agreed needed further analysis: (1) precision blending with the C02 Removal Plant 
as a back-up; (2) reliance on the C02 Removal Plant; and (3) precision blending with the Kern 
River backup using Feeder Line 85. No participant presented a different alternative. 
The sixth technical conference was held to provide a more thorough analysis of 
these three preferred alternatives. Questar Gas compared the three alternatives in greater detail 
using the safety, reliability and implementation criteria. The Company stated it would not 
support the precision blending with Kern River backup alternative because of the unavailability 
of intraday transportation service and gas supplies, as well as the cost risk of very high demand 
charges associated with securing gas supplies if they were available.4 
Questar Gas then presented an expanded cost analysis for the three preferred 
alternatives for various time frames ranging from 4 to 15 years. This analysis showed the costs 
of the C02 Removal Plant and precision blending with the C02 Removal Plant as a backup were 
approximately equal in the near term, but that precision blending with C02 removal as a backup 
had slightly lower costs over longer time periods. The cost of precision blending with Kern 
River gas supplies as a backup was significantly more expensive. 
Put another way, Questar Gas believed this alternative should be removed from further consideration because of its 
unreliable gas supply and cost risk. 
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The Company also presented a detailed affiliate analysis of the three preferred 
alternatives that identified potential affiliate conflict, explained how the possibility of a conflict 
could be minimized, showed how customers' interests would be prioritized first, and showed 
there would be no undue affiliate influence. 
C. Public Witness Testimony and Statements 
The final portion of the record in these dockets is the public witness testimony 
provided at hearing on October 20, 2005, and the two late-filed statements of Mr. Ball and Ms. 
Geddes filed on November 4, 2005. Two individuals, H. Sam Neslen and Roger J. Swenson, 
appeared at the public witness hearing providing sworn testimony. Mr. Neslen's testimony did 
not address the Stipulation, but rather addressed more general issues related to pricing of natural 
gas to producers of electricity. Mr. Swenson appeared on behalf of US Magnesium Corp ("US 
Mag"). Mr. Swenson testified that US Mag does not oppose the Stipulation, except for 
allocating a portion of the costs of the C02 Removal Plant to industrial customers. US Mag 
believes the costs of C02 removal should be borne by those customers whose appliances require 
adjustment due to the changes in the heat content of gas supplies delivered to them. Large 
industrial customers such as US Mag require no adjustment in order to safely burn coal bed 
methane. 
Mr. Ball's statement complains about the notice of hearing and the filing of the 
Stipulation. Mr. Ball provides background on his former employment as administrative 
secretary and director of the Committee and his view that the Committee has not vigorously and 
effectively represented consumers' interests in this proceeding. Mr. Ball also states that he does 
not believe the Division has fulfilled its duty to illuminate all aspects of this matter. 
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Mr. Ball argues the prudence of the C02 Removal Plant has not and can not be 
demonstrated on a going forward basis because construction and operation of the plant was not 
prudent in the first instance. He also challenges the agreement by Parties to the Stipulation that 
going to the FERC to prevent coal bed methane from entering Questar Gas's system is not 
viable. In addition, Mr. Ball argues the Stipulation does not adequately address: (1) the 
compensation due from Questar Pipeline to Questar Gas customers for money paid in prior years 
to support pipeline construction and operation; (2) the viability of using a second pipeline, 
already constructed by Questar Pipeline, to transport coal bed methane and thereby keep it off 
the Questar Gas system; and (3) the fact that approval of the tariff revision in Docket No. 98-
057-T02 may have been a mistake in so much as it has resulted in Questar Gas wanting 
customers to twice pay for costs caused by Questar Pipeline, once to process the coal bed 
methane and again to adjust their appliances. 
Mr. Ball requests his statement be admitted into evidence. He acknowledges his 
absence from the public witness hearing rendered him unavailable for cross-examination, but 
argues he was not present for the public witness hearing because he was not aware that any 
hearings had been scheduled until after hearing on the Stipulation. He also urges the 
Commission not to take administrative notice of, nor consider, the various documents produced 
and distributed at the technical conferences held in Docket No. 04-057-09, nor the direct 
testimony on behalf of Questar Gas, discovery questions and answers, or the opinions of the 
Division's and Committee's analysts produced in Docket No. 05-057-01. 
Mr. Ball argues the documents distributed during the technical conferences are 
not filed under the Commission's docket index, nor have they been readily available to the 
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public. In addition, he notes the comments of participants at those conferences were neither 
made under oath nor contemporaneously transcribed or recorded. He also notes that none of the 
discovery questions and answers exchanged between Parties to the Stipulation are available via 
the docket index on the Commission's website and that this discovery has thus far been opaque 
to members of the public. Finally, Mr. Ball argues that none of the Division's or Committee's 
staff or consultants, save two, appeared, were sworn, or were available for cross-examination 
during hearing on the Stipulation. 
Ms. Geddes also argues the prudence of the Questar Gas decision to construct and 
operate the C02 Removal Plant remains unproven. In addition, she challenges the terms of the 
Stipulation that would provide 90% recovery of the plant's fixed operation costs while also 
awarding Questar Transportation the first $400,000 in profits received annually from third-party 
contracts. 
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
Settlement of matters before the Commission is encouraged at any stage of 
proceedings.5 The Commission may approve a stipulation or settlement after considering the 
interests of the public and other affected persons if it finds the stipulation or settlement in the 
public interest.6 In reviewing a stipulation, the Commission may also consider whether it was 
the result of good faith arms-length negotiations.7 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1. See also Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 613-
14 (Utah 1983). 
6
 Id. 
7
 Utah Dept. of Admin. Services, 658 P.2d at 614, n.24. 
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In conducting a prudence review, we must analyze the decision-making process in 
light of the circumstances and the facts that the utility knew or reasonably should have known at 
the time of the decision.8 We do not substitute our judgment in hindsight for the reasonable 
decisions made by management,9 nor do we determine that a reasonable decision is imprudent 
merely because we conclude that a better, reasonable alternative was available for consideration 
or action. Our 2004 Order specifically addressed this issue in the context of Questar Gas's prior 
decision to remove C02 from coal bed methane: 
One would expect a prudent gas distribution company faced 
with the risk of [a] safety issue of the magnitude faced by Questar's 
distribution customers to clearly identify its objective; to identify 
alternatives to meet the objective, to define the method and criteria 
by which it would evaluate the alternatives and to record or document 
the process in support of the ultimate decision.. .. 
In making this determination, we believe that ratepayers are 
best served by reserving wide latitude to utilities' managerial 
experience and technical expertise. We therefore do not promulgate 
a checklist of actions which, if followed, might inoculate a utility's 
action against a finding of imprudence. Instead, we simply require 
substantial evidence that the utility's decision-making process, under 
the totality of the circumstances, was not the product of a conscious 
or unconscious favoring of affiliate over ratepayer interests. The 
utility's and its customers' interests must be paramount and affiliate 
interests subordinate.10 
These criteria were recently codified with the addition of subsection (4) to Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-4. This subsection specifically provides that, in considering prudence, the 
In the Matter of the Application of Mountain Fuel Supply to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah, Docket 
Nos. 91-057-11 and 91-057-17 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
9
 Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 296 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1931). 
10
 2004 Order at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). 
DOCKET NOS. 04-057-04. 04-057-11, 04-057-13. 04-057-09 & 05-057-01 
-28-
Commission shall "focus on the reasonableness of the expense .. .judged as of the time the 
action was taken"11 and shall "determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility 
knew or reasonably should have known at the time of the action, would reasonably have incurred 
all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or some other prudent action".12 
We therefore assess the prudence of Questar Gas's actions going forward from 
February 1, 200513 by asking whether an unaffiliated utility acting in the best interests of its 
customers, in light of the circumstances and possessing the same knowledge which Questar Gas 
had or should have had at the time, could reasonably have responded the way Questar Gas has 
responded in selecting operation of the C02 Removal Plant as the best alternative to manage the 
changing heat content of its gas supplies in light of current and anticipated conditions. 
Where potential exists for conflict with affiliate interests, we do not presume 
affiliate transactions to be reasonable.14 We view customers' interests as paramount and require 
in all instances that those interests not be subordinated to the interests of affiliates.15 We are 
guided in this matter by our October 20, 2004, Order on Request for Reconsideration and 
Clarification in Docket Nos. 03-057-05, 01-057-14, 99-057-20, and 99-057-12 : 
11
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4)(a)(ii). 
12
 See id. at § 54-4-4(4)(a)(iii). 
1
 We need not assess the prudence of the Company's actions prior to February 1, 2005 since, pursuant to the 
Stipulation, the Company has agreed to forego request of any cost recovery prior to this date. 
14US West Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 901 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1995). 
15
 E.g., In the Matter of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Docket 
No. 91-057-09 (Sept. 26, 1994), p. 3. 
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We anticipate where such conflicts can arise and utility seeks 
recovery of costs affected with such potential conflicts, the utility 
understands its burdens of proof and persuasion and takes steps 
(which enable it to present evidence of its actions) showing how 
these conflicts were recognized, were minimized and how the utility 
prioritized its customers' interests and was not unduly influenced by 
its affiliate interests in the actions it took.16 
V. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Public Witness Procedural Challenges 
As an initial matter, we consider whether to regard the statements submitted by 
Ms. Geddes and Mr. Ball as sworn or unsworn testimony, examine the adequacy of our notice of 
the hearings on the Stipulation, and address our decisions to take notice of information presented 
at the technical conferences and to admit Questar Gas's pre-filed testimony, as well as the 
information contained in its application. 
Ms. Geddes and Mr. Ball are not parties in any of the present dockets. However, 
Ms. Geddes has previously participated in public witness hearings before the Commission. In 
addition, until March of this year, Mr. Ball regularly participated, as long-time Committee 
administrative secretary and staff director, in Commission proceedings and is familiar with the 
Commission's procedures. Despite their familiarity with Commission proceedings generally, 
and Mr. Ball's familiarity with this proceeding in particular, neither of these individuals sought 
intervention or discovery prior to the hearing on the Stipulation, nor did they file testimony or 
otherwise participate as a party. As noted above, we have denied their joint Request to Intervene 
which was filed almost a month after the hearing on the Stipulation and nearly two weeks after 
16
 Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification. Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-
05 (Oct. 20, 2004) at 3. 
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submission of their late-filed public witness statements. They are not parties to these dockets 
and appear solely in the role of public witnesses. 
Pursuant to Commission Rule 746-100-10.F.1, public witness testimony may be 
sworn or unsworn. If sworn, the testimony is subject to cross-examination and the Commission 
may make findings based upon the testimony. If unsworn, cross-examination is not permitted 
and no finding may be based on the testimony. The statements of Ms. Geddes and Mr. Ball were 
not presented at hearing and were not subject to cross-examination. We therefore conclude these 
statements are properly viewed as unsworn public witness statements and we treat them 
accordingly.17 
We issued notice of these hearings on October 11, 2005, nine days prior to the 
hearings. No minimum notice period is set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act. Rule 
R746-100-10.A specifies the Commission will give at least five days notice but may decide upon 
a shorter period. Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also states not less than five 
days notice should be given unless otherwise ordered. Notice of the hearings on the Stipulation 
clearly complied with these requirements. 
Furthermore, the hearing in this case was on a settlement proposed by all of the 
parties in this proceeding. Before approving a settlement, we are required to notify all parties to 
a proceeding of the settlement and to afford them an opportunity to provide evidence or 
argument in opposition to it. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-l(3)(c) and (e)(ii)(C). Because the 
We note, however, that even if we were to admit these statements into evidence as sworn testimony, such 
testimony would prove unpersuasive in light of the overwhelming weight of competing evidence in the record. 
Therefore, whether these statements are treated as sworn testimony or unsworn opinion is in fact immaterial to our 
findings and conclusions contained herein. 
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Stipulation was between all parties, the Commission was not even required to give notice. 
Nonetheless, public notice was given. 
Mr. Ball complains it is unlikely customers would have known of the public 
witness hearing, stating that although the Commission's docket index indicates that the notice of 
hearing was issued on October 11, 2005, the index also indicates that the Stipulation was not 
filed, and therefore not available for public review, until October 13, 2005. In fact, the 
Commission's file shows that the Stipulation was filed at 11:06 a.m. on October 11, 2005. If 
Mr. Ball had contacted the Commission at anytime after the notice of hearing was issued at 1:52 
p.m. on October 11, 2005, the Commission would have provided him with a copy of the 
Stipulation. Even if the Stipulation was not available on the Commission website until October 
13, 2005, this was nonetheless seven days in advance of the hearing in full compliance with any 
notice requirement in the Administrative Procedures Act, the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure Governing Formal Hearings, or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, U.C.A. § 52-4-1 et seq. 
(the "Act"), requires posting of written public notice and notice to the press and media 
representatives. The Commission complied with these requirements; Mr. Ball submits no 
evidence to the contrary. The Act also encourages electronic notification, a practice which the 
Commission routinely follows, and which it followed in this case, via an email list subscription 
service. As prior participants in Commission proceedings, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes are 
undoubtedly aware of this service, yet both failed to avail themselves of its benefits in these 
dockets. We therefore conclude notice was adequate and proper in all respects. 
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Mr. Ball's challenge also lacks merit with regard to the Commission's decision to 
take notice of the information developed at the various technical conferences and to admit the 
application and written testimony filed by Questar Gas. Each technical conference held in 
Docket No. 04-057-09 was duly noticed and open to the public. Extensive testimony admitted 
into the record documents the agenda, presentations, and discussion undertaken at each technical 
conference. Copies of these presentations were provided as attachments to the Questar Gas 
application and have been a matter of public record available for review and comment since the 
application's filing on January 31, 2005. The specific agenda and content of each technical 
conference was spelled out in great detail within the body of the application. Despite the 
passage of nearly nine months between the application's filing and hearing on the Stipulation, no 
party or person challenged the veracity of the application's statement of facts regarding the 
conduct and content of the technical conferences, nor did any party challenge the authenticity or 
substantive content of the attachments to the application. Under these circumstances, and absent 
objection from any party to these proceedings, it is appropriate that we take administrative notice 
of this information.18 
Finally, Mr. Ball argues the pre-filed testimony admitted into evidence at the 
request of the Parties was not subject to cross-examination. He is incorrect. This testimony was 
admitted only after all parties were given the opportunity in open hearing to object to its 
admission, as is routine Commission practice. No one objected and no one chose to conduct any 
l8While we take such notice, we base our findings and conclusions contained herein upon a thorough examination of 
the entire evidentiary record in these dockets and conclude that, absent any reliance on the noticed material, the 
overwhelming weight of evidence admitted in these proceedings, including testimony on the Stipulation, pre-filed 
testimony, and the facts asserted in the application, support both our conclusion that Questar Gas has acted prudently 
in evaluating and choosing among the available alternatives and our approval of the Stipulation. 
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cross-examination regarding this testimony. Mr. Ball also ignores the fact that the Commission 
asked a number of questions of the Parties at hearing regarding the substance of this testimony. 
This testimony is signed and sworn and was properly admitted. 
B. Prudence of Decision to Use C02 Removal Plant Operation 
In considering the prudence of Questar Gas's decision to use the C02 Removal 
Plant to manage the heat content of its gas supplies since February 1, 2005, we must consider the 
facts and conditions as they existed at that time. Our prior finding that the Company failed to 
demonstrate prudence in its decision to contract for construction and operation of the C02 
Removal Plant during the 1997 and 1998 time frame is relevant only to the extent the same 
conditions present in 1997 and 1998 continue to be present. Based on the evidence presented in 
these dockets, it is apparent these conditions have changed. 
We were critical in our 2004 Order of the lack of documentation in the 
Company's decision-making process in 1997 and 1998. We determined that the introduction of 
coal bed methane into the Company's system could have been the result of Questar Pipeline 
taking advantage of a business opportunity to transport the gas and that the Company's analysis 
of possible solutions appeared to be influenced by affiliate considerations. We were troubled by 
the fact that the contract for operation of the C02 Removal Plant was given to an unregulated 
affiliate of Questar Gas. Finally, we concluded that the Company should have anticipated the 
safety issue earlier than it did, which may have allowed more time to address the issue and 
pursue other alternatives, such as keeping coal bed methane off of Questar Pipeline's system 
through action by Questar Gas at the FERC. 
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The record in these dockets, on the other hand, indicates that the Company's 
customers have benefitted from the shipment of coal bed methane by Questar Pipeline and that 
coal bed methane has become an important component of Questar Gas's gas supplies. Since 
2002, coal bed methane has accounted for a significant portion (up to 40 percent) of the 
Company's annual gas supply purchases, compared to less than 5 percent only a few years 
earlier. 
This increasing presence of coal bed methane on the Questar Pipeline system 
results from the expansion of the interstate natural gas pipeline grid to transport new coal bed 
methane from wells throughout the Rocky Mountain region. As this expansion continues, it is 
very likely that additional coal bed methane will enter Questar Pipeline's system, and thus 
Questar Gas's system. Therefore, while we previously questioned the initial presence of coal 
bed methane on the Questar Pipeline system, such questioning is no longer relevant to today's 
circumstances. The amount of coal bed methane on the interstate pipeline system is increasing 
and represents an increasingly important source of gas to meet growing customer demand as 
traditional gas supplies decline. 
The record also establishes that having the C02 Removal Plant owned and 
operated by Questar Transportation does not result in any prejudice to Questar Gas or its 
customers. The costs incurred by Questar Gas are the same as if the plant were owned and 
operated by Questar Gas. The provisions in the Stipulation that permit recovery of only 90% of 
non-fuel costs, limit fuel costs to 360,000 Dth/year, require the sharing of third-party processing 
revenues in excess of $400,000 per year, and prohibit recovery of costs for additional C02 
Removal plant facilities assure that the interests of Questar Gas's customers are given priority in 
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this arrangement. In addition, Questar Gas has agreed to forego request of any recovery of gas 
management costs incurred prior to February 1, 2005 (the $29 million previously refunded by 
order of the Commission and the $15 million foregone for the period January 1, 2003 through 
January 31, 2005). 
In addition, no Party believes it would be reasonable to pursue actions at the 
FERC to attempt to keep coal bed methane off of Questar Pipeline. Indeed, it appears that 
pursuing such actions would be detrimental to Questar Gas customers. Therefore, the fact that 
Questar Gas did not pursue these potential actions prior to 1999, which gave rise to concerns 
about affiliate conflicts in prior proceedings, does not give rise to the same concerns in the 
current context. 
Following issuance of our 2004 Order, Questar Gas, the Division, and the 
Committee undertook a comprehensive investigation and analysis of the benefits and safety 
concerns associated with the increasing volumes of coal bed methane on Questar Gas's system 
and of the alternatives available to address those concerns. The series of six technical 
conferences held in Docket No. 04-057-09 were a primary tool for the exchange of information 
and ideas among participants, resulting in detailed analysis on a wide range of subjects. The first 
five of these conferences provided a forum for discussion of such topics as the evolution of the 
changing heat content of gas on the Questar Gas system, demonstration of unsafe appliance 
operation when non-interchangeable gas is burned, set point, safety standards, changing FERC 
regulations, cost recovery for management of heat content, possible FERC resolution of issues 
related to Questar Pipeline's tariff and gas quality specifications, additional review of heat-
content specifications, a framework for analysis of alternatives for managing the heat content of 
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natural gas delivered to the Company's customers, analysis and discussion of fourteen such 
alternatives, the Green Sticker Program, the positions of participants concerning the alternatives 
previously discussed, the process for refining the remaining alternatives, and a time line for 
decision. Throughout this process, the participants were encouraged to analyze each alternative 
and to propose other potentially viable alternatives. 
At the fifth technical conference, Questar Gas presented its three preferred 
alternatives. No party presented a different alternative. The sixth technical conference provided 
a more thorough analysis of the three preferred alternatives, employing safety, reliability and 
implementation criteria as a basis for comparison. The participants evaluated the estimated cost 
for each of the preferred alternatives over various time frames ranging from 4 to 15 years and 
also considered the potential for affiliate conflicts and methods for mitigating any such conflicts. 
This analysis showed that the costs of the C02 Removal Plant alternative or the precision 
blending with the C02 Removal Plant as a backup alternative were approximately equal in the 
near term, but that precision blending with C02 removal as a backup had slightly lower costs 
over longer time periods. It also showed that the cost of precision blending with Kern River gas 
supplies as a backup were significantly more expensive. 
In addition to these technical conferences, the Division and Committee submitted 
twenty-three sets of data requests totaling over 400 questions and producing nearly one thousand 
pages of studies, analysis, and information related to evaluation of the alternatives presented. 
The extensive analysis represented by these technical conferences and discovery 
activities resulted in comprehensive and detailed oral and written testimony by Company, 
Division, and Committee witnesses. Key within this testimony are the Parties' conclusions that 
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Utah customers have benefitted financially from the presence of coal bed methane on the 
Questar Gas system, that approaching FERC to attempt to preclude coal bed methane from the 
Questar Gas system would not be a viable alternative, and that the affiliate interests which so 
concerned us in prior dockets have been subordinated to the interests of Questar Gas customers. 
While any activity involving a Questar Gas affiliate raises legitimate affiliate interest concerns, it 
is clear that it is the continuing integration of the nation's natural gas pipeline system, not 
affiliate interests, that is driving the increasing volumes of coal bed methane on the Questar 
Pipeline and Questar Gas systems. It is equally clear that safety, efficiency, and cost 
considerations, not affiliate interests, led Parties to conclude that operation of the C02 Removal 
Plant is the preferred course of action during the stipulated transition period. 
The Company conducted a transparent decision-making process open to the 
public and subject to scrutiny by any interested person. Throughout the technical conference 
process, Questar Gas repeatedly sought input from other parties on how to best address the 
issues presented by the presence of coal bed methane going forward. No participant challenged 
the conclusions Questar Gas presented as being prudent and in the best interest of customers, and 
no participant suggested any alternative as more preferable. 
Questar Gas clearly identified its objective to address the safety issue posed by 
the presence of coal bed methane on its system. The Company identified alternatives to meet 
this objective, employed reasonable methods and criteria in evaluating the alternatives, and 
adequately recorded and documented its evaluation. The Company carefully considered 
potential conflicts between affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those of its 
affiliates. This process satisfies the concerns outlined in our 2004 Order. We therefore conclude 
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that a reasonable, unaffiliated utility, knowing what Questar Gas knew or reasonably should 
have known, could reasonably have acted the way Questar Gas has acted in choosing to use the 
C02 Removal Plant since February 2005 and thereafter. 
Coal bed methane is now an important part of the gas supply purchased by 
Questar Gas for its customers. However, the use of this gas creates a significant safety risk for 
customers who have not adjusted their appliances to properly burn this gas. Providing a 
transition period for customers to have their appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted to 
the range now specified in Questar Gas's tariff is reasonable both because of the uncontested 
safety concerns and because customers need additional time to complete necessary inspections 
and adjustments. Given the extensive investigation and analysis undertaken by Questar Gas, the 
Division and the Committee to identify and compare alternatives for dealing with this risk, we 
find that operation of the C02 Removal Plant in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation 
provides a reasonable, reliable, cost-effective solution during the necessary transition period. 
Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this Order, we conclude 
that Questar Gas's use of the C02 Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 to manage the 
heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial recovery of costs provided in the 
Stipulation is reasonable and in the public interest. 
C. Cost Allocation in Accordance with the Stipulation 
Paragraph 9(g) of the Stipulation provides for a cost allocation between sales and 
transportation customer classes consistent with the general allocation of non-gas revenue 
requirement approved in Questar Gas's most recent general rate case, Docket No. 02-057-02. 
This allocation will be adjusted in the future consistent with adjustments in future Questar Gas 
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general rate cases. We find that the allocation of the cost of CO? removal among all customer 
classes, including the allocation of some costs to industrial customers, is reasonable. All 
customers have benefitted from the development and availability of coal bed methane near 
Questar Gas's distribution area and should therefore share in the cost of ensuring this gas is safe 
for use by all customers. 
However, we disagree with Questar Gas's stated conclusion that the Stipulation's 
cost allocation procedure produces only two rates, one each for sales and transportation 
customers in the aggregate. This approach would charge all sales customers an identical rate for 
C02 removal costs, regardless of their relative responsibility in driving those costs. We find a 
more reasonable approach, consistent with the terms of paragraph 9(g), is to employ the cost 
allocations in the referenced exhibit to calculate a schedule-specific gas management cost 
recovery rate for each listed customer schedule based on anticipated volumes used within each 
schedule. To accomplish this, we employ the rate calculated for schedule Fl as a proxy for 
schedules F3 and F4 until such time as a new cost of service study has been completed. This 
approach is consistent with our oft-stated goal of developing and refining cost-based rates to the 
greatest extent possible. Viewed in this light, we find that the level of rate recovery provided in 
the Stipulation for the Company's gas management activities is just and reasonable. 
D. Approval of the Stipulation 
The Parties to the Stipulation represent the interests of Questar Gas, the public 
interest generally, and the specific interests of residential, small commercial, and agricultural 
customers. The Division and Committee were assisted in their analyses not only by their staffs, 
but by separate, retained consultants. The Parties were initially deeply divided in their views, as 
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demonstrated by the prior proceedings on this issue. Nonetheless, they were able to reach 
agreement on the Stipulation following extensive discovery, technical conferences, and arms-
length negotiations. Large customers were represented at public hearing and indicated support 
for the Stipulation except for the very limited cost allocation concern addressed supra. We 
therefore find the interests of all Questar Gas customers were adequately represented in these 
proceedings and conclude the Stipulation fosters the policy of encouraging settlement of issues 
before the Commission. 
It is important to bear in mind that we are not being asked to approve rate 
recovery of all gas management costs incurred by Questar Gas since January 2003. As part of 
the compromise reached in the Stipulation, Questar Gas has agreed to forego recovery of such 
costs amounting to approximately $15 million for the period January 1, 2003 through January 
31, 2005. In fact, Questar Gas will not recover any gas management operations costs incurred 
prior to February 1, 2005. Thereafter, the Company will recover only 90 percent of actual non-
fuel costs, its fuel costs will be limited to 360,000 Dths per year, and customers will receive an 
offset against these costs of 50 percent of any revenues Questar Transportation receives for 
providing processing to third parties in excess of $400,000 per year. This opportunity for third-
party revenue credits, coupled with the use of third-party fuel gas, makes operation of the C02 
Removal Plant the least-cost alternative going forward. Customers are also protected from 
incurring any costs for additions to the C02 Removal Plant related to third-party processing, and 
the Company will assist low-income customers to have their appliances inspected and adjusted. 
We therefore conclude that the rates resulting from the Stipulation are just and 
reasonable and that approval of the Stipulation is in the public interest. However, as we have 
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indicated in previous cases, said approval is not intended to alter any existing Commission 
policy nor to establish any precedent by the Commission. 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing information, and for good cause appearing, 
the Commission enters the following 
VI. ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that: 
1. The Gas Management Cost Stipulation is approved. 
2. Cost allocation to determine gas management cost recovery rates shall be 
conducted on a schedule-specific basis as indicated supra. 
3. Questar Gas Company shall file appropriate tariff revisions based upon the 
Stipulation and this Order. The Division shall review the tariff revisions for compliance with the 
terms of the Stipulation and this Order. 
This Report and Order constitutes final agency action in these dockets. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §§ 63-46b-12 and 54-7-15, agency review or rehearing of this order 
may be obtained by filing a request for review or rehearing with the Commission within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order. Responses to a request for agency review or rehearing must be 
filed within 15 days of the filing of the request for review or rehearing. If the Commission fails 
to grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days after the filing of a request for review or 
rehearing, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the Commission's final agency action may be 
obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court within 30 days after final 
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agency action. Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 63-46b-14, 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of January, 2006. 
1st Ric Campbell, Chairman 
I si Ted Boyer, Commissioner 
Is/ Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
G#47054 Docket No. 04-057-04 
G#47119 Docket No. 04-057-11 
G#47120 Docket No. 04-057-13 
G#47121 Docket No. 04-057-09 
G#47122 Docket No. 05-057-01 
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APPENDIX: GAS MANAGEMENT COST STIPULATION 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Application of Questar Gas Company to 
Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah 
Application of Questar Gas Company ] 
to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service 
in Utah 
Application of Questar Gas Company ] 
for a Continuation of Previously 
Authorized Rates and Charges Pursuant to its ' 
Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause 
In the Matter of the Investigation ] 
of Questar Gas Company's Gas Quality 
Application of Questar Gas Company for ] 
Recovery of Gas Management Costs in its 
191 Gas Cost Balancing Account ] 
) Docket No. 04-057-04 
) Docket No. 04-057-11 
) Docket No. 04-057-13 
) Docket No. 04-057-09 
) Docket No. 05-057-01 
) GAS MANAGEMENT 
COST STIPULATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1 (2000) and Utah Administrative Code R746-100-
10.F.5 (2005), Questar Gas Company (Questar Gas), the Division of Public Utilities (Division), and 
the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) (collectively, Parties) submit this Stipulation in 
final resolution and settlement of Questar Gas' application for rate recovery of certain costs incurred 
in managing the heat content of its gas supplies. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
1. On August 30,2004, the Commission issued its Order in Docket Nos. 98-057-12,99-
057-20, 01-057-14, and 03-057-05 implementing a Utah Supreme Court decision that reversed a 
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Commission order approving a prior stipulation between Questar Gas and the Division that provided 
Questar Gas a portion of the recovery of C02-removal costs incurred in managing the heat content 
of its gas supplies from June 1999 to May 31, 2004. ' On September 16, 2004, Questar Gas filed a 
petition for reconsideration or clarification of certain issues related to the Commission's Order, 
including clarification of the time period over which Questar Gas could pursue recovery of gas heat-
content management costs in other or future proceedings. The Commission clarified in its Order 
on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification that: 
The Order addressed only Questar's failure to substantiate 
approval of the C02 Stipulation in these proceedings and our 
necessary rejection of the Stipulation, which would have permitted 
recovery of some processing costs through May of 2004. Our 
reference to the May 2004 end date was dictated by the Stipulation's 
terms and was not intended to have any other preclusive effect on 
recovery by Questar. In regards to Questar's requests for 
clarification and reconsideration, we state that our Order does not 
preclude Questar from seeking recovery of C02 processing costs in 
other dockets. ... We will need to wait for Questar to make whatever 
arguments and present whatever evidence it deems appropriate in 
seeking recovery of these costs, whether incurred pre- or post-May 
2004, in whatever dockets Questar may raise the issue.2 
2. On September 8,2004, the Commission opened Docket No. 04-057-09, In the Matter 
of the Investigation of Questar Gas Company's Gas Quality, "to set dates for technical conferences 
to discuss the long-term solution to Questar Gas Company's gas quality."3 A series of six formal 
technical conferences were subsequently held during the months of October 2004 through January 
1
 Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Comm 'n, 2003 UT 29, 75 P.3d 481, reversing in part, Report 
and Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company for a General Increase in Rates and Charges, 
Docket No. 99-057-20 (Utah PSC Aug. 11, 2000). 
2
 Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-
05 (Oct. 20, 2004) at 4-5. 
3
 See Notice of Scheduling Conference, In the Matter of Investigation of Questar Gas Company's Gas Quality, 
Docket No. 04-057-09 (Sept. 8, 2004). 
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2005 that were attended by the Commission and Commission staff and representatives from the 
Company, the Division, the Committee, and other interested parties. The topics of these conferences 
included: (1) the changing heat content of gas on the Questar Gas system; (2) the potential for 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) resolution of issues related to Questar Pipeline's 
tariff and gas quality specifications; (3) possible alternatives to address the changing heat content 
of natural gas; (4) the Green Sticker Program; (5) parties' positions on possible alternatives; and 
(6) an in-depth overview of the three preferred alternatives for managing heat content. 
3. On January 31, 2005, Questar Gas applied to the Commission for inclusion of its 
costs to manage the heat content of gas required to assure safe gas supplies for its customers in its 
191 Gas Balancing Account (191 Account) on a going-forward basis. However, Questar Gas 
reserved the right to seek cost recovery for its gas heat-content management costs back to the 
earliest date permitted by law. This application was assigned Docket No. 05-057-01. 
4. On March 1, 2005, the Commission conducted a scheduling conference at which 
Questar Gas, the Division, the Committee, intervenors and interested persons discussed scheduling 
issues in the above dockets, and determined filing and hearing dates for Commission consideration 
of the issues. The Commission subsequently issued a Scheduling Order in these dockets. 
5. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Questar Gas filed its direct testimony on April 15, 
2005. The testimony filed by the Company to support its request for cost recovery included 
testimony from: (1) Charles Benson, a mechanical engineer specializing in combustion theory, and 
Larry Conti, Questar Gas, General Manager of Operations and Gas Control, who explained that there 
is a safety concern with the change in the gas supplies; (2) Mr. Conti and Barrie McKay, Questar 
Gas, Manager, State Regulatory Affairs, who explained the various alternatives to manage Questar 
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Gas' gas supply and the rationale for selecting various alternatives to address gas quality needs; 
(3) Mr. Conti and Bob Lamarre, a petroleum and exploration geologist, who explained that the 
evolution and changes in gas supplies were beyond both the Company's and its affiliates' control 
and that coal-bed methane supplies were a proven new source of available natural gas; (4) Mr. Conti 
and Mr. McKay, who explained that going to the FERC to prevent coal-bed methane from coming 
on Questar Gas' system is an action that all parties agree is not viable; and (5) Al J. Walker, Questar 
Gas, Manager Gas Supply, and Robert Reid, Ph.D, an economist, who explained that the 
development of large quantities of coal-bed methane geographically near Questar Gas' system has, 
in fact, saved customers millions of dollars.4 
6. In response to Questar Gas' January 31, 2005 application, the Division and the 
Committee began the process of inquiry and clarification to determine whether they would support 
or oppose Questar Gas' renewed effort to obtain rate recovery of costs related to the Company's 
management of its gas supplies. To that end, the Division and Committee retained separate outside 
consultants to review the Company's claims that the decisions resulting in the costs at issue were 
prudent and incurred in response to a safety risk to customers. 
7. Subsequent to the filing of the Company's direct testimony, numerous technical 
meetings were held with Company, Division and Committee representatives and their consultants 
to further review and discuss concerns raised by the Committee and Division regarding, among other 
things, recent changes to the configuration of Questar Pipeline's southern system, additional 
alternatives, conflicting affiliate interests, and the prudence and timeliness of Company management 
4
 The Parties request that the Commission take administrative notice of the information presented in the technical 
conferences in Docket No. 04-057-09 and admit and incorporate the facts asserted in Questar Gas' application and 
written testimony filed in these dockets into the record in support of this Stipulation. 
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decisions. As those discussions progressed into settlement negotiations between the Company, the 
Division and the Committee, the Company advised the Division and Committee it had determined 
that, with physical modifications to the C02 Removal Plant and operational cooperation from third 
parties, the C02 Removal Plant could provide processing to third parties on an increased basis over 
what had occurred in the past. The potential for increased third party processing results in the 
possibility of lower processing costs to Questar Gas' customers. Operating the plant year round and 
providing processing service to third parties, accordingly, became the preferred alternative because 
of potential benefits to the utility's customers stemming from revenue sharing and fuel cost savings. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF STIPULATION 
8. The Parties agree that Questar Gas is legally obligated to provide safe and reliable 
gas service to its customers and to: "maintain the heating value established in [its]... tariffs and [to] 
... regulate the chemical composition and specific gravity of the gas so as to maintain satisfactory 
combustion in customers' appliances without repeated adjustment of the burners."5 The Parties 
further agree that Questar Gas must currently manage its gas supply within a narrower range than 
provided in its Utah Tariff to allow customers a transition period in which their appliances can be 
inspected and, if necessary adjusted for the different composition of gas that Questar Gas will 
manage once that transition period is over. Following the extensive analysis, review and discussions 
that were described above, and without waiver or acceptance of the claims, testimony or objections 
of any Party, the Company, Division, and Committee have agreed to compromise and settle their 
differences with respect to the Company's application for rate recovery in these proceedings and 
enter into this Stipulation. The Parties agree that the entry of this Stipulation is in the public interest, 
5
 Utah Administrative Code R746-320-2.B.2 (2005) 
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is consistent with just and reasonable rates, and will help ensure customer safety. The Parties further 
agree that the continued operation of the C02 Removal Plant, with cost recovery as set forth below, 
is a reasonable means of accomplishing the necessary heat-content management. 
9. The Parties agree that Questar Gas should be granted cost recovery as provided 
below: 
(a) Past Costs. If this Stipulation is approved in a final order and Questar Gas actually 
receives the recovery contemplated in paragraph 9(c), Questar Gas will not seek recovery of 
approximately $15 million of past gas-management costs incurred from January 1, 2003 through 
January 31, 2005.6 
(b) Cost Recovery beginning February 1,2005. Rate recovery shall be allowed for costs 
incurred after January 31,2005, pursuant to the terms of this Stipulation. The Parties agree that non-
fuel costs incurred by Questar Gas to manage the heat content of gas supplies using the C02 
Removal Plant, with available blending by Questar Pipeline, are approximately $4 million annually. 
Non-fuel costs are defined as all costs billed to Questar Gas from Questar Transportation Services 
(i.e., labor, overheads, materials, supplies, taxes other than income, power, return, depreciation, 
etc.), the owner and operator of the C02 Removal Plant, except fuel gas costs. Questar Gas shall 
recover in rates, 90% of the actual non-fuel costs as defined in this Stipulation. The fuel needed 
to operate the C02 Removal Plant for Questar Gas will be provided in-kind by Questar Gas and will 
be passed through to customers on a dollar for dollar basis in the 191 Account. Cost recovery will 
be for the longer of three (3) years or the date in 2008 when Questar Gas' original 10-year transition 
period is scheduled to end as described in earlier proceedings, but in no event longer than operation 
6
 See n.2 supra. 
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of the C02 Removal Plant is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the transition period. Any 
extension of recovery would be contingent upon a Commission Order to extend the deadline for the 
10-year transition period. The Parties agree to work together to present recommendations to the 
Commission about the ultimate duration of the transition period. The Parties agree that any 
extension of the transition period shall be presented to the Commission upon the same terms and 
conditions as provided in this Stipulation. 
(c) Fuel Gas Charges. 
(i) Questar Gas Fuel. Questar Gas' rate recovery for any fuel charges at the C02 
Removal Plant for gas processing services performed for Questar Gas will be for the lesser of 
360,000 Dth/year or the actual fuel gas used. 
(ii) Third Party Fuel. All fuel provided by third parties for processing at the C02 
Removal Plant will be used to help keep fuel charges in the 191 Account at or below 360,000 
Dths/year. Limiting 191 Account rate recovery for fuel charges at the C02 Removal Plant to the 
lesser of 360,000Dth/year or the actual fuel gas used results in an estimated fuel cost savings benefit 
to the utility's customers of about $1 million per year. 
(d) Third-Party Revenues. The Parties agree that if Questar Transportation Services 
should contract with a third-party to process gas at the C02 Removal Plant, Questar Transportation 
Services will be allowed to keep 100% of the revenues credited to its account from such third-party 
processing up to $400,000 annually. Revenue received by Questar Transportation Services for third-
party processing at the C02 Removal Plant that exceeds $400,000 annually will be credited 50% to 
Questar Transportation Services and 50% to Questar Gas; and any such credit to Questar Gas will 
be recorded in the 191 Account as an offset to costs recoverable from customers. 
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(e) Additional Plant Facilities. The Parties agree that the costs of any additional C02 
Removal Plant facilities or pipeline facilities required by Questar Gas or third parties to remove C02 
from the gas supplies will not be borne by Questar Gas' customers. 
(f) HEAT Customers. The Parties agree that Questar Gas will take all commercially 
reasonable measures to inform low-income customers who qualify for Home Energy Assistance 
Target (HEAT) of the necessity to have their appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted for the 
change in gas supply. Questar Gas agrees to provide free furnace inspection and adjustment 
services, and to waive additional rate recovery of its costs to provide such services, for up to 2000 
HEAT or other qualifying customers per year, in addition to the approximately 1000 customers 
whose appliances are inspected and/or adjusted by Weatherization of Utah annually, for each full 
year this Stipulation is in effect. 
(g) Allocation of Gas Management Costs. The Parties agree that the costs associated 
with the C02 Removal Plant as provided for in this Stipulation will be allocated between sales and 
transportation customer classes using the non-gas revenue requirement as identified in Questar Gas 
Company's Barrie L. McKay - Rate Design - Exhibit 1, lines 1 and 2, in Docket No. 02-057-02. 
If the Commission, in a general rate case, changes the allocation of the final revenue requirement 
between the sales and transportation classes as provided in this Stipulation, then the new class 
allocation will be used. 
10. All negotiations related to this Stipulation are privileged and confidential and no 
party shall be bound by any position asserted in negotiations. Neither the execution of this 
Stipulation nor the order adopting this Stipulation shall be deemed to constitute an acknowledgment 
by any party of the validity or invalidity of any principle or practice of ratemaking, or the basis of 
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an estoppel or waiver by any party other than with respect to issues explicitly resolved by this 
Stipulation; nor shall they be introduced or used as evidence for any other purpose in a future 
proceeding by any Party to this Stipulation except a proceeding to enforce the approval or terms of 
this Stipulation. The Parties believe that this Stipulation is in the public interest and that the rates, 
terms and conditions it provides for are just and reasonable. 
11. The Parties each agree to present testimony of one or more witnesses to explain and 
support this Stipulation. Such witnesses will be available for examination. No Party to this 
Stipulation may present testimony in opposition to this Stipulation. 
12. This Stipulation shall remain in effect from the date of the Commission's order 
approving the Stipulation until the date of a superseding Commission order. 
13. The Parties agree that if any other party, entity or individual challenges the approval 
of this Stipulation, requests rehearing of any approval of the Stipulation or appeals the approval of 
this Stipulation, each Party will use its best efforts to support the terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation at the Commission and/or at the applicable appellate court. 
14. In the event the Commission rejects any or all of this Stipulation, or imposes any 
additional material conditions on approval of this Stipulation, or in the event the Commission's 
approval of this Stipulation is rejected or conditioned in whole or in part by an appellate court, 
each Party reserves the right, upon written notice to the Commission and the other Parties to this 
proceeding delivered no later than five (5) business days after the issuance date of the applicable 
Commission or court order, to withdraw from this Stipulation. Prior to that election, the Parties 
agree to meet and discuss the Commission's order or court's decision. In the event that no new 
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agreement is reached, no Party shall be bound or prejudiced by the terms of this Stipulation, 
each Party shall be entitled to undertake any steps it deems appropriate. 
DATED: October 11, 2005. 
/s/ 
C. Scott Brown 
Colleen Larkin Bell 
Gregory B. Monson 
David L. Elmont 
Stoel Rives LLP 
Attorneys for Questar Gas Company 
Isl 
Michael Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
Patricia E. Schmid 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Utah Division of Public Utilities 
/s/ 
Reed T. Warnick 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah Committee of Consumer Services 
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Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause 
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DOCKET NO. 05-057-01 
ORDER ON REQUEST TO INTERVENE 
SYNOPSIS 
The Commission denies the Request to Intervene submitted by Roger Ball and Claire Geddes on 
November 17, 2005, finding that the intervention cannot be granted at this late date without 
ignoring the requirements for intervention set forth in Utah Code § 63-46b-9(2). 
ISSUED: January 6. 2006 
By the Commission: 
By written Request to Intervene, submitted November 17, 2005, Roger Ball and 
Claire Geddes seek to intervene in these dockets. Questar Gas Company ("Questar"), the 
Division of Public Utilities ("Division") and the Committee of Consumer Services 
("Committee") have filed memoranda in opposition to the requested intervention. Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes have submitted their reply to the opposing parties. 
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Intervention is governed by Utah Code§63-46b-9.1 As determined by the Utah 
Supreme Court, §63-46b-9(2) grants a conditional right to intervene, as long as both of its prongs 
are met.2 Millard County vs. Utah Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1991). The 
opposition to the intervention focuses on the second prong. An understanding of the parties' 
arguments and our resolution is aided by reviewing these dockets. 
HISTORY 
This matter has a long and storied procedural history. Suffice it to say that the 
prior dockets leading up to the present matter were resolved by order of this Commission on 
September 16, 2004, ("2004 Order") wherein the Commission ordered a refund to Questar 
customers of approximately $29 million in gas processing costs and interest previously collected 
by Questar in rates between 1997 and 2003. See, September 16, 2004, Order issued in Docket 
No. 04-057-09. 
Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-11 and 04-057-13 are 191 Account proceedings 
pursuant to the 191 Account tariff and process. In each, Questar includes in its 191 Account 
expense accounting costs incurred or projected for C02 plant operations. Although these C02 
plant expenses are accounted for in the 191 Account, Questar's opportunity to seek recovery of 
them had been deferred until a later date, pending Questar's specific request to recover them and 
Commission resolution of any disputes regarding their recovery. 
Docket 04-057-09 is a Commission initiated docket to investigate or "discuss the 
long-term solution to Questar Gas Company's gas quality." Notice of Scheduling Conference, 
September 8, 2004. By Scheduling Order issued October 7, 2004, the Commission provided 
]The Commission's own procedural rule, Utah Admin. Code R746-100-7, uses Utah Code §63-
46b-9 as its intervention standard. 
2The two prongs are: " . . . (a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and (b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt 
conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention." Utah Code §63-46b-9(2). 
DOCKET NOS. 04-057-04, 04-057-11. 04-057-13. 04-057-09 & 05-057-01 
- 3 -
notice of a series of public technical conferences for the 04-047-09 docket, including the issues 
to be discussed. Prior to any technical conference being held, Questar filed with the 
Commission, an informational list of the alternative options it had considered (relative to "the 
need for the C02 plant in the future and alternatives to processing") and that it would be 
prepared to discuss at the technical conferences. Letter of Colleen Bell (Questar Attorney) to 
Julie Orchard (Commission Secretary), dated October 27, 2004. The options Questar identified 
were "1. FERC Option. 2. No Action Option. 3. Shut In City Gates Option. 4. Appliance 
Adjustment Option. 5. Producer Option. 6. Gross Blending Option. 7. Precision Blending 
Option. 8. Propane Injection Option. 9. C02 Removal Option. 10. Kern River Options - Riverton 
toLehi -Utah Lake Route - Goshen to Payson. 11. Other?" Id. 
After completion of the technical conferences contemplated in Docket No. 04-
057-09, Docket 05-057-01 was commenced with the January 31, 2005, filing of Questar's 
Application ("January 2005 Application") to recover specific gas treatment or processing costs 
incurred to deliver natural gas to its customers that can be safely utilized until customers' 
appliances can be inspected, and adjusted if necessary, to burn the natural gas that is available 
and which is anticipated to be available from the natural gas markets from which Questar may 
obtain natural gas supplies. 
Arguing that circumstances had changed materially since the resolution of the 
earlier cases by the 2004 Order, the January 2005 Application outlined Questar's position that it 
was entitled to recovery of certain costs incurred to manage the heat-content of its natural gas 
supplies delivered to Utah customers. Questar maintained that its customers were better off, 
from the perspective of the company's overall expenditures for the acquisition and delivery of 
natural gas and from the company's operational and gas delivery perspective, with the presence 
of coal bed methane in its natural gas supplies. 
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The January 2005 Application claimed that the best means of dealing with the 
changing heat-content of natural gas was for the company to engage in what it called precision 
blending of gas (which would also entail the operation of the C02 plant for seven months out of 
the year) or to continue to use the C02 plant throughout the twelve months of the year. Questar 
claimed that the changing heat-content of natural gas results not solely from decisions made by 
Questar and its affiliates, but also from decisions and actions of third parties, over which Questar 
has no control. These include natural gas developers and producers operating in the Rocky 
Mountain region, natural gas purchasers and transporters of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain 
region, operators of the multiple interstate natural gas pipelines located not only in the Rocky 
Mountain region but beyond, and federal policy makers' efforts to encourage and enhance the 
interconnection of pipelines and the increased fungibility of natural gas transported through the 
interstate natural gas pipeline system. Questar claimed that because of these third parties' 
actions, Questar and its affiliates are not able to avoid the inclusion of coal bed methane gas in 
supplies to Questar's customers, nor reverse the decline and continuing decline in the heat-
content of natural gas delivered to Questar customers. 
Questar claimed that the changing heat-content posed a safety risk for customers 
whose appliances were not properly adjusted to the heat range approved by the Commission; it 
claimed that efforts to have the FERC address the gas quality issues faced by Questar and its 
customers would result in the imposition of additional, greater costs upon Questar and its 
customers and that Questar's own natural gas production could be adversely affected3; and it 
claimed that it had presented and thoroughly analyzed more than 11 different alternatives that 
were either requested by other parties or proposed by Questar during the 04-057-09 technical 
conferences. 
3Questar claimed that no one advocated or supported the initiation by Questar (or any other 
person) of an action at FERC to address Questar's natural gas interchangeability issues. 
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Although no formal consolidation of the five dockets was requested of the 
Commission, because Questar sought recovery of the costs it had incurred and would incur to 
deliver natural gas supplies to its customers by utilizing the C02 plant, these enumerated dockets 
were treated on a joint basis by the Commission after the filing of the January 2005 Application. 
Through three Scheduling Orders, parties were to begin filing their pre-filed written testimony 
beginning in April, 2005, and the Commission planned to hold evidentiary hearings in October 
or November; hearing dates were ultimately set for November 1, 2, 3 and 4, 2005. See, 
Scheduling Orders, dated October 6, 2004, August 24, 2005, and September 6, 2005. 
On October 11, 2005, attorneys for Questar, the Division and the Committee filed 
those parties' Gas Management Cost Stipulation ("Stipulation") with the Commission. The 
Commission issued an October 11, 2005, Notice Of Hearing On Gas Management Cost 
Stipulation, setting October 20, 2005, as the hearing date to consider the Stipulation. The Notice 
stated that u[t]he purpose of the hearing is to hear evidence and argument on approval of the Gas 
Management Cost Stipulation between Questar Gas Company, the Division of Public Utilities, 
and the Committee of Consumer Services filed on October 11, 2005. The Stipulation settles 
issues regarding rate recovery of a portion of the costs incurred by Questar Gas Company in 
addressing a potential customer safety concern by managing the heat content of its gas supplies, 
including a portion of the costs associated with the plant removing CO2 from coal-seam gas 
supplies from the Ferron Basin in Emery County, Utah, operated by Questar Transportation 
Services Company." Id 
The October 20, 2005, hearing was held at which the parties to the Stipulation 
presented their witnesses who provided oral testimony in support of the Stipulation and at which 
Questar's April 15, 2005, pre-filed written direct testimony was also received. Later in the day, 
at the scheduled time for public witness testimony regarding the merits of the Stipulation, two 
public witnesses appeared and provided sworn testimony to the Commission. After the hearings 
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were adjourned, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes contacted the Commission Secretary and Chairman 
and inquired about how they could provide information to the Commission concerning the 
Stipulation. Members of the public from time to time desire to make comments on matters 
pending before the Commission. Beyond making provision for their appearance as public 
witnesses at its hearings, the Commission also accepts written comments from the public and 
places them in its dockets. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes were told they could submit written 
comments and they submitted what they styled as affidavits on November 4, 2005. On 
November 10, 2005, Questar filed a letter response to Mr. Ball's and Ms. Geddes' written 
comments. On November 17, 2005, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes ("Petitioners") filed their joint 
request to intervene in these dockets, seeking in essence, to reopen the case and begin anew. 
DISCUSSION 
Intervention in administrative proceedings is governed by Utah Code §63-46b-9, 
which provides, in relevant part, "the presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if 
the presiding officer determines that: (a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially 
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding; and (b) the interests of justice and the orderly 
and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing 
intervention." Questar, the Division and the Committee all argue that Petitioner's intervention 
would violate the second prong; i.e, their intervention would not be in the interests of justice and 
would materially impair the orderly and prompt conduct of adjudicative proceedings. Petitioners 
claim that they may intervene without affecting the second prong of the intervention standard. 
As we have been unable to identify any prior precedent similar to this case, we also recognize 
the precedential nature of our ruling. 
Petitioners claim they were unaware of the October 20, 2005, hearing on the 
Stipulation. Petitioners assert their expertise and familiarity with utility matters, but provide no 
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explanation for not being aware of these proceedings until reading about the hearing in the 
newspaper. All requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act were met and the 
Commission exceeded the requirements of that act by providing a publicly accessible website 
containing notices and orders and permits a person to request their inclusion on docket specific 
mailing lists. Petitioners apparently took advantage of none of these notification services. 
Furthermore, Mr. Ball either personally participated in these proceedings or directed the 
participation of Committee staff while he was employed for years prior to his termination in mid-
March, 2005. Ms. Geddes has been a frequent participant in other Commission proceedings; 
appearing frequently in other dockets during scheduled times to receive Public Witness 
comments or testimony. Petitioners' lack of involvement in these proceedings is due to their 
inattention and indicates a lack of diligence to prepare to participate in the hearings scheduled 
for November, 2005. But for the Stipulation and the earlier hearing date set for it, which 
apparently precipitated their attention, Petitioners otherwise would have come to intervene and 
address Questar's request to seek recovery of C02 plant costs only a few days prior to the 
hearing dates set for early November. Whatever logic or reliance Petitioners put in their actions 
to address or deal with Questar's claims, they are of their own doing. We will not give them 
reprieve from the consequences of their own choices. 
The distillation of the Petitioners' criticism of the actions of the Committee and 
the Division at this late date is basically that the Committee and Division developed decisions on 
the merits of Questar's requests that are different than the decisions or positions Petitioners have 
already submitted to the Commission. Petitioners apparently now wish to expound, justify or 
present additional rationales to the Commission. Petitioners claim that customers' interests have 
not been adequately represented before the Commission by the Committee and the Division. 
Petitioners claim their ability to rectify the situation. Yet the same argument applies to 
Petitioners' opinions and positions. There would be nothing to distinguish allowing Petitioners to 
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now go forward and to then have another petitioning intervener or interveners, professing to 
represent and advocate for customers, claim that Petitioners are/were also insufficient or 
otherwise off-the-mark. Administrative agencies need take care to not open their adjudicative 
process for an endless intervention parade. More so where, as here, it sets precedent for seeking 
intervention after the normal conclusion of the administrative process. This is particularly so 
where each individual customer has the same claimed legal interest in the proceeding (each 
customer pays his rate for natural gas consumed) as the petitioning interveners.4 Additional, self-
proclaimed customer advocates would not be hard to come by, each critical of the current 
representation before the Commission. We reject as a basis to grant intervention at this time in 
the completed proceedings the Petitioners' disagreements with the positions taken by the 
Committee or the Division. By their own admission and inaction, Petitioners did not avail 
themselves of the information that was made available by Questar; information which was 
analyzed by the Division, the Committee, their respective experts, and other parties. It is, 
therefore, not surprising Petitioners would reach a different conclusion than those parties to the 
Stipulation, who were involved in the analysis. 
Petitioners claim that customer interests are not represented here by the 
Committee and Division, who somehow have abdicated their responsibilities. Distinguishable 
from the situation in Millard County, customer interests are represented in these proceedings. 
The State of Utah has recognized the potential morass that multiple intervention poses in utility 
regulation and in proceedings before the Commission. The State has also recognized that 
customers, individually or grouped, may not have the means nor the expertise to be involved in 
proceedings before the Commission. Therefore, it has created entities to participate in 
4There are approximately 775,000 Questar customers. 
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Commission proceedings and utility regulation to accommodate the consumers' views.5 Both the 
Division and the Committee are statutorily charged with including customers' interest in their 
deliberations and advocacy. Utah Code §54-4a-6 and §54-10-4. 
The Committee is specifically charged with representing solely the utility's 
customers' interests; that of residential, small commercial and agricultural customers. The State 
of Utah has carefully crafted the organization and operation of the Committee to represent 
customers' interests. By statute, the multiple members of the Committee are designed to be a 
representative cross-section of the utility's residential, small commercial and agricultural 
customers. Committee members are required to represent different geographical areas of the state 
and different demographics such as low-income residents, retired persons, etc. Utah Code §54-
10-2(3). The members of the Committee, not Mr. Ball or his successor, are charged to assess the 
impact upon consumers of utility or regulatory actions. Utah Code §54-10-4(1). The person 
holding Mr. Ball's former position is required to "carry out the policies and directives of the 
Committee..." Utah Code §54-10-5. The members of the Committee determine how the 
Committee's staff and retained experts are to represent customers' interests and direct the 
Committee's advocacy on customers' behalf. Utah Code §54-10-4(3). These directed individuals 
are responsible to carry out the policies and directives of the members of the Committee. Utah 
Code §54-10-5. Petitioners do not allege that the Committee staff is not carrying out the 
Committee's directives and policies. The composition of the Committee has remained identical 
after Mr. Ball's termination. The only noteworthy change after Mr. Ball's termination was the 
retention of an additional expert to assist the Committee and its staff in carrying out the 
Committee's statutory duty to look out for Questar customers. As noted in the Committee's 
Response, uMr. Ball never allowed himself the benefit of that outside professional expertise 
5Similar to the Supreme Court's suggestion, in Millard County, of means by which interests 
could be represented in proceedings without the intervention quagmire. Millard County, supra, 
823P2dat463. 
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while he was Committee Director. The Committee's application to solicit and retain technical 
expertise did not move off his desk for months, despite urgings of staff, counsel and the 
Committee Chairman that the Committee avail itself of technical expertise in order to credibly 
present and defend its position." Response of the Utah Committee of Consumer Services to 
Request to Intervene, page 6. 
If Petitioners' claims and arguments are a collateral attack on the operations and 
workings of the Committee, they are of no avail to us. We are not in a position to change, at 
Petitioners' behest, the internal mechanisms through which the Committee6 resolved what the 
Committee concluded would be in the best interests of customers, how or what the Committee 
determined to be the means by which it advocated on customers' behalf and why, from the 
Committee's view, it supported the resolution of the case through the Stipulation. We have no 
authority over the Committee; its decisions and conduct are independently made and taken by 
the Committee members (as we suspect the Petitioners would argue they should be). Petitioners 
do not claim that the current staff (or its retained experts) have failed to perform or carry out the 
directives of the Committee's members. Any change in the Committee's composition or internal 
deliberation process is not in our purview. We give no weight to Petitioners' unsupported claims 
that the Division's and the Committee's independent decision making have succumbed to the 
utility industry; in this case to Questar's interests. 
The Dr. Jeckle-Mr.Hyde like transfiguration Petitioners make for these state 
agencies is unsubstantiated. We give no weight to Petitioners characterization that the Division 
and Committee are hamstrung because they have agreed to support the Stipulation. Petitioners 
point to this as further indication that these agencies have failed to represent customer interests; 
that they "transmogrify from watchdog[s] to lapdog[s]." Petition to Intervene, page 16. 
Petitioners use the wrong referential mark for their argument and draw the wrong conclusion. 
Similarly for the Division. 
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The Division and the Committee signed the Stipulation only after months and months (indeed 
years) of investigation and examination of Questar's claims. "Both entities throughly studied the 
issues in this matter, carefully scrutinized the Company's proposals and analysis, and fulfilled 
their statutory responsibilities. Both the Committee and the Division conducted extensive 
discovery. In all, over 400 data requests were made of the Company and answered with almost 
1000 pages of data and studies, many of them performed by the Company at the request of the 
Division and the Committee. Both the Committee and the Division retained independent experts, 
with extensive relevant experience, who participated in the review of Questar Gas's direct 
testimony and scrutinized the Company's proposals for addressing coal bed methane. And as Mr. 
Ball knows full well, both the Division and Committee used the extensive technical conferences 
to aggressively protect the public interest and the interests of the Company's customers." 
Opposition of Questar Gas Company to Request to Intervene, page 13. They agreed to the 
Stipulation terms only after such work and, not withstanding Petitioners' unsubstantiated 
postulates to the contrary, prolonged arms-length negotiations with Questar. 
Whatever the ultimate merits of the Stipulation, Petitioners fail to recognize that, 
on its face, the Stipulation's terms show that the Division and Committee obtained significant 
concessions and compromises from Questar. Rather than recovery of all C02 plant costs, for the 
past, present and future, which Questar had consistently maintained up to the negotiated 
Stipulation, Questar will bear all costs incurred for the C02 plant up to February 1, 2005. The 
Division and Committee claim the financial benefits of the Stipulation exceed $40 million. After 
February 1, 2005, rather than full recovery, Questar will obtain only partial recovery of the costs 
incurred in the C02 plant's operation and will receive no recovery of any additional capital costs 
expended for the plant. Rather than an open-ended time period for recovery of C02 plant costs, 
Questar's partial recovery will end in 2008. Any extension beyond that date requires explicit 
Commission authorization. Questar (and its customers) are to share in the third party 
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processing revenues received from the C02 plant's operations, rather than Questar's affiliates 
having full retention.7 Questar agrees to provide targeted free inspection and adjustment services 
(which otherwise are customer responsibilities for which they themselves would pay) to 
customers most likely not able to afford such work and, thus, likely to forgo such important 
safety actions. The parties believe that the presence of the coal bed methane gas has and will 
continue to depress the overall price of natural gas in the Utah system. And, the processed gas 
will burn safely in Utah appliances until necessary adjustments to the appliances have been 
completed. Contrary to Petitioners' hamstrung, obsequious lapdog characterization, the Division 
and Committee have obtained, for customers' benefit, Questar's abandonment of claims running 
in the tens of millions of dollars. 
Public policy in Utah favors informal, non-adjudicative resolution of the 
controversy through settlement stipulation. "Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of 
matters before the commission is encouraged as a means to: (a) resolve disputes while 
minimizing the time and expense that is expended by: (i) public utilities; (ii) the state; and (iii) 
consumers; (b) enhance administrative efficiency; or ( c) enhance the regulatory process by 
allowing the commission to concentrate on those issues that adverse parties cannot otherwise 
resolve." Utah Code §54-7-1(1). The legislature is not alone in recognizing the benefits from 
and encouraging settlement. "The law has no interest in compelling all disputes to be resolved by 
litigation. One reason public policy favors the settlement of disputes by compromise is that this 
avoids the delay and the public and private expense of litigation. The policy in favor of 
settlements applies to controversies before regulatory agencies, so long as the settlement is not 
contrary to law and the public interest is safeguarded by review and approval by the appropriate 
7We are puzzled by concerns expressed by such utility cognoscenti as Petitioners relative to the 
lack of acknowledgment or signature of Questar affiliates. See, US West Communications vs. 
Public Service Commission, 998 P.2d 247 (Utah 2000) (Commission may impute revenues to a 
utility regardless of the contractual terms between the utility and its affiliate). 
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public authority." Utah Department of Administrative Services vs. Public Service Commission, 
658 P.2d 601, 613 and 614 (Utah 1983). UA principal objective of the participating parties in 
settling their dispute was to avoid the additional time, effort and expense, and the uncertainty of 
outcome, that would necessarily attend a 'full evidentiary hearing' which the Petitioners would 
now seek to impose on everyone." Response of the Committee of Consumer Services to Request 
to Intervene, page 3 (emphasis in original). We conclude that it is not appropriate for Petitioners 
to be granted such a tardy intervention and eviscerate the work already done and subject all 
parties, the regulatory process, the State's and customers' interests, to the vagaries of the 
odyssey foreshadowed in Petitioners' intervention. 
The Petitioners' ability or inability to participate in these dockets is of their own 
making. They give no creditable explanation for why they delayed seeking intervention until 
after the end of our proceedings, especially when they were aware of, or should have been aware 
of, Questar's request for recovery of C02 plant expenses. Questar's specific arguments and 
evidentiary basis upon which it sought recovery was available for months, without question 
beginning with the filing of the January 2005 Application and Questar's April 2005 testimony. 
Adequate time was available to them to consider the information upon which Questar sought 
recovery of C02 plant expenses. Questar's alternatives and the analysis upon which it based its 
decision were known and available even before the January 2005 Application. Petitioners had 
adequate opportunity to address the specifics of the January 2005 Application's claims and 
rationales supported by the April 2005 testimony. The evidence provided at the October 20, 
2005, hearing on the Stipulation did not vary from what was previously made available. The 
participating parties restated what had already been given and explained why they concurred in 
Questar's claims and agreed to permit recovery of processing costs; to ultimately support the 
terms of the Stipulation allowing recovery. Petitioners have not provided adequate and credible 
reasons to excuse them from the decisions and reliance they made in how to address Questar's 
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claims. We will not provide them with additional opportunity to present their views on the 
appropriateness of the recovery of C02 plant expenses. They have had their opportunity to 
comment on the merits of the Stipulation, whether to accept or reject it. What Petitioners made 
of their capability has already been received by the Commission. If they are dissatisfied with 
their effort, they need only look to themselves. What Petitioners would now add is a cumulative 
reaffirmation that they continue to disagree. We conclude that we cannot grant intervention to 
Petitioners at this stage of the proceedings under the circumstances of these proceedings without 
violating Utah Code §63-46b-9. 
In view of the substantial efforts and expenditures of time and money incurred by 
all of the parties in this case, reopening this case at this late date to provide additional time 
permitting Petitioners to go on an a fishing expedition to see if they might find some deficiency 
or uncover some new evidence, is contrary to public policy which encourages resolution by 
negotiated stipulation. In summary, while Petitioner's legal interests may be affected by these 
proceedings (as indeed may the interests of the other hundreds of thousands of Questar 
customers), those interests have been vigorously protected by those statutorily charged with the 
task; namely the Committee, the Division and their respective experts. There is no evidence the 
Committee "handcuffed" itself by signing the Stipulation. Indeed, the Stipulation was not signed 
by the parties until after the issues were fully investigated, probed and analyzed with the 
assistance of experts. There has been extensive investigation of why it may be or why it may not 
be appropriate and prudent to utilize the C02 plant for circumstances as they now are or are 
expected to be for Questar and its customers. The investigation and these proceedings have 
explored numerous alternatives to addressing the changing heat-content of natural gas available 
to Questar's customers and the reasons for the changing heat-content. Appropriate notices for all 
of the Commission's technical conferences and docket proceedings have been given; the 
Commission has complied with the requirements of Utah law. The Commission has conducted 
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an evidentiary hearing to receive evidence to resolve the matter. Other public witnesses were 
aware of that hearing's scheduling and the time set for it; they appeared and provided their 
statements to the Commission. Petitioners have been provided the opportunity to submit written 
statements, they have submitted them and they have been considered by the Commission. Due 
process has been followed to provide interested persons the opportunity to participate in our 
proceedings and respond to Questar's claims. An adequate process and procedure have been 
followed to address the Stipulation. The matter has been submitted and is under consideration by 
the Commission. As we have noted, we have not been able to find any prior precedent in which 
persons petitioning for intervention have been granted intervention when proceedings have 
progressed to the stage these were at when Petitioners filed their request. We have found 
precedents where intervention was denied for requests made earlier in the process. We are 
unpersuaded by Petitioners' arguments that their intervention at this stage is necessary, can be 
done without violating Utah Code §63-46b-9's touchstones regarding impairment of the interests 
of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of proceedings, nor without setting a debilitating 
intervention precedent. 
Wherefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Roger Ball's and Clair Geddess' Petition 
to Intervene is denied. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of January, 2006. 
I si Ric Campbell, Chairman 
Is/ Ted Boven Commissioner 
I si Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
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STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
OF INTERVENOR STATUS 
FOR CLAIRE GEDDES 
AND ROGER J BALL 
I use natural gas for space and/or water heating at my home, or a business that I own, 
or both, in Utah It is delivered by Questar Gas Company, and the bills are paid by me, 
or on my behalf, or by a landlord who then bills me or includes utilities in my rent, or in 
some other way that ensures that, sooner or later, it costs me more when rates 
increase 
The Utah Division of Public Utilities and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services 
have joined the Gas Company in a Stipulation (or agreement), which they have jointly 
asked the Public Service Commission of Utah to approve In a hearing on 20 October, 
the Commission received only testimony supporting the agreement, no party opposed it, 
or vigorously cross-examined its proponents If the Commission approves the 
Stipulation, rates are likely to increase by more than $4 million a year for at least four 
years 
I am not satisfied that, in joining the agreement and limiting its testimony to supporting 
arguments, the Division has fulfilled its statutory obligation "to provide the 
Commission with objective and comprehensive information, evidence and 
recommendations" that will "provide for just (and) reasonable rates", and "protect the 
long-range interest of consumers" (Utah Code Annotated 54-4a-6) 
Nor am I satisfied that the Committee, acting likewise, has properly "assess(ed) the 
impact o f the rate increase "on residential consumers and small commercial 
enterprises", or that it is "be(ing) an advocate of positions most advantageous to a 
majority of residential consumers and those engaged in small commercial 
enterprises" (UCA 54-10-4) 
I respectfully request that the Commission grant Claire Geddes (of 3542 Honeycomb 
Road Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, telephone (801) 943-3654, e-mail 
geddes@xmission com) and Roger J Ball (of 1375 Vintry Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121, telephone (801)277-1375, e-mail ball roger@gmail com) intervener status in 
this matter, because I expect that their participation will result in the Commission 
receiving more comprehensive information and evidence, and hearing a more complete 
range of perspectives on Questar's Application than it so far has, including more 
vigorous and effective advocacy in my interests and those of most other customers of 
Questar Gas, and views that better reflect mine 
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I use natural gas for space and/or water heating at my home, or a business that I own, 
or both, in Utah. It is delivered by Questar Gas Company, and the bills are paid by me, 
or on my behalf, or by a landlord who then bills me or includes utilities in my rent, or in 
some other way that ensures that, sooner or later, it costs me more when rates 
increase. 
The Utah Division of Public Utilities and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services 
have joined the Gas Company in a Stipulation (or agreement), which they have jointly 
asked the Public Service Commission of Utah to approve. In a hearing on 20 October, 
the Commission received only testimony supporting the agreement; no party opposed 
it, or vigorously cross-examined its proponents. If the Commission approves the 
Stipulation, rates are likely to increase by more than $4 million a year for at least four 
years. 
I am not satisfied that, in joining the agreement and limiting its testimony to supporting 
arguments, the Division has fulfilled its statutory obligation "to provide the ... 
Commission with objective and comprehensive information, evidence and 
recommendations" that will "provide for just (and) reasonable ... rates", and "protect the 
long-range interest of consumers" (Utah Code Annotated 54-4a-6). 
Nor am I satisfied that the Committee, acting likewise, has properly "assess(ed) the 
impact o f the rate increase "on residential consumers and ... small commercial 
enterprises", or that it is "be(ing) an advocate ... of positions most advantageous to a 
majority of residential consumers ... and those engaged in small commercial 
enterprises" (UCA 54-10-4). 
I respectfully request that the Commission grant Claire Geddes (of 3542 Honeycomb 
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121; telephone: (801) 943-3654; e-mail: 
geddes@xmission.com) and Roger J Ball (of 1375 Vintry Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121; telephone: (801)277-1375; e-mail: ball.roger@gmail.com) intervenor status in 
this matter, because I expect that their participation will result in the Commission 
receiving more comprehensive information and evidence, and hearing a more complete 
range of perspectives on Questar's Application than it so far has, including more 
vigorous and effective advocacy in my interests and those of most other customers of 
Questar Gas, and views that better reflect mine. 
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Attorneys for Questar Gas Company 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Bud Allen, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Utah Public Service Commission and 
Questar Gas Company, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20060280 
Utah Public Service Commission 
Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 
04-057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS OF QUESTAR 
GAS COMPANY 
Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas" or "Company"), pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10 
and 23, provides this memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") the "Joint 
Petition for Review of a Report and Order of the Utah Public Service Commission, issued 
RUED 
UTAH -WELbUE COURTS 
MAY " I 5006 
January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation" ("Petition") filed by Bud Allen 
and 54 other persons ("Petitioners") on March 27, 2006. 
The basis for the Motion is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition 
because (1) Petitioners lacked standing to seek reconsideration of the Report and Order 
("Order") of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") and, therefore, review of 
the Order is barred under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15; and (2) Petitioners lack standing to seek 
appellate review because they are not aggrieved parties substantially prejudiced by agency error 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the 
Petition. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Comm 'n, 2003 UT 29, 75 P.3d 481 
("2003 Decision"), the Court reversed an order of the Commission in Docket No. 99-057-20 (the 
Company's 1999 general rate case) approving the CO2 Stipulation entered into by Questar Gas 
and the Utah Division of Public Utilities ("Division"), but opposed by the Utah Committee of 
Consumer Services ("Committee"). The CO2 Stipulation provided for partial rate recovery of the 
costs incurred by Questar Gas from June 1999 through May 2004 under a contract with its 
affiliate Questar Transportation Services Company ("Questar Transportation") for operation of a 
plant located in Castle Valley, Utah ("CO2 Removal Plant") that removes carbon dioxide 
("CO2") from natural gas produced from coal seams ("coal bed methane") in the Ferron area of 
Emery County, Utah. The basis for the Court's reversal was that the Commission had failed to 
hold Questar Gas to its burden of demonstrating that the CO2 removal costs provided for in the 
stipulation were prudent.1 
1
 2003 Decision at m 13-15, 75 P.3d at 486-87. 
Following remand and after extensive briefing and oral argument involving marshalling 
of the evidence from the prior proceedings, the Commission concluded that Questar Gas had not 
met its burden to demonstrate that the decision to enter into a contract with Questar 
Transportation to build and operate the CO2 Removal Plant was prudent; thus, the Commission 
required Questar Gas to refund to customers all amounts collected in rates for these processing 
costs, plus interest.2 However, recognizing that this is an ongoing issue, the Commission 
specifically stated that: 
We will also address, in a separate docket, how to craft a long-term 
solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with natural 
gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's 
obligation to provide safe commodity and service to its customers.3 
Furthermore, in response to the Company's request for reconsideration and clarification, the 
Commission stated: 
The [2004 Order] addressed only Questar's failure to 
substantiate approval of the CO2 Stipulation in these proceedings 
and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation, which would have 
permitted recovery of some processing costs through May of 2004. 
Our reference to the May 2004 end date was dictated by the 
Stipulation's terms and was not intended to have any other 
preclusive effect on recovery by Questar. In regards to Questar's 
requests for clarification and reconsideration, we state that our 
Order does not preclude Questar from seeking recovery of 
CO2 processing costs in other dockets. We cannot opine, here, 
on the likelihood of success for rate recovery of CO2 processing 
costs coming in other dockets. However arduous or facile the task 
may be to support or oppose recovery in other proceedings, it will 
be that of the participants. We will not prejudge the outcome. We 
will need to wait for Questar to make whatever arguments and 
2
 Order, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-05 (Utah PSC Aug. 30, 2004) 
("2004 Order") at 38. On January 21, 2004, prior to the parties' briefing on prudence but after the 
Commission had determined to allow Questar Gas to attempt to demonstrate prudence in the wake of the 
2003 Decision, the Committee sought extraordinary relief before this Court to prevent the Commission 
from addressing prudence. The Court denied the Committee's petition for extraordinary relief in an order 
dated March 22, 2004. See Order, Case No. 20040060-SC (Mar. 22, 2004). 
3
 2004 Order at 38-39. 
present whatever evidence it deems appropriate in seeking 
recovery of these costs, whether incurred pre- or post-May 2004, in 
whatever dockets Questar may raise the issue.4 
Following issuance of the 2004 Order, the Commission issued a notice of scheduling 
conference on September 8, 2004, in Docket No. 04-057-09, "to set dates for technical 
conferences to discuss the long-term solution to Questar Gas Company's gas quality."5 The 
parties, including the Committee with Petitioner Roger Ball as its staff director, reached 
agreement on dates and subjects for a series of public technical conferences to explore various 
aspects of the issue. These six public technical conferences commenced on October 13, 2004 
and continued, with some adjustments in schedule agreed upon by the parties, through January 
19, 2005. At the last technical conference, on January 19, the Commission suggested that the 
next step was for Questar Gas to file an application for rate recovery. 
Following conclusion of the technical conferences, Questar Gas filed an application on 
January 31, 2005, in Docket No. 05-057-01, seeking recovery of its ongoing CO2 removal costs. 
These were not the $25 million in costs disallowed by the 2004 Order, refunded to customers and 
absorbed by Company shareholders, but rather ongoing costs incurred commencing at the 
earliest date allowed by law in light of the 2004 Order.6 This verified filing included as exhibits 
essentially every hand-out that had been introduced in the six public technical conferences. 
4
 Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-
057-14 and 03-057-05 (Utah PSC Oct. 20, 2004) at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
5
 Notice of Scheduling Conference, In the Matter of the Investigation of Questar Gas Company's 
Gas Quality, Docket No. 04-057-09 (Utah PSC Sep. 8, 2004). 
6
 Questar Gas had preserved its right to seek ongoing expenses through pass-through gas cost 
applications on May 5, 2004 m Docket No. 04-057-04, on September 17, 2004 m Docket No. 04-057-11, 
and on December 9, 2004 m Docket No. 04-057-13. Each of these applications sought recovery of the 
costs Questar Gas was incurring for C02 removal at the C02 Removal Plant on a going-forward basis. In 
Docket No. 05-057-01, Questar Gas formally sought an order allowing recovery of these costs through a 
change in rates. 
The Commission gave notice on February 22, 2005 of a scheduling conference to 
schedule further proceedings in this matter. At that conference, held on March 1, the parties 
agreed upon a schedule under which Questar Gas would file testimony on April 15 supporting 
the prudence of its ongoing CO2 removal expenditures and the Division, Committee and any 
intervenor would file responsive testimony on August 15. Hearings were scheduled to 
commence on October 6, 2005. At least two of the Petitioners, Mr. Ball and Claire Geddes, were 
familiar with all of this contemplated procedure.7 
As contemplated, Questar Gas filed extensive sworn testimony in support of its 
application on April 15, 2005.8 The Division and Committee conducted extensive discovery 
both prior to and following this filing. They requested an extension of their August 15 testimony 
filing date in part because the parties were involved in settlement discussions based on the 
information provided in the testimony and discovery.9 An order amending the schedule was 
issued August 24, 2005, setting the new testimony filing date for September 20. No testimony 
was filed on September 20, again because the parties were in settlement discussions. On October 
11, 2005, after extensive and difficult settlement discussions, at which not only the parties and 
their expert witnesses but others who expressed an interest in the matter (including industrial 
7
 Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 
(Nov. 17, 2005) ("Intervention Request") at 2. 
8
 See, eg.. Direct Testimony of Bame L. McKay (April 15, 2005) at 16-22 (reviewing the 
technical conferences and their outcome, explaining how potential affiliate conflicts had been identified 
and addressed, explaining why ownership and operation of the C02 Removal Plant by Questar 
Transportation was not disadvantageous to Questar Gas customers, and introducing other witnesses and 
the focus of their testimony, including Lawrence Conti addressing the Company's obligation to manage 
the heat content of its gas supplies; Robert Lammare addressing coal bed methane as a critical source of 
supply for the Company and the nation more generally; Alan Walker descnbing and quantifying benefits 
to the Company's customers from the production of coal bed methane; Robert Reid discussing changes in 
production and transportation of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain region and how coal bed methane has 
impacted natural gas prices; and Charles Benson addressing gas mterchangeabihty.). 
9
 Mr. Ball was personally aware that settlement discussions were occurring, having participated in 
them as director of Committee staff prior to the termination of his employment in that position. 
customer representatives) participated, the parties filed their Gas Management Cost Stipulation 
("Stipulation"). On the same day, even though no public hearing is required for the approval of a 
settlement among all parties to a case,10 the Commission gave notice of public hearings to be 
held on October 20, 2005 to consider approval of the Stipulation. 
Hearings were held on October 20 as scheduled. Each of the parties provided a witness 
in support of approval of the Stipulation. In addition, as provided in the Stipulation, the parties 
moved the Commission to admit into evidence in support of approval of the Stipulation the 
sworn testimony of Questar Gas filed on April 15.11 The Commission did so without objection. 
No one other than the parties appeared at the hearing to question the witnesses, present 
testimony, seek cross-examination of the filed testimony or object to its admission. The 
Commission asked questions regarding the motion and the Stipulation, which were answered by 
the witnesses. 
Two persons appeared and offered sworn testimony at the public witness hearing 
scheduled at 4:30 p.m. on the same day. Although one of these persons represented an industrial 
customer that regularly participates in Commission proceedings involving Questar Gas, the other 
was an individual who does not regularly participate in such proceedings. His presence 
demonstrated that the Commission's notice was effective as to the public generally. At the 
conclusion of the public witness hearing, the Commission took the matter under advisement. 
10
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-l(3)(c) and (3)(e)(ii)(C). 
11
 The motion included a request that the Commission take notice of the information provided in 
the six public technical conferences and the application. However, as noted by the Commission, this 
aspect of the motion was unnecessary because the filed testimony adequately supported its decision. 
Order at 32, n.18. In any event, the information provided in the technical conferences and the application 
was largely incorporated, without objection, into the sworn testimony of Barrie L. McKay filed April 15, 
2005. 
Sometime following conclusion of the hearings, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes contacted the 
Commission, complaining that they were not aware of the hearings and requesting the 
opportunity to file statements. Although the hearings were properly noticed, the Commission 
informed them that they could still file statements. They filed affidavits on November 4, 2005. 
The Commission notified the parties that they could respond to the affidavits if they wished to do 
so. Questar Gas filed a response on November 11, stating that it did not object to the 
Commission considering the affidavits as unsworn public witness testimony (since there had 
been no opportunity for cross examination) and further stating that the affidavits provided no 
basis for the Commission to reject the Stipulation. 
On November 15, 2005, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes filed the Intervention Request, which 
contained essentially the same information and argument that was included in their affidavits. 
Questar Gas, the Division and the Committee all filed responses in opposition to the Intervention 
Request. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes filed a reply to the responses on December 13, 2005. 
On January 6, 2006, the Commission issued its Order on Request to Intervene 
("Intervention Order"), denying the request of Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes to intervene. On the 
same day, the Commission issued its Report and Order ("Order"), approving the Stipulation. 
On February 6, 2006, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes filed a brief pleading seeking 
reconsideration of the Order, and Mr. Allen and the 52 other Petitioners filed a lengthy pleading 
seeking reconsideration of the Order.12 The requests for reconsideration were deemed denied by 
12
 Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes also filed a request for reconsideration of the Intervention Order on 
February 6, 2006. This request for reconsideration is the subject of another petition for review in Roger 
Ball and Claire Geddes v Utah Public Service Comm 'n, Supreme Court No. 20060279. Questar Gas is 
also moving to dismiss that petition. 
operation of law on February 27, 2006.13 Petitioners filed their Petition on March 27, 2006 and 
their docketing statement on April 17, 2006 (serving the latter on Questar Gas on April 18). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 53 Petitioners (i.e., all of the Petitioners other than Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes) filed 
no evidence before the Commission and made no attempt at intervention or participation in the 
case. Their only filing, a request for reconsideration of the Order,14 represented that three of 
them were shareholders of Questar Gas, but offered no evidence of that ownership or any 
evidence or assertion that the three purported shareholders were adversely affected in their 
interest as shareholders as a result of the Order. Rather, the Request for Reconsideration 
repeatedly asserted that all Petitioners were seeking to protect their interests as ratepayers and 
acknowledged that those interests were contrary to the interest of Questar Gas shareholders. For 
example, the Request for Reconsideration stated: "If the Utility has mismanaged in the selection 
of means, then shareholders, not ratepayers, will—and rightly should—bear the cost of this 
imprudence;"15 "[t]o rule otherwise [than saying recovery is barred by the prudence language of 
the 2003 Decision] would mean that a regulated utility could hold ratepayers hostage;"16 that 
ratepayers are "the real parties in interest" affected by the Stipulation;17 that the Commission 
"surely must now permit the ratepayers to retain their own attorneys [i.e., counsel for Petitioners] 
and champion their own and the public interests when all other advocates have abandoned 
13
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(c) ("Any application for rehearing not granted by the 
commission within 20 days is denied.") 
14
 Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public Service 
Commission , Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation, Docket Nos. 04-
057-04, 04-057-09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, 05-057-01 (Feb. 6, 2006) ("Request for Reconsideration"). 
15
 Mat 22. 
16
 Mat 45. 
17
 Id. at 65. 
1 Q 
them;" and, finally, that the Order was an "egregious Commission gift to Questar's 
shareholders . . . ."] 
The affidavits filed by Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes in the proceedings before the 
Commission do not claim that either of these Petitioners has any type of a pecuniary interest in 
Questar Gas. Rather, the affidavits state that they sought participation in the proceedings based 
solely on their role as ratepayers and as potential representatives of the interest of other 
ratepayers. In addition, the affidavits provide no evidence to support the claim that Mr. Ball was 
a de facto party in the proceeding before the Commission. Mr. Ball's affidavit simply 
establishes that he participated in earlier aspects of the proceeding before the Commission in his 
role as director of the staff of the Committee.20 
No Petitioner submitted evidence of holding a statutorily protected interest or of an injury 
to that interest sufficient to confer standing to seek reconsideration of the Order or to pursue an 
appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary disposition can be sought at any time on the basis that the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider an appeal,21 and within ten days after a docketing statement is served on 
the basis that "the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and 
consideration" by the Court.22 The Court may also order summary disposition sua sponte if it 
18
 Id. at 74. 
19
 Id. at 76. 
20
 See, e g., Ball Affid. at 3 (noting Mr. Ball's prior position as Committee staff director, but not 
identifying any prior participation m a personal capacity). 
21
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1). 
22
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(2)(A). 
determines that it lacks jurisdiction or if "it plainly appears that no substantial question is 
presented."23 
Petitioners bear the burden to establish their standing to appeal the Order,24 and in a 
petition for review of an agency action a would-be appellant "waive[s] its right to judicial review 
by failing to participate in the administrative proceedings."25 This is based on 
policy considerations which apply to all administrative decision making. 
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures that those who 
have an interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts and 
considerations at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover, the 
requirement of [participation] gives the agency and the other participants 
notice of the identity and concern of interested parties." Colorado Water 
Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 
1982). These observations . . . are applicable to any administrative 
decision in which interested parties have the right to participate. The 
requirement of participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a 
corollary of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies."6 
Since none of the Petitioners sought to appropriately intervene in the proceedings below, 
in normal circumstances they would lack standing to pursue an appeal of the Order, having 
waived any right to judicial review by their failure to participate at the agency level. 
23
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(e). 
24
 See, e.g., Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26,1} 12, 73 P.3d 334, 339 ("[I]t is the burden 
of the 'party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor' [to clearly allege] facts essential to show 
junsdiction. If [it] fail[s] to make the necessary allegations, [it has] no standing.") (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. 
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 
1138, 1145 (Utah 1981) ("In the instant case, plaintiffs have not shown, by stipulation, affidavit, or 
otherwise, that any one of the massage parlors seeking declaratory relief below employed 25 or more 
individuals. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate standing to challenge the application of the 
Anti-discrimination Act, as it does not appear that any of their number is an 'employer' for purposes of 
the statute."); KERM, Inc. v. F.CC, 353 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("A petitioner [for review of 
agency action] bears the burden of establishing its standing."). 
25
 See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990). 
26
 See id. 
The legislature also has the authority to grant statutory standing, and whether or not it has 
done so is a matter of statutory interpretation.27 In this case, a provision in the Public Utilities 
Code may alter the typical standing requirements for review of an agency action. Specifically, 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 provides that "[b]efore seeking judicial review" of a Commission 
action, "any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public 
utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this 
section" and that "[a]fter any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to 
the action or proceeding, any stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in the 
public utility affected may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in the action or 
proceeding."28 
Related statutes are considered to be in pari materia and must be read together in 
harmony.29 While it addresses the requirements for seeking rehearing prior to appeal, section 54-
7-15 does not comprehensively address the requirements for pursuing an appeal or address at all 
the grounds upon which an appeal can be granted. Rather, sections 63-64b-14 and 63-64b-16 
address those issues, and therefore must be read in conjunction with section 54-7-15 to address 
Petitioners' standing to pursue this appeal. In considering these statutory provisions, the Court 
should seek to give effect to the legislative intent as manifest by the plain language of the 
statutes, and if it finds ambiguity should seek to read the statutes reasonably in a manner that 
27
 See, e.g., Washington County Water Conserv. Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ^  7, 82 P.3d 1125, 
1128. 
28
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-15(1), (2)(a). 
29
 See, e.g., Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) 
gives effect to all provisions, and in a manner that would not render any provision superfluous or 
absurd 30 
Unless sections 54-7-15, 63-46b-14, and 63-46b-16 can be read as providing standing for 
Petitioners to pursue their appeal, Questar Gas is unaware of any statutory provision that might 
override the general requirement of exhaustion prior to appeal, and Petitioners failure to 
appropriately intervene and participate in the agency action below divests the Court of 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
B. A TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A JURISDICTIONAL 
PREREQUISITE TO AN APPEAL AND ONLY PARTIES WITH PROPER 
STANDING MAY FILE SUCH A REQUEST; AFTER SEEKING 
RECONSIDERATION, ONLY PARTIES WHO ARE AGGRIEVED AND 
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY AN ORDER MAY PURSUE AN APPEAL. 
As noted above, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 establishes prerequisites to any appeal of a 
Commission order 
Section 54-7-15 provides in part. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's 
action, any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied with 
an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this 
section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made 
by the commission, any party to the action or proceeding, 
any stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily 
interested in the public utility may apply for rehearing of 
any matters determined in the action or proceeding. 
30
 See, e g, Summit Water Distribution Co v Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 1^ 16, 123 P 3d 437, 
442, State v Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P 3d 795, 799-800, Derbidge \ Mutual Protective Ins Co , 963 P 2d 
788, 791 (Utah Ct App 1998), V-1 Oil Co v State Tax Comm n9 942 P 2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997), Millett 
v Clark Clinic Corp, 609 P 2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) 
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any 
ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any 
court.31 
The requirement that an application or petition for rehearing or reconsideration be filed in 
the Commission by a party is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. " Further, "[t]he 
rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse 
judgment, is well settled/' Thus, to preserve the right of appeal a person must obtain standing 
and must pursue rehearing under section 54-7-15. In the absence of a person with standing filing 
such a request, the requirements of section 54-7-15 cannot be met and judicial review is barred. 
Once an appropriate party has sought rehearing, section 63-46b-14 only allows a "party 
aggrieved" to obtain judicial review and section 63-46b-16 requires that in order to obtain 
judicial relief from a formal agency action such as the Order, the person seeking appellate review 
must have been "substantially prejudiced by" agency error or a constitutional infirmity.35 Thus, 
31
 Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (emphasis added). 
32
 See, e.g., Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v Public Service Comm 'n, 789 P.2d 298, 
300 (Utah 1990) ("We first consider UP & L's argument that under section 54-7-15 of the Code, an issue 
is not preserved for consideration on appeal unless it has been specifically raised m a petition for 
reheanng before the PSC. We agree with this contention."); Williams v. Public Service Comm Vz, 754 P.2d 
41, 46 (Utah 1988) ("In the instant case, neither American Paging nor any of the intervening parties filed 
an application for reheanng with the PSC prior to seeking a wnt of certioran. Thus, even though they are 
interested parties, their failure to apply for reheanng withm twenty days of the Commission's issuance of 
its order divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(1) (1986). 
Additionally, section 54-7-15 states that petitioning parties can only bring those grounds before this Court 
that were argued in the application for rehearing. Id. In the absence of an application for reheanng, the 
parties are left without anything to appeal. Therefore, this Court has no subject matter junsdiction over 
the petition and will not review the PSC's dismissal of American Paging's application for a certificate."). 
33
 Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988); see also Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 714 P.2d 
1130, 1131 (Utah 1989) ("Further, as a nonparty, Duke has no standing now to challenge on appeal the 
court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment."). 
34
 See supra note 32. 
35
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 (requinng exhaustion of administrative remedies unless a 
statutory provision provides otherwise or a court relieves the exhaustion requirement, and requinng that 
the party seeking judicial review file a petition within 30 days after the final agency action); 63-46b-16(4) 
(setting forth the vanous defects in the agency action, or statute or rule upon which the action is based, 
that could lead to appellate relief). 
to have standing to pursue their appeal, Petitioners must be stockholders, bondholders, or other 
persons pecuniarily interested in Questar Gas (in order to have had standing to seek 
reconsideration), and must be aggrieved by and substantially prejudiced by the Order (in order to 
have standing to appeal and grounds for appellate relief). Petitioners do not meet these 
requirements. 
C. PETITIONERS LACKED STANDING TO SEEK RECONSIDERATION. 
Seeking review of an administrative order requires party standing, and as noted above 
Petitioners bear the burden of proof that they have such standing.36 Standing is typically 
obtained for a person not originally a party to the proceeding through appropriate intervention,37 
which only two of the Petitioners pursued (Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes—in an untimely manner) in 
this case. In the absence of intervening and participating, a person has no basis to seek rehearing 
or appeal because the person has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.38 And although 
section 54-7-15 does contain the potential additional grant of standing to non-parties noted 
above, if the person seeking reconsideration is a "stockholder, bondholder, or other person 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility,"39 that grant is neither sufficient to confer standing on 
Petitioners in this case nor did Petitioners even attempt to provide evidence or argument before 
the Commission that they satisfy the requirements of section 54-7-15 sufficient to acquire 
standing. Rather, they left it completely to the Commission to assume the basis for standing and 
failed to do anything to attempt to meet their burden.40 
See supra note 24. 
37
 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9; Utah Admin. Code R746-100-7. 
38
 See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d at 1087. 
39
 Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(1). 
40
 See supra note 24; see also, e.g., Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F.Supp.2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 
2002) ("The burden of proving that standing exists rests with the Plaintiff and must be supported by 
Based on Appendix A of the Request for Reconsideration, all but three of the 55 
Petitioners do not even purport to be shareholders or to have any interest in Questar Gas beyond 
their interest as customers. Petitioners apparently assume (again, without argument) that a 
customer interest is some type of "pecuniary" sufficient to trigger standing under the statute. But 
the interest of customers is limited to receiving safe, reliable and adequate service at just and 
reasonable rates—it is not a pecuniary interest in Questar Gas of the type addressed in section 
54-7-15. The three Petitioners who do purport to be "Questar Stockholders," on the other hand, 
failed to provide the Commission with any evidence of that status. Moreover, while apparently 
seeking to assert standing based on their alleged status as shareholders, the alleged injury these 
three Petitioners assert clearly arises out of their status as customers rather than their alleged 
pecuniary interest in Questar Gas. Such an alleged injury is insufficient to warrant standing. 
1. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes Were Appropriately Denied Intervention; the 
Remaining Petitioners Did Not Even Attempt to Intervene or to 
Demonstrate Their Standing. 
As demonstrated in the Company's motion to dismiss the petition of Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes for review of the Intervention Order and supporting memorandum filed concurrently 
with this memorandum, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes were appropriately denied intervention and 
Mr. Ball was not a de facto party. The 53 other Petitioners did not even attempt to intervene, 
even as they seek to act as parties in this proceeding and to overturn the Order. The absence of 
party status to these Petitioners that did not even attempt intervention was fatal to their attempt to 
obtain reconsideration unless they have some other statutory right potentially applicable in this 
situation. But they failed to argue what that statutory right was or provide any evidence in 
sufficient evidence."); Harris v. Zoning Comm 'n of Town of New Milford, 788 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Conn. 
2002) ("It is .. . fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person 
must be aggrieved. .. . Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging 
aggrievement bears the burden of proving it."). 
support of their standing and, thus, have not met their burden to establish their standing. 
Moreover, for the reasons set forth below, the only potentially applicable statutory provision— 
section 54-7-15, is not applicable to any of the Petitioners in this case. 
2. AH But Three of the 55 Petitioners Do Not Purport to Have any Interest 
Beyond Their Interest as Customers; That Interest Is in Service and 
Rates and Is Not a Pecuniary Interest in Questar Gas. 
Neither the Request for Reconsideration nor the Docketing Statement provided any 
support or argument for why customers should be entitled to pursue reconsideration or appeal 
notwithstanding the fact that they were not parties to the Commission proceeding below. Only 
three of the customers are allegedly shareholders, and these are the only three with even a 
colorable argument that they have standing pursuant to section 54-7-15. The other Petitioners 
have no basis at all to allege standing. These Petitioners with no interest beyond a customer 
interest may attempt to argue that they have a pecuniary interest in Questar Gas, but this view 
would be erroneous. A pecuniary interest is a financial interest,41 and that interest must be a 
financial interest in the public utility,42 not merely in the services provided by that utility. The 
Legislature knows how to use the term "customer" or "ratepayer" when it chooses to do so,43 and 
the absence of those terms in section 54-7-15, as well as the presence of the terms "stockholder" 
and "bondholder" establishing the types of things that make up the list of pecuniary interests, 
precludes a finding that customers are "pecuniarily interested" in the utility for the purposes of 
41
 See, e.g., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 856 (10th ed. 1998) (''pecuniary 
1: consisting of or measured in money 2: of or relating to money."). 
42
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(1) (". .. any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility . ..") (emphasis added). 
4
' See, eg., Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-l(15)(e); 54-3-1; 54-4-4(4)(a)(i); 54-4-14; 54-4-25(5); 54-4-
37; 54-4a-6. 
the statute. This interpretation is consistent with that reached in other cases interpreting similar 
statutory provisions.45 It is also consistent with the use of "pecuniary" in other sections of the 
Public Utilities Code,46 as the Committee aptly noted in opposing reconsideration in this case— 
pointing out that a pecuniary interest could not simply be the interest of a utility customer 
because that would require Commissioners, staff members, and Division employees to live out of 
state, given essentially everyone in Utah is a utility customer who would hold a pecuniary 
interest in the utility if mere customer status were sufficient to qualify as such an interest.47 
Finally, this is the only interpretation that makes sense—one does not acquire a pecuniary 
interest in a grocery store by purchasing groceries or an auto dealership by purchasing a car. 
Likewise, Petitioners do not gain any type of pecuniary interest in Questar Gas by virtue of their 
customer interest in safe, adequate and reliable service at just and reasonable rates; and in the 
absence of such a pecuniary interest, Petitioners lacked standing to seek reconsideration. This 
44
 See, e.g., State ex rel A.T., 2001 UT 82, 1J 12, 34 P.3d 228, 232 ("The doctrine of ejusdem 
generis applies in instances where an inexhaustive enumeration of particular or specific terms is followed 
by a general term or terms that suggest a class. The doctrine declares that in order to give meaning to the 
general term, the general term is understood as restricted to include things of the same kind, class, 
character, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to show a contrary 
intent.") (citations omitted). 
45
 See, e.g., In re Citizens Util. Co., 11 CPUC 2d 667 (Cal. PUC Jun. 1, 1983) ("The assertion that 
the Committee has standing as it is 'pecuniarily interested' in Citizens because of its ratepayer 
relationship is without merit. If we had considered the pleading to be an application for rehearing, it 
would have been dismissed for lack of standing and for untimeliness.") (citation omitted); In re SoCal 
Gas Co., 1982 WL 196731, * 1 (Cal. PUC May 4, 1982) ("Every customer shares an interest in reasonable 
rates based on reasonable costs but the Legislature did not intend to grant to every customer the standing 
to apply for rehearing on that account.") California Pub. Util. Code § 1731(b) provides that "[a]fter any 
order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the action or proceeding, or any 
stockholder or bondholder or other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected, may apply 
for a rehearing in respect to any matters determined in the action or proceeding and specified in the 
application for rehearing." 
46
 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 54-1-11 (prohibiting a Commissioner or member of the 
Commission staff from holding "any pecuniary interest [in a public utility], whether as the holder of 
stock or other securities") (emphasis added); § 54-4a5 (same for employees of the Division). 
47
 See Utah Committee of Consumer Services' Response to Petitions for Reconsideration, Docket 
Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, 05-057-01 (Feb. 21, 2006) at 25. 
lack of any type of a demonstrated pecuniary interest deprives them of standing and is fatal to 
their appeal. 
3. The Three Remaining Petitioners Did Not Demonstrate Their Status as 
Shareholders. 
Petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their standing in order to seek 
reconsideration, which in this case meant (in the first instance) appropriately demonstrating their 
status as stockholders, bondholders, or holders of some other pecuniary interest in Questar Gas. 
They failed to do so. Instead, they merely provided an unsigned, unsworn appendix listing the 
three Petitioners as "Questar Stockholders."48 Even after Questar Gas challenged the evidentiary 
basis for the three Petitioners' status,49 Petitioners failed to provide any supplemental 
information with evidence of their alleged status. Thus, the Commission was left with only the 
unsworn, nonevidentiary, hearsay statement in Appendix A as support for the three Petitioners' 
claim to be shareholders. This statement was insufficient both under the Administrative 
Procedures Act and under Commission rules to provide substantial evidence for a Commission 
finding that the three Petitioners hold any type of pecuniary interest in the Company.50 In the 
absence of substantial evidence, Petitioners provided the Commission with no basis to make a 
See Request for Reconsideration at Appendix A. The stock of Questar Gas is not publicly 
traded but rather is held by its parent, Questar Corporation. The stock of Questar Corporation is publicly 
traded. 
49
 See Response of Questar Gas Company in Opposition to Requests for Reconsideration of 
Report and Order and Request for Reconsideration of Order on Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-
057-04, 04-057-09,04-057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 (Feb. 21, 2006) at 25-26 ("As noted above, 
petitioners have the burden of proof to establish their standing, which in this case means appropriately 
demonstrating their status as stockholders, bondholders, or holders of some other pecuniary interest in 
Questar Gas. They have failed to do so. Thus, there is no substantial evidence in support of a 
Commission finding that petitioners hold a pecuniary interest m the Company, and no basis to conclude 
that petitioners have met their burden of establishing standing."). 
50
 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(3) ("A finding of fact that was contested may not be based 
solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence."); Utah 
Admin. Code R746-100-10.F.1 ("The Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence and 
may receive any oral or documentary evidence; except that no finding may be predicated solely on 
hearsay or otherwise incompetent evidence."). 
finding that the three Petitioners hold any type of pecuniary interest in the Company, and no 
basis to conclude that they had met their burden of establishing standing. 
4. Even If The Three Petitioners Had Demonstrated Their Status as 
Shareholders, They Did Not Suffer Injury to That Interest. 
Even if the three Petitioners had demonstrated that they are shareholders or that they hold 
some type of pecuniary interest in Questar Gas, they would have no basis to pursue the Petition. 
Standing requires a showing of a distinct and palpable injury.51 While the precise level of 
necessary injury may not be clear from the face of section 54-7-15, the person holding a 
pecuniary interest in the public utility must at least be "dissatisfied" with the order at issue. 
Further, the provisions of section 54-7-15 must be read in harmony with other applicable law.52 
To pursue an appeal, section 63-46b-14 requires that one be "aggrieved."53 Thus, some showing 
of injury is mandatory. 
But showing the possibility of just any injury is not alone enough to establish standing. 
Rather, the injury must be suffered within the capacity of a protected interest. In accordance 
with this principle, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in appeals under the federal 
administrative procedures act a complainant must establish that its injury "falls within the 'zone 
of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal 
basis of [the complainant's] complaint."54 A key purpose of this "zone of interest" requirement 
51
 See, e.g., National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 
913 (Utah 1993). 
52
 See, e.g., Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1117, 66 P.3d 592, 597 ("We read the plain language of 
the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters.") (citations omitted). 
53
 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l). 
54
 Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (quoting Clarke v. Securities Industry 
Ass >i„ 479 U.S. 388 (1987)). See also, e.g., S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 
737-38 (Utah 1996) (implicitly acknowledging zone of interest test); New York State Ass n of Nurse 
Anesthetists v. Novello, 810 N.E.2d 405, 407 (N.Y. 2004) C[T]he injury a plaintiff asserts must fall 
is "to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory 
objectives."55 Thus, a person whose interests are "inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the 
statute" lacks standing to sue.56 In this case, the statutorily protected interest is the interest of a 
shareholder, bondholder, or other person with a pecuniary interest in the utility. The injury 
Petitioners must allege in order to establish standing, therefore, has to have been suffered in their 
capacity as alleged shareholders or holders of some other type of pecuniary interest in the 
Company, not as customers. Otherwise, the specific grant of standing to a shareholder (or 
equivalent) would be meaningless.57 
The three purported shareholder Petitioners did not allege any injury in their capacity as 
shareholders. Rather, the entire premise of the Request for Reconsideration was Petitioners' 
within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory 
provision under which the agency has acted.") (citations omitted; emphasis added); Goldin v. Dept. of 
Environmental Protection, No. 03-P-l 168, 2004 WL 74466,*1 (Mass. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004) C[F]or the 
plaintiff to have standing, the injury alleged must fall within the area of concern of the statute or 
regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred.") (quotation omitted; emphasis 
added); United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dep 't of Pub. UtiL Control, 663 A.2d 1011, 1018 
(Conn. 1995) ("[I]n considering whether a plaintiffs interest has been injuriously affected by the granting 
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, we have looked to whether the injury he complains of 
(his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him ) falls within the zone of interests sought to be 
protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [his] complaint.") (emphasis 
in original; quotation omitted); Brink's, Inc. v. Maine Armored Car and Courier Service, Inc., 423 A.2d 
536, 538 (Me. 1980) ("For [competitors] to have standing to appeal [PUC decision], they must 
demonstrate that (1) they are within the class of persons whose interests [the statute] seeks to 
protect and (2) the objectives of [the statute] cannot be realized without their participation.") (citation 
omitted; emphasis added); cf, e.g., Utah Bankers Ass n v. America First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988, 991 
(Utah 1996) (Utah 1996) ("As defendants point out. however, a competitor in a regulated industry cannot 
prove palpable injury solely by alleging competitive disadvantage. It must also show that the alleged 
injury is within the scope of statutory concerns and is inconsistent with the aims and purposes of 
the entire regulatory scheme.") (quotation omitted; emphasis added). 
5D
 See Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass 7iM 479 U.S. at 397 n.12. 
56
 See id. at 399. 
57
 See, e.g., Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ("[Statutory enactments 
are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to 
be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.") (citations omitted). 
concern about it "cost[ing] them more when gas rates increase." In other words, they were 
alleging injury to their interests as customers, not their interests as shareholders. Indeed, the 
Request for Reconsideration^ rhetoric left nothing to the imagination regarding the interests 
Petitioners seek to represent. On the approximately 39 pages of the Request for Reconsideration 
where either the Order, specifically, or rate recovery for CO: removal costs more generally was 
attacked,59 not once was there any indication of an intent to protect the interests of shareholders. 
Rather, the Request for Reconsideration stated things such as: "If the Utility has mismanaged in 
the selection of means, then shareholders, not ratepayers, will—and rightly should—bear the cost 
of this imprudence;"60 "[t]o rule otherwise [than saying recovery is barred by the prudence 
language of the 2003 Decision] would mean that a regulated utility could hold ratepayers 
hostage;"61 that ratepayers are "the real parties in interest" affected by the Stipulation;62 that the 
Commission "surely must now permit the ratepayers to retain their own attorneys [i.e., counsel 
for Petitioners] and champion their own and the public interests when all other advocates have 
abandoned them;"63 and, finally, that the 2006 Order was an "egregious Commission gift to 
Questar's shareholders . . . ."64 Clearly, the three purported shareholders are not pursuing this 
case to protect any shareholder interest. 
The interests of shareholders protected under the statute cannot possibly have been 
harmed by the Commission's allowance of partial rate recovery for CO2 removal costs (at least 
3b
 Request for Reconsideration at 2. 
59
 See, e.g, id at 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19,22,24,26,27,28,29,30,35,36,37,38,39,43,44, 
45,46, 47,48, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 74, 75, 76. 
60
 Id. at 22. 
51
 Mat 45. 
62
 Id. at 65. 
63
 Id. at 74. 
64
 Mat 76. 
not from the direction pursued by Petitioners, where they seek to deny all rate recovery rather 
than alleging that the recovery was insufficient). Thus, in their capacity as shareholders, the 
three Petitioners lacked any showing of injury,05 while in their capacity as customers they were 
not entitled to seek reconsideration under the provisions of section 54-7-15. Either way, they 
lacked standing to pursue reconsideration, and could not satisfy section 54-7-15's prerequisites 
to bringing an appeal. 
This is precisely as it should be. The relevant language in section 54-7-15 was obviously 
intended to offer a level of special protection to people with some type of pecuniary interest in a 
public utility, potentially allowing them to seek reconsideration in certain circumstances where 
others could not. If persons were not required to demonstrate injury in their capacity as 
shareholders, they could assert their status as shareholders in order to seek reconsideration for 
the very purpose of undermining shareholder interests (exactly as Petitioners seek to do in this 
case). Indeed, they could even acquire a nominal amount of stock with the very intent of using 
that position to gain shareholder status under section 54-7-15 in order to undermine shareholder 
interests if an order favorable to shareholders were issued. In other words, they could 
deliberately become shareholders for the very purpose of harming shareholders. Such an 
interpretation of the statute would be absurd,66 allowing a person to acquire and use shareholder 
status as a club for harming the very people the statute is intended to protect, and would grant 
3
 Another way to descnbe this lack of injury is that in their capacity as alleged shareholders the 
three Petitioners are not adverse to the Order and there is no justiciable controversy. See, e g., Salt Lake 
County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 304 (1996) (justiciability should be determined even before standing); 
Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 535 U.S. 682, 684 (2002) ("As a general rule, a party may not 
appeal from a favorable judgment simply to obtain review of findings it deems erroneous.") (citing New 
York Tel Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645 (1934)). 
See supra note 57. 
standing to persons "whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further' the statutory 
objectives of section 54-7-15. 
D. PETITIONERS LACK OF INJURY TO A PROTECTED INTEREST ALSO 
PRECLUDES THEM FROM SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
Petitioners' inability to satisfy the requirements of section 54-7-15 prevented them from 
appropriately seeking reconsideration. Their inability to appropriately seek reconsideration in 
turn prevents them from pursuing an appeal. However, as noted above, section 54-7-15 is not 
the only provision relevant to Petitioners' standing to appeal. In addition to its impact under 
section 54-7-15, the lack of injury to a protected interest likewise prevents the three alleged 
shareholder Petitioners from being "aggrieved" parties under section 63-46b-14 and from being 
"substantially prejudiced" by the Order under section 63-46b-16 in their capacity as 
shareholders.69 No reasonable person with any type of pecuniary interest in Questar Gas could in 
good faith believe it favorable to that interest for the Commission to deny all rate recovery for 
CO2 removal costs as Petitioners seek to argue, and Petitioners have not even pretended to be 
forwarding any shareholder or other pecuniary interest in Questar Gas. Rate recovery is 
necessarily favorable to those with a pecuniary interest in the Company, and there would be no 
legitimate basis for a person holding such an interest to pursue denial of rate recovery through 
See Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass 'n., 479 U.S. at 397 n. 12. 
68
 See supra note 32. 
69
 See, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v Public Service Comm '/?, 861 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah 1993) 
("[F]or a reviewing court to grant relief under the UAPA, it must determine that the party has been 
'substantially prejudiced' by the complamed-of agency action. In other words, we must be able to 
determine that the alleged error was not harmless. Thus, the aggrieved party must be able to demonstrate 
how the agency's action has prejudiced it.") (citations omitted); cf., e.g.. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property 
Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm '/i, 1999 UT 41, % 11, 979 P.2d 346, 351 ("aggrieved" under Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act means "the traditional principle that claimants must be able to show that 
they have suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives them a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute.") (quotation and bracketing omitted). 
appeal. It is only through their alleged status as shareholders that the three Petitioners could 
even begin to attempt to qualify to pursue reconsideration and appeal, but the lack of injury in 
their alleged capacity as shareholders precludes appeal under sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16 
just as it precludes reconsideration under section 54-7-15. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition should be dismissed. A timely request for 
reconsideration filed by a party or other person with standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a 
petition for review. In the absence of standing to seek reconsideration of the Order, the Request 
for Reconsideration was invalid. No shareholder, bondholder, or other person holding any type 
of pecuniary interest in Questar Gas asserted any injury to that interest as a result of the Order, 
and no such person sought reconsideration. Thus, because no actual party to the case or person 
pecuniarily interested in Questar Gas and injured by the Order sought reconsideration within the 
time required by statute, a necessary prerequisite to appeal has not been met. Likewise, because 
no appropriate Petitioner can claim to be an aggrieved party or substantially prejudiced by the 
Order, another necessary prerequisite to appeal has not been met. Petitioners lack standing to 
pursue the Petition. As a result, it is respectfully submitted that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider the Petition and the Petition should be summarily dismissed. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Roger Ball and Claire Geddes, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Utah Public Service Commission and 
Questar Gas Company, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20060279 
Utah Public Service Commission 
Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 
04-057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS OF QUESTAR 
GAS COMPANY 
Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas" or "Company"), pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10 
and 23, provides this memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") the "Petition 
for Review of an Order on Request to Intervene, Issued by the Utah Public Service Commission, 
FILtC 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
m - 2 2006 
issued January 6, 2006" ("Petition") filed by Roger Ball and Claire Geddes ("Petitioners") on 
March 27, 2006. 
The bases for this Motion are that (1) the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to 
merit further consideration by the Court, (2) Petitioners failed to preserve issues for review in 
their "Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for Reconsideration of the Report and 
Order of the Utah Public Service Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Denying Them 
Intervention as Parties in These Dockets" ("Request for Reconsideration") and (3) by failing to 
seek a stay of the Report and Order ("Order") issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah 
("Commission") on the same date as the Commission's order denying Petitioners intervention 
("Intervention Order"), Petitioners failed to preserve their right to appeal the Order and, 
therefore, review of the Intervention Order is moot. 
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss the Petition. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Comm 'n, 2003 UT 29, 75 P. 3d 481 
("2003 Decision"), the Court reversed an order of the Commission in Docket No. 99-057-20 (the 
Company's 1999 general rate case) approving the CO2 Stipulation entered into by Questar Gas 
and the Utah Division of Public Utilities ("Division"), but opposed by the Utah Committee of 
Consumer Services ("Committee"). The CO2 Stipulation provided for partial rate recovery of the 
costs incurred by Questar Gas from June 1999 through May 2004 under a contract with its 
affiliate Questar Transportation Services Company ("Questar Transportation") for operation of a 
plant located in Castle Valley, Utah ("CO2 Removal Plant") that removes carbon dioxide 
("CO2") from natural gas produced from coal seams ("coal bed methane") in the Ferron area of 
Emery County, Utah. The basis for the Court's reversal was that the Commission had failed to 
hold Questar Gas to its burden of demonstrating that the CO2 removal costs provided for in the 
stipulation were prudent.1 
Following remand and after extensive briefing and oral argument involving marshalling 
of the evidence from the prior proceedings, the Commission concluded that Questar Gas had not 
met its burden to demonstrate that the decision to enter into a contract with Questar 
Transportation to build and operate the CO2 Removal Plant was prudent; thus, the Commission 
required Questar Gas to refund to customers all amounts collected in rates for these processing 
costs, plus interest. However, recognizing that this is an ongoing issue, the Commission 
specifically stated that: 
We will also address, in a separate docket, how to craft a long-term 
solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with natural 
gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's 
obligation to provide safe commodity and service to its customers.3 
Furthermore, in response to the Company's request for reconsideration and clarification, the 
Commission stated: 
The [2004 Order] addressed only Questar's failure to 
substantiate approval of the CO2 Stipulation in these proceedings 
and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation, which would have 
permitted recovery of some processing costs through May of 2004. 
Our reference to the May 2004 end date was dictated by the 
Stipulation's terms and was not intended to have any other 
preclusive effect on recovery by Questar. In regards to Questar's 
requests for clarification and reconsideration, we state that our 
Order does not preclude Questar from seeking recovery of 
CO2 processing costs in other dockets. We cannot opine, here, 
1
 2003 Decision at TI 13-15, 75 P.3d at 486-87. 
2
 Order, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-05 (Utah PSC Aug. 30, 2004) 
("2004 Order") at 38. On January 21, 2004, prior to the parties' briefing on prudence but after the 
Commission had determined to allow Questar Gas to attempt to demonstrate prudence in the wake of the 
2003 Decision, the Committee sought extraordinary relief before this Court to prevent the Commission 
from addressing prudence. The Court denied the Committee's petition for extraordinary relief m an order 
dated March 22, 2004. See Order, Case No. 20040060-SC (Mar. 22, 2004). 
3
 2004 Order at 38-39. 
on the likelihood of success for rate recovery of CO2 processing 
costs coming in other dockets. However arduous or facile the task 
may be to support or oppose recovery in other proceedings, it will 
be that of the participants. We will not prejudge the outcome. We 
will need to wait for Questar to make whatever arguments and 
present whatever evidence it deems appropriate in seeking 
recovery of these costs, whether incurred pre- or post-May 2004, in 
whatever dockets Questar may raise the issue.4 
Following issuance of the 2004 Order, the Commission issued a notice of scheduling 
conference on September 8, 2004, in Docket No. 04-057-09, "to set dates for technical 
conferences to discuss the long-term solution to Questar Gas Company's gas quality."5 The 
parties, including the Committee with Petitioner Roger Ball as its staff director, reached 
agreement on dates and subjects for a series of public technical conferences to explore various 
aspects of the issue. These six public technical conferences commenced on October 13, 2004 
and continued, with some adjustments in schedule agreed upon by the parties, through January 
19, 2005. At the last technical conference, on January 19, the Commission suggested that the 
next step was for Questar Gas to file an application for rate recovery. 
Following conclusion of the technical conferences, Questar Gas filed an application on 
January 31, 2005, in Docket No. 05-057-01, seeking recovery of its ongoing CO2 removal costs. 
These were not the $25 million in costs disallowed by the 2004 Order, refunded to customers and 
absorbed by Company shareholders, but rather ongoing costs incurred commencing at the 
earliest date allowed by law in light of the 2004 Order.6 This verified filing included as exhibits 
essentially every hand-out that had been introduced in the six public technical conferences. 
4
 Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-
057-14 and 03-057-05 (Utah PSC Oct. 20, 2004) at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
5
 Notice of Scheduling Conference, In the Matter of the Investigation of Questar Gas Company 5 
Gas Quality, Docket No. 04-057-09 (Utah PSC Sep. 8, 2004). 
6
 Questar Gas had preserved its right to seek ongoing expenses through pass-through gas cost 
applications on May 5, 2004 in Docket No. 04-057-04, on September 17, 2004 in Docket No. 04-057-11, 
The Commission gave notice on February 22, 2005 of a scheduling conference to 
schedule further proceedings in this matter. At that conference, held on March 1, the parties 
agreed upon a schedule under which Questar Gas would file testimony on April 15 supporting 
the prudence of its ongoing CO2 removal expenditures and the Division, Committee and any 
intervenor would file responsive testimony on August 15. Hearings were scheduled to 
commence on October 6, 2005. At least two of the Petitioners, Mr. Ball and Claire Geddes, were 
familiar with all of this contemplated procedure.7 
As contemplated, Questar Gas filed extensive sworn testimony in support of its 
Q 
application on April 15, 2005. The Division and Committee conducted extensive discovery 
both prior to and following this filing. They requested an extension of their August 15 testimony 
filing date in part because the parties were involved in settlement discussions based on the 
information provided in the testimony and discovery.9 An order amending the schedule was 
issued August 24, 2005, setting the new testimony filing date for September 20. No testimony 
was filed on September 20, again because the parties were in settlement discussions. On October 
and on December 9, 2004 m Docket No. 04-057-13. Each of these applications sought recovery of the 
costs Questar Gas was incurring for C02 removal at the C02 Removal Plant on a going-forward basis. In 
Docket No. 05-057-01, Questar Gas formally sought an order allowing recovery of these costs through a 
change m rates. 
7
 Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 
(Nov. 17, 2005) ("Intervention Request") at 2. 
8
 See, e g., Direct Testimony of Barrie L. McKay (Apnl 15, 2005) at 16-22 (reviewing the 
technical conferences and their outcome, explaining how potential affiliate conflicts had been identified 
and addressed, explaining why ownership and operation of the C02 Removal Plant by Questar 
Transportation was not disadvantageous to Questar Gas customers, and introducing other witnesses and 
the focus of their testimony, including Lawrence Conti addressing the Company's obligation to manage 
the heat content of its gas supplies; Robert Lammare addressing coal bed methane as a critical source of 
supply for the Company and the nation more generally; Alan Walker describing and quantifying benefits 
to the Company's customers from the production of coal bed methane; Robert Reid discussing changes in 
production and transportation of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain region and how coal bed methane has 
impacted natural gas prices; and Charles Benson addressing gas interchangeability ). 
9
 Mr. Ball was personally aware that settlement discussions were occurring, having participated in 
them as director of Committee staff pnor to the termination of his employment in that position. 
11, 2005, after extensive and difficult settlement discussions, at which not only the parties and 
their expert witnesses but others who expressed an interest in the matter (including industrial 
customer representatives) participated, the parties filed their Gas Management Cost Stipulation 
("Stipulation"). On the same day, even though no public hearing is required for the approval of a 
settlement among all parties to a case,10 the Commission gave notice of public hearings to be 
held on October 20, 2005 to consider approval of the Stipulation. 
Hearings were held on October 20 as scheduled. Each of the parties provided a witness 
in support of approval of the Stipulation. In addition, as provided in the Stipulation, the parties 
moved the Commission to admit into evidence in support of approval of the Stipulation the 
sworn testimony of Questar Gas filed on April 15.11 The Commission did so without objection. 
No one other than the parties appeared at the hearing to question the witnesses, present 
testimony, seek cross-examination of the filed testimony or object to its admission. The 
Commission asked questions regarding the motion and the Stipulation, which were answered by 
the witnesses. 
Two persons appeared and offered sworn testimony at the public witness hearing 
scheduled at 4:30 p.m. on the same day. Although one of these persons represented an industrial 
customer that regularly participates in Commission proceedings involving Questar Gas, the other 
was an individual who does not regularly participate in such proceedings. His presence 
10
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-l(3)(c) and (3)(e)(ii)(C). 
11
 The motion included a request that the Commission take notice of the information provided in 
the six public technical conferences and the application. However, as noted by the Commission, this 
aspect of the motion was unnecessary because the filed testimony adequately supported its decision. 
Order at 32, n. 18. In any event, the information provided m the technical conferences and the application 
was largely incorporated, without objection, into the sworn testimony of Barrie L. McKay filed April 15, 
2005. 
demonstrated that the Commission's notice was effective as to the public generally. At the 
conclusion of the public witness hearing, the Commission took the matter under advisement. 
Sometime following conclusion of the hearings, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes contacted the 
Commission, complaining that they were not aware of the hearings and requesting the 
opportunity to file statements. Although the hearings were properly noticed, the Commission 
informed them that they could still file statements. They filed affidavits on November 4, 2005. 
The Commission notified the parties that they could respond to the affidavits if they wished to do 
so. Questar Gas filed a response on November 11, stating that it did not object to the 
Commission considering the affidavits as unsworn public witness testimony (since there had 
been no opportunity for cross examination) and further stating that the affidavits provided no 
basis for the Commission to reject the Stipulation. 
On November 15, 2005, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes filed the Intervention Request, which 
contained essentially the same information and argument that was included in their affidavits. 
Questar Gas, the Division and the Committee all filed responses in opposition to the Intervention 
Request. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes filed a reply to the responses on December 13, 2005. 
On January 6, 2006, the Commission issued its Order on Request to Intervene 
("Intervention Order"), denying the request of Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes to intervene. On the 
same day, the Commission issued its Report and Order ("Order"), approving the Stipulation. 
On February 6, 2006, Petitioners filed their brief Request for Reconsideration seeking 
reconsideration of the Intervention Order.12 In the Request for Reconsideration, Petitioners cited 
a lengthy "Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public 
12
 Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for Reconsideration of the Report and 
Order of the Utah Public Service Commission, Issued January 6. 2006, Denying Them Intervention as 
Parties in these Dockets, Docket Nos. o4-057-04, 04-057-09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, and 05-057-01, 
("Request for Reconsideration1') at 2. 
Service Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation" 
filed by Bud Allen and the 52 others ("Allen Request"), seeking reconsideration of the Order 
approving the Stipulation13 and also cited their reply to the responses to their Intervention 
Request. 
Following the Commission's denial of the Request for Reconsideration, Petitioners filed 
the Petition with the Court on March 27, 2006, seeking review of the Commission's Intervention 
Order. 
Finally, on April 18, 2006, Petitioners served their docketing statement ("Docketing 
Statement") on Questar Gas (apparently filed with the Court on April 17), in which they 
identified as the issues for review: (1) "Whether the [Commission] erred in denying Petitioners 
the opportunity to intervene and be heard as parties in connection with the matters raised in the 
dockets below" and (2) "Whether the [Commission] should have acknowledged that Roger Ball 
was a de facto party and, hence, already a party in interest for purposes of participation in the 
dockets below."14 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Request to Intervene filed by Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes in the proceedings before the 
Commission stated that they were well aware of the proceedings before the Commission.15 
Nonetheless, Petitioners failed to pursue intervention until the proceedings were completed, and 
the Commission had taken the matter under advisement. Petitioners stated that the basis for their 
13
 Petitioners also filed a brief request for reconsideration of the Order which also cited the Allen 
Request. The Allen Request is the subject of another petition for review in Bud Allen, et ai v. Utah 
Public Service Commission and Questar Gas Company, Supreme Court No. 20060280. Questar Gas is 
also moving to dismiss that petition. 
14
 Docketing Statement at 3-4. 
15
 Intervention Request at 2. 
extremely tardy intervention was that they assumed their interests were being represented by the 
Committee until the Stipulation was filed and that they were not aware of the hearings scheduled 
by the Commission to consider approval of the Stipulation.16 However, the Petitioners had 
ample opportunity to inquire into the status of the proceedings long before the hearings. 
Furthermore, the affidavits provided no evidence to support the claim that Mr. Ball was a de 
facto party in the proceeding before the Commission. 
As noted in the Intervention Order, the Petitioners provided no explanation for not being 
aware earlier of the proceedings and the Commission found that the lack of involvement was due 
to their own inattention and lack of diligence.17 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW OF THE INTERVENTION ORDER ARE SO 
INSUBSTANTIAL THAT THEY DO NOT MERIT FURTHER CONSIDERATION. 
Summary disposition can be sought at any time on the basis that the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider an appeal, and within ten days after a docketing statement is served on 
the basis that "the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and 
consideration" by the Court.19 The Court may also order summary disposition sua sponte if it 
determines that it lacks jurisdiction or if "it plainly appears that no substantial question is 
presented."20 
16
 See Affidavit and Public Testimony of Roger J Ball, Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-09, 04-
057-11, 04-057-13 and 05-057-01 (Nov. 4, 2005) ("Ball Affid.") at 9. 
17
 Intervention Order at 6-7. 
18
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1). 
19
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(2)(A). 
20
 See Utah R. App. P. 10(e). 
1. Petitioners Dilatory Intervention Would Have Materially Impaired the 
Interests of Justice and the Orderly and Prompt Conduct of the 
Proceeding. 
Intervention in a formal Commission proceeding is inappropriate if intervention would 
materially impair the interests of justice or the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding."1 
There can be no reasonable dispute that granting Petitioners' intervention after the parties' 
participation in the proceeding had concluded and the Commission had taken the matter under 
advisement would have materially impaired the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt 
conduct of the proceeding. Thus, the Commission's denial was proper and there is no substantial 
basis for review of the Intervention Order. 
The proceedings in these dockets had been ongoing for over 18 months when Petitioners 
sought to intervene. More than 14 months prior to the filing of the Intervention Request, the 
Commission had instituted Docket No. 04-057-09 to investigate solutions to the issue presented 
by the increasing reliance of the Company's customers on coal bed methane and the 
incompatibility of that gas with their appliance settings.23 That investigation, which consisted of 
six public technical conferences and discovery by the Division, concluded nearly ten months 
prior to Petitioners' Intervention Request.24 Questar Gas filed its application formally seeking 
recovery in rates of CO2 removal costs on a going-forward basis over nine months prior to the 
filing of the Intervention Request and filed its extensive testimony in support of the application 
21
 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(2). 
22
 The application in Docket No. 04-057-04 was filed on May 5, 2004. 
23
 The Commission gave notice of the scheduling conference in this investigation on September 8, 
2004. 
24
 As noted above, the last technical conference, at which the Commission suggested that the next 
step was for Questar Gas to file an application for rate recovery occurred on January 19, 2005. 
seven months before the filing of the Intervention Request.25 Under the schedule of which 
Petitioners were fully aware, any intervenor was required to file testimony three months prior to 
the filing of the Intervention Request. Settlement discussions, in which Mr. Ball initially 
participated as director of Committee staff, commenced many months prior to the filing of the 
Intervention Request. The public notice of hearings on approval of the settlement ultimately 
reached by the parties was given more than one month prior to the filing of the Intervention 
Request, and the hearings on the Stipulation were completed 26 days before the Intervention 
Request was filed.26 
As noted above, Petitioners were aware of this matter throughout the proceedings. They 
knew of the technical conferences, of the submission of testimony and of the opportunity for 
discovery. Mr. Ball, at least, participated throughout a substantial part of the proceedings in his 
role as director of Committee staff. Petitioners' Intervention Request stated that "[a]ll parties are 
apt to need to conduct further discovery and prepare pre-filed testimony, and the Commission 
will likely want to again schedule several days for hearings" if they were granted intervention.27 
Yet Petitioners—with their extensive experience with Commission proceedings (and this 
proceeding in particular), with their review of the Commission's Notice of Hearing on Gas 
Management Cost Stipulation, and with their apparent review of the transcript of the hearing28— 
knew full well that all of the proceedings contemplated for this matter were complete, with the 
exception of the entry of a final order, before they requested intervention. 
25
 The application in Docket No. 05-057-01 was filed on January 31. 2005. The Company's 
testimony was filed on April 15, 2005. 
25
 The notice of hearing was given on October 11, 2005, and the hearings were held on October 
20,2005. 
27
 Intervention Request at 12-13. 
28
 Id. at 9. 
Thus, any further discovery, testimony, and hearings would only have been necessary to 
accommodate their untimely intervention.*" And an accommodation is an understatement of 
what they sought. They wished to undo the value of the work done by the parties in six public 
technical conferences, extensive discovery, the filing and review of voluminous sworn testimony 
and numerous settlement meetings and require all of the issues to be readdressed.30 They wished 
to "be permitted to conduct discovery, to testify, to call witnesses of their own, to put on 
evidence in support of their positions, and to be allowed to cross-examine any and all witnesses, 
to put on rebuttal evidence and testimony . . . ."31 They sought to re-examine coal bed methane 
issues going back "beginning to no later than 1989.. . ." They even sought to review the heat 
content range identified in the Company's tariff, which was approved without objection in 
1998.33 
There would have been nothing prompt nor orderly about the proceedings contemplated 
by Petitioners' intervention when they sought it; and, given the ample opportunity to participate 
earlier, it would have been manifestly unjust for them to be allowed to unwind the parties' hard 
work in adjudicating and settling this manner. Granting intervention to Petitioners after 
proceedings were essentially already concluded clearly would have impaired the interests of 
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of proceedings. 
If an administrative agency cannot appropriately deny intervention to parties that were 
29
 As the Commission noted in the Order, the Division and Committee had already submitted 
substantial discovery prior to determining whether to settle the case. The Division and Committee 
collectively "submitted twenty-three sets of data requests totaling over 400 questions" that resulted in the 
production of "nearly one thousand pages of studies, analysis, and information related to evaluation of the 
alternatives presented." See Order at 36. 
30
 See id. at 6-8. 
31
 Id. at 11. 
32
 Id. at 12. 
33
 Ball Affid. at 24-25. 
fully aware of the proceedings and yet chose not to participate for many months, only seeking 
intervention after the proceedings were essentially complete and all that was missing was a final 
order, then it has no ability to police its proceedings to ensure that the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings will not be impaired by untimely intervention. It 
should be so readily apparent that the Commission acted appropriately in denying intervention 
that "the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and 
consideration by" the Court.34 In such a case, the Petition should be summarily rejected. 
2. Mr. Ball Was Not a De Facto Party. 
In an effort to find a loophole to excuse Petitioners' failure to participate in this matter 
when they had so much notice and opportunity to intervene in a timely manner, the Request for 
Reconsideration (and now the Docketing Statement) claimed that Mr. Ball was a de facto party 
as a result of his prior involvement in the case as head of Committee staff.35 This claim relied on 
a mischaracterization of case law and of the positions of the Commission and the parties. 
The relevant cases do not hold that anyone participating in any capacity in an 
administrative proceeding without objection is a de facto party. Rather, they hold that an agency 
cannot seek to block appeal by an entity that was allowed to participate in a proceeding as a party 
without objection on the ground that the entity never sought intervention in the proceeding. In 
such a case, the party was a de facto party and the agency and other parties waived any objection 
to the party's standing.36 
34
 Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(2)(A). 
3D
 Request for Reconsideration at 2; Docketing Statement at 37. 
36
 See, e.g, Utah Ass *n of Counties v. Tax Comm 'n, 895 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1995) ("Counsel for 
UAC and the Counties conducted a cross-examination of [one witness] and a portion of the direct 
examination of [another witness]. Neither the Commission nor [MCI] objected to this participation at the 
hearing. While we commend to the Commission the observance of the statutes and its own rules 
regarding intervention, we conclude again that there has been a waiver of any objection to UACs and 
Mr. Ball's participation in the case prior to his filing of an affidavit on November 4, 
2005, was solely in his capacity as head of the staff of the Committee, not as a separate party. 
Indeed, it would have been improper for Mr. Ball to represent his own interests as a Questar Gas 
customer while appearing to all concerned to be acting on behalf of the broader interests of 
residential and small commercial customers as staff director of the Committee. Moreover, 
Mr. Ball never stated, suggested or implied that he was separately appearing in his own interests 
as a customer. 
The party in this case was the Committee, not Mr. Ball. He was simply one of the 
representatives of Committee. In the Counties case cited by Petitioners, the Utah Association of 
Counties ("UAC") appeared as UAC.37 Its attorney actively participated at the agency hearing, 
including conducting direct and cross examination on behalf of UAC, without objection by other 
parties. Mr. Ball did not do these things, or indeed participate in any way on his own behalf, 
while acting on behalf of the Committee. Nor did he do anything in the case following his 
termination from Committee staff. If Mr. Ball had been a de facto party, he would have 
continued participating after leaving Committee staff. Likewise, he would not have felt the need 
to later petition to intervene. Mr. Ball was clearly not a de facto party in this matter. 
B. PETITIONERS FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF THE INTERVENTION ORDER. 
Parties challenging a Commission order bear the burden of demonstrating that there was 
some essential legal or factual error by the Commission, or that previously undiscoverable 
evidence has been located that would support a different outcome. Section 54-7-15 specifically 
the Counties' participation and that they adequately intervened on a de facto basis.") (emphasis added)) 
("Counties case"). 
3
' See id. 
38
 See id. 
states that "[a]n applicant [for reconsideration] may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth 
in the application in an appeal to any court."39 The reason it is necessary to specifically identify 
issues in a petition for reconsideration to preserve them for appeal is that the principle of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that the agency have an opportunity to correct its 
own error before it is reviewed by a court.40 In the absence of an appropriate request for 
reconsideration, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal41 and summary disposition is 
appropriate. 
Petitioners failed to raise or even identify in the Request for Reconsideration the specific 
grounds for reconsideration before the Commission. Rather, with respect to the grounds for 
reconsideration, the one-page Request for Reconsideration simply stated: 
As grounds for this petition, Ball and Geddes hereby adopt and incorporate by 
reference all of the text, arguments, and reasoning found in that certain "Request 
of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public 
Service Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost 
Stipulation," which is being filed with the Commission on even date herewith, 
February 6, 2006. Ball and Geddes further adopt and incorporate by reference 
(with one exception noted below) all of the text, argument, and reasoning found in 
that certain "Petitioners' Response to Opposition of Questar Gas Company, the 
Division of Public Utilities, and the Committee of Consumer Services to Request 
for Intervention," which pleading was filed with the Utah Public Service 
Commission on December 13, 2005.42 
The express grounds for Petitioners' Request for Reconsideration were all "text, arguments, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). See also Utah Assoc. Mun. Power Sys. v. Public Service 
Comm 'n, 789 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1990) ("[A]n issue is not preserved for consideration on appeal unless 
it has been specifically raised m a petition for rehearing before the commission/'). 
40
 See, e g., Williams v. Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988) ("Requiring 
parties to PSC proceedings to file a petition for reheanng prior to seeking judicial review provides the 
PSC an opportunity to correct any manifest errors in its own decisions. The PSC's expertise and 
expenence in public utility regulation place it in the best position to review and expeditiously resolve any 
problems with its own decisions, orders, or rules. This process also conserves judicial resources by 
allowing some parties to obtain a resolution of their conflicts without involving the expense and time of 
formal appellate review."). 
42
 Request for Reconsideration at 2. 
reasoning" contained in the 77-page Allen Request, which sought reconsideration of a different 
order, and Petitioners' earlier argument which the Commission had already considered and 
rejected. Petitioners essentially asked the Commission and the parties to sift through the entirety 
of the Allen Request and take a second look at Petitioners' earlier filing, and attempt to ascertain 
which if any of the arguments made in the filings may apply to reconsideration of the 
Intervention Order. If Petitioners were not willing to put forth the effort to identify their grounds 
for reconsideration of the Intervention Order, there was no reason the Commission should have 
been required to do so. Nor would it have been reasonable for the Commission to rule in favor 
of Petitioners' Request for Reconsideration without requiring Petitioners to first clearly identify 
the basis for their request. Even if, for the sake of argument, the Commission should have been 
required to identify Petitioners' grounds for reconsideration, the Commission had already 
rejected the Petitioners' earlier arguments, and a review of the arguments in the Allen Request 
indicates that they did not address the issues raised in the Intervention Order. There is no 
argument in either the Intervention Response or the Allen Request or in the Docketing Statement 
that refers to any claimed error in the Intervention Order. Accordingly, Petitioners failed to 
identify the issues for reconsideration before the Commission and, therefore, preserved no 
grounds upon which to assert that this Court should review the Intervention Order.43 
C. PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO SEEK A STAY OF THE ORDER RENDERS THE 
PETITION MOOT. 
The Petition should be dismissed as moot because while Petitioners appealed the 
Intervention Order, they failed to properly preserve their right to appeal the Order approving the 
Stipulation. Thus, they never attained party status that would give them the right of appeal. In 
order to preserve their ability to appeal the Order as alleged interested parties in the proceeding, 
43
 Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). 
the Petitioners were required to seek a stay of the Order from the Commission, or alternatively, 
from this Court. If granted, such a motion would have tolled the appeals period for the Order, 
allowing the Commission or the Court to timely review the appeal of the Intervention Order 
before the time period to appeal the Order expired. Petitioners, however, failed to take such 
action. As a result, while this Court may review the Petition, Petitioners have not preserved the 
right to obtain the relief they are seeking: the ability to appeal the Order. As a matter of 
jurisdictional policy, courts refrain from adjudicating legal issues when the underlying case is 
moot.44 Accordingly, the Petition is moot and should be dismissed. 
The law regarding time limits for invoking review of an agency action is set forth in the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12, a party seeking 
review of an administrative order must file a written request for review within 30 days after the 
issuance of that order. Absent a stay or showing of good cause for an extension, the request must 
be delivered to the agency within the 30-day time limit in order for the agency to take 
jurisdiction over the request.45 Likewise, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, a party 
seeking judicial review of an administrative order must file a written request within 30 days of 
the order constituting a final agency action. This Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, have 
strictly construed and honored the statutory time limitation for filing a petition for judicial review 
of a final agency action under subsection 63-46b-14(3)(a).46 Such a limitation to hear an appeal 
from an administrative decision is jurisdictional in nature, and, where the time limit passes 
Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm Vi, 912 P.2d 960, 961 (Utah 
1996). 
45
 Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Comm >i, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
46
 See Dusty %s Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992); see also Maverick Country 
Stores, 860 P.2d at 950. 
without the request for review being made by a party to the proceeding, the jurisdiction of the 
<:ourt to take cognizance of the party's grievance is cut off by operation of law.47 
Specifically with respect to intervention requests, if a motion to intervene is denied, a 
movant may protect its position as an alleged interested party in the proceeding by seeking a stay 
of the proceeding or order with the agency or the court.48 Such a motion would provide the 
appellate body with a timely opportunity to review the merits of the movant's claim and decide 
whether a stay is warranted.49 Upon failure of a party to take timely action to protect its right of 
review, thereafter the party is precluded from seeking review of the agency action in any court."0 
Petitioners failed to protect their position as alleged interested parties in the proceeding 
by seeking a stay of the Order and thereby lost the right to appeal the Order. On January 6, 
2006, the Commission denied Petitioner's Intervention Request, concluding that granting 
intervention to Petitioners after the proceedings were already essentially concluded would impair 
the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings. On the same day, 
the Commission issued the Order approving the Stipulation. On February 6, 2006, Petitioners 
filed their Request for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the Intervention Order. 
Petitioners, however, failed to take the appropriate action with respect to the Order. Rather than 
seek a stay, Petitioners presumed the ability to seek reconsideration and appeal of the Order 
Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Senice Commission, 602 P.2d 696, 699-700 
(Utah 1979). 
48
 See Dominion Video Satellite v. Echostar Satellite, 356 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2004). 
"id. 
~
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 Bowen Trucking, Inc v. Public Sennce Comm 'n, 559 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah 1977). 
notwithstanding the fact that they were not proper parties to the proceeding. They, however, had 
no standing or right to do so in the absence of being granted party status.51 
When the Commission denied the Intervention Request, the proper procedure would have 
entailed moving the Commission to stay the Order pending reconsideration and appeal of the 
Intervention Order.52 If the Commission refused to stay the Order, Petitioners could have 
petitioned this Court for a stay.53 Such a stay would have tolled the appeals period and provided 
the Commission or the Court timely opportunity to review the merits of the Petitioners' 
challenge to the Intervention Order and, if their challenge was meritorious, preserved their right 
as alleged interested parties to appeal the Order. Petitioners, however, failed to take such action. 
Even if the Commission erred in denying intervention, Petitioners' failure to seek a stay of the 
Order makes it too late for them to now file an appropriate petition for reconsideration and an 
appeal of the Order. Accordingly, their Petition is moot. As a matter of jurisdictional policy, 
courts refrain from adjudicating legal issues when the underlying case is moot and, therefore, the 
Petition should be denied.54 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There can be no legitimate dispute that Petitioners' attempt to intervene and conduct 
discovery, file testimony, and conduct several days of hearings after the matter had been 
51
 Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that 
properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled."); S & G, Inc. v Morgan, 797 
P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (would-be appellant of administrative decision "waivefs] its right to judicial 
review by failing to participate in the administrative proceedings."). 
52
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(e) ("Unless an order of the commission directs that an order 
is stayed or postponed, an application for review or reheanng does not excuse any corporation or person 
from complying with and obeying any order or decision of the commission.''); Utah Admin. Code R746-
100-11 .E ("Upon petition of a party, and for good cause shown, the Commission may extend the time for 
compliance fixed in an order/'). 
53
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-17. 
"
4
 Matrix Funding Corp., 912 P.2d at 961. 
submitted to the Commission for decision would have materially impaired the interests of justice 
and the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding. Petitioners failed to preserve any issue 
for appeal by failing to specify grounds for reconsideration in their Request for Reconsideration 
Petitioners' failure to seek a stay of the Order approving the Stipulation until the Intervention 
Order was reconsidered or reviewed on appeal renders the Petition moot. For all of these 
reasons, the Petition should be dismissed. 
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Approval of a Natural Gas Processing 
Agreement 
DOCKET NO. 03-057-05 
DOCKET NO. 01-057-14 
DOCKET NO. 99-057-20 
DOCKET NO. 98-057-12 
ORDER 
SYNOPSIS 
ISSUED: August 30. 2004 
The Commission determined that Questar Gas Company failed to meet its burden 
of proving it acted prudently in response to increasing deliveries of low heat content coal-seam 
gas to its distribution system by affiliate Questar Pipeline Company. The Commission rejects the 
parties' carbon dioxide stipulation, denies Questar Gas Company's request for carbon dioxide 
processing plant rate recovery The Commission will conduct further proceedings, in a separate 
docket, to address treatment of funds collected from ratepayers and address a long term solution 
to coal-seam gas delivered to customers. 
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BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Docket No. 98-057-T02 
Following a series of meetings and discussions beginning in January 1998 with 
the Commission, the Division of Public Utilities (Division), and the Committee of Consumer 
Services (Committee) to notify us of an imminent safety problem associated with heat-content 
levels in the natural gas supplies it was receiving from Questar Pipeline Company (Questar 
Pipeline), an affiliated company, and the incompatibility of that gas with current appliance set 
points, Questar Gas Company (Questar Gas or Company) filed Advice Letter 98-02 on April 21, 
1998, reducing the heat-content operating range in its tariff from 1020 to 1320 Btu per cubic foot 
(cf) to 980 to 1170 Btu/cf. The Division filed a memorandum on April 30, 1998, supporting the 
change, and no party objected to it. The change became effective on May 1, 1998. 
B. Docket No. 98-057-12 
Questar Gas filed an application on November 25, 1998, in Docket No. 98-057-
12, requesting approval of a contract with Questar Transportation Services Company (Questar 
Transportation), a subsidiary of Questar Pipeline, for removal of carbon dioxide (C02) from 
coal-seam gas tendered by shippers for transport on the pipeline. The application also requested 
authorization to include C02 removal costs, then estimated at $7.5 to $8.5 million annually, in 
the 191 Gas Cost Balancing Account (Account 191). Questar Gas requested a Commission 
finding that the contract was prudent. The Division and Committee presented testimony about 
the CO2 processing plant but argued that it was not necessary for the Commission to determine 
the prudence of the contract at that time and that inclusion of the C02 removal costs in Account 
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191 was inappropriate because the costs did not qualify for pass-through treatment under Utah 
Code Ann. §54-7-12(3). 
The parties conducted substantial discovery and presented extensive evidence in 
the case regarding Questar's decision to process CO2. On February 1, 1999, Questar Gas filed 
the direct testimony of Alan K. Allred, Manager of Regulatory and Gas Supply Services for 
Questar Regulated Services Company (Questar Regulated Services); Gary W. DeBernardi, Vice 
President of Technical Services for Questar Regulated Services; George K. Schroeder, Director 
of Research and Development for Questar Gas; and John P. Snider, an outside consultant from 
Grimm Engineering, Inc. On April 1, 1999, the Division filed the direct testimony of Darrell S. 
Hanson, Technical Consultant in the Division's Energy Section, and Neal Townsend, Division 
Rate Analyst. On the same day, the Committee filed the direct testimony of Michael J. 
McFadden, a consultant from McFadden Consulting Group, Inc., and A.E. Middents, an 
independent consultant retained by McFadden Consulting. Questar Gas then filed the rebuttal 
testimony on April 26, 1999 of Messrs. Allred, DeBernardi and Schroeder and of Branko Terzic, 
who is both a former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) commissioner and a 
former state regulator. 
The Division and Committee filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that the C02 removal costs could not be included in Account 191 because they did not qualify for 
pass-through treatment under the pass-through statute as a matter of law. Following the filing of 
memoranda, the motion was argued in a hearing on June 7, 1999. Following the hearing, the 
Commission denied the motion without prejudice. Accordingly, the Division filed the testimony 
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of Charles E. Olson, consultant from Zinder Companies, Inc., on June 17, 1999 and the rebuttal 
testimony of Mr. Hanson on June 22, 1999. Evidentiary hearings were held on June 22 and 23, 
1999. Thereafter, the parties filed opening briefs on September 1, 1999 and responsive briefs on 
September 30, 1999. 
The Commission issued its Report and Order in Docket No.98-057-12 on 
December 3, 1999 (1999 Order), ruling that the C02 removal costs could not be recovered 
through Account 191 because they were not appropriate pass-through costs under section 54-7-
12(3). The Commission specifically declined to rule on the prudence of the contract. The 
Commission stated that the request for approval of the contract and recovery of costs must be 
considered either in a general rate case or an abbreviated proceeding as defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Utah Dept. of Business Reg. v. Public Serv. Corntnn, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 
1980). 
C. 2001 Supreme Court Decision 
Questar Gas sought review of the 1999 Order before the Supreme Court. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the Court reversed the 1999 Order on October 23, 2001, 
holding that Account 191 was a separate rate-changing mechanism not tied to the pass-through 
statute and that the Commission was required to consider Questar Gas's application according to 
previously established Account 191 procedures. 
By the time the case was remanded, the Commission had already issued its Report 
and Order in Docket No. 99-057-20, (a non gas pass-through general rate case) discussed below. 
1
 Questar Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2001 UT 93, 34 P.3d 218. 
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Accordingly, the remand of Docket No. 98-057-12 was consolidated with Docket No. 01-057-14, 
the then-pending gas cost pass-through docket, also discussed below. 
D. Docket No. 99-057-20 
On December 17, 1999, Questar Gas filed an application in Docket No. 99-057-
20 to increase its general rates by $22,227,000, $7.3 million of that amount being for C02 
removal costs. The application included direct testimony from Mr. Allred relating to the C02 
removal cost issue. Questar Gas sought emergency interim rate relief of approximately $7 
million, which was granted following hearing. 
Thereafter, additional discovery took place and the Division, Committee, Large 
Customer Group (LCG) and MagCorp filed testimony on April 9, 2000 related to C02 removal 
costs. Division witnesses Messrs. Hanson and Townsend and George Compton, Technical 
Consultant in the Division's Telecommunications Group, filed testimony on the C02 removal 
cost issue and Lowell Alt, Manager of the Division's Energy Section and the Division's policy 
witness, filed testimony recommending that 50% of the C02 removal costs be allowed in rates. 
Committee witness Mr, McFadden recommended that none of the costs be allowed in rates. LCG 
witness Kevin C. Higgins, a consultant, and MagCorp witness Roger C. Swenson, MagCorp's 
Energy Manager, also recommended that none of the costs be allowed in rates. 
On May 24, 2000, Questar Gas filed the rebuttal testimony of Messrs. Allred, 
Snider and Terzic relating to C02 removal costs. On the same day, LCG filed the rebuttal 
testimony of Mr. Higgins responding to the Division testimony on rate design associated with 
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recovery of C02 removal costs. Surrebuttal testimony on C02 removal cost issues was filed by 
Dr. Compton for the Division on May 31, 2000. 
On June 2, 2000, Questar Gas and the Division filed a C02 Stipulation, agreeing 
that $5 million (approximately 68%) of C02 removal costs could be included in rates and that up 
to $5 million could be included in rates each year for five years, subject to further regulatory 
review of the reasonableness of the costs. They also agreed that if Questar Gas wished recovery 
of C02 removal costs after May of 2004, it would be required to seek further regulatory 
approval. 
An allocation and rate design stipulation was filed by Questar Gas, the Division, 
LCG and the Utah Industrial Gas Users (UIGU). Based on the rate design for recovery of C02 
removal costs provided in the latter stipulation, LCG and UIGU withdrew their opposition to 
recovery of C02 removal costs in the amount provided in the C02 Stipulation. 
A hearing was held on June 5 and 6, 2000, for the purpose of hearing testimony in 
support of and in opposition to the C02 Stipulation. Based upon a request of all parties, the 
Commission took administrative notice of the entire record in Docket No. 98-057-12. Questar 
Gas and Division witnesses presented testimony in support of the Stipulation and were cross 
examined by the Committee, which was the only party that opposed approval of the Stipulation. 
The Committee also cross-examined Messrs. Hanson and Townsend and Dr. Compton, in an 
attempt to elicit support for its position that no recovery of C02 costs should be allowed. 
Questar Gas, the Division, UIGU and LCG waived both cross examination of testimony 
challenging the prudence of Questar Gas and the submission of further surrebuttal testimony, but 
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reserved their right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present further testimony if the 
Stipulation were not approved by the Commission. Public witnesses, two of whom represented 
coal-seam gas producers, presented sworn testimony on the Stipulation during the continued 
hearing in the case on June 7, 2000. 
A further hearing consisting of both testimony and argument on the C02 issue was 
held on June 23, 2000, at the Commission's request. Thereafter, the parties submitted opening 
briefs on June 30, 2000 and responsive briefs on July 14, 2000. 
On August 11, 2000, the Commission issued its Report and Order in Docket No. 
99-067-20 (2000 Order). The 2000 Order approved the C02 stipulation, concluding that 
The record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the 
Company's analysis of options prior to early 1998 was sufficiently 
objective and thorough, that is, to reach a conclusion whether 
options were ruled in or out as a result of the influence of affiliate 
interests. Nor can a sufficient record be developed.... The record 
leaves no doubt, however, that by early 1998, the number of 
effective alternatives had narrowed to two: process the coal-seam 
gas or keep it off the distribution system. [Questar Gas] chose to 
process the gas. If the gate had been closed to coal-seam gas, 
[Questar Gas] states, demand on the southern part of its system 
could not have been met. This assertion is uncontroverted. 
The most troubling question is whether the contract between 
[Questar Gas] and its unregulated affiliate, [Questar 
Transportation], was prudently entered. . . . Clearly, [Questar Gas] 
has the burden to demonstrate the decision to enter the contract is a 
prudent one. Parties differ as to whether it did so successfully. But 
whether or not [Questar Gas] met this burden, we can and do 
conclude that its decision to procure gas processing has yielded the 
required result, that is, it has effectively protected the safety of its 
customers. This means the costs of gas processing can be 
legitimately recovered in rates. 
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We conclude that the Stipulation offers a fair and 
reasonable settlement of the cost recovery issue. We accept the 
Stipulation.2 
E. 2003 Supreme Court Decision 
The Committee sought review of the 2000 Order before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the Court reversed the 2000 Order on August 1, 2003, holding 
[Tjhe real issue in this case is whether the Commission may rely 
on a "safety exception" that relieves Questar Gas of its burden to 
demonstrate the prudence of its contract with Questar Pipeline to 
construct and operate the C02 plant under terms that caused 
Questar Gas to incur the costs it now seeks to pass on to 
ratepayers. 
. . . We hold that the Commission's safety rationale is neither an 
adequate nor a fair and rational basis for departing from its 
prudence review standard. While safety concerns may have 
necessitated the construction and operation of a C02 plant, they do 
not establish who should bear the cost of these measures.3 
Even before the Court issued its remittitur on August 22, 2003, the parties made filings based on 
the 2003 Decision. These filings are discussed below. 
F. Docket No. 01-057-14 
On December 14, 2001, in Docket No. 01-057-14, Questar Gas filed a pass-
through application requesting an annualized cost decrease. After the Court's 2001 Decision 
reversing the Commission's 1999 Order in Docket No. 98-057-12, the Commission consolidated 
z
 2000 Order at 34-36. 
3
 Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2003 UT 29, && 12-13, 75 P.3d 481, 
485-86 (2003 Decision) 
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that docket with Docket No. 01-057-14. The Commission authorized the rate decrease to become 
effective on January 1, 2002 on an interim basis. The decrease was made final by the 
Commission in an order issued on August 14, 2002 in Docket No. 01-057-14 (2002 Order). 
The 2002 Order addressed recovery of C02 removal costs through Account 191 
pursuant to the 2001 Supreme Court decision. Because Questar Gas had been recovering $5 
million of C02 costs annually in general rates since the 2000 Order in Docket No. 99-057-20, the 
Commission was concerned only with recovery of C02 removal costs for the period from June 1, 
1999 through August 10, 2000. The Commission found that the C02 Stipulation, which included 
the $5 million annual cap, should govern their determination of the methodology to be used for 
the recovery of the C02 costs from June 1, 1999 to August 10, 2000. Within that framework the 
Commission authorized the recovery of an additional $3.76 million for the prior period on the 
same rate spread as was approved in Docket No. 99-057-20. Because the rate design stipulation 
in Docket No. 99-057-20 recovered a portion of C02 removal costs from customers whose rates 
are not subject to Account 191, the Commission directed that recovery of a small portion of the 
$3.76 million would be through rate changes made in a new pending general rate case, Docket 
No. 02-057-02. 
On October 7, 2002, the Committee sought review of the Commission's 2002 
Order in this docket by the Supreme Court. That appeal was consolidated with the Committee's 
prior appeal of the 2000 Order in Docket No. 99-057-20. 
G. Docket No. 02-057-02 
Questar Gas filed an application in Docket No. 02-057-02 on May 3, 2002, for a 
general rate increase of $23,017,000. The parties, including the Committee, ultimately settled all 
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issues (except for gas processing costs which were not at issue) in the case by stipulation except 
return on equity and capital structure. The stipulation provided for future recovery of C02 
removal costs through Account 191 in the amount specified in the C02 Stipulation. In its Report 
and Order issued December 30, 2002, the Commission approved the stipulation of the parties. 
No party appealed this decision. 
H. Docket No. 03-057-05 
On May 30, 2003, in Docket No. 03-057-05, Questar Gas filed a pass-through 
application requesting an annualized gas cost increase to become effective on July 1, 2003. C02 
removal costs of $5 million were included in this application. The Commission issued an order 
authorizing the proposed rate increase on an interim basis, effective July 1, 2003. 
The Committee filed a petition in this docket on August 8, 2003, following 
issuance of the 2003 Supreme Court Decision, requesting that Questar Gas's rates be 
immediately reduced by $5 million and that a refund of the entire amount of C02 removal costs 
included in rates to date be implemented through Account 191. The portion of the docket dealing 
with the Committee's petition was consolidated with Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20 and 01-
057-14, as discussed below. 
I. Docket No. 03-057-10 
Questar Gas filed an application in Docket No. 03-057-10 on September 4, 2003, 
requesting an annualized gas cost decrease to become effective on October 1, 2003. The 
application specified that Questar Gas was seeking recovery of all its ongoing C02 removal 
costs, but was leaving recovery at $5 million per year on an interim basis pending the outcome of 
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this proceeding. Questar Gas, the Division and the Committee entered into a stipulation on 
September 25, 2003, providing that the proposed rate reduction could be implemented and that 
future recovery of C02 removal costs would be deferred for later decision following completion 
of the consolidated dockets. The Commission approved the stipulation on September 30, 2003. 
J. Consolidated Dockets 
On August 6, 2003, Questar Gas filed a motion requesting a scheduling and 
procedural conference in Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20 and 01-057-14 "to allow the parties 
in the case to discuss, determine and schedule such additional proceedings as may be necessary" 
in light of the 2003 Decision. The Commission scheduled a hearing on August 26, 2003. At the 
outset of the hearing, Chairman Ric Campbell announced that he, Commission Executive Staff 
Director Lowell Alt and Commission Attorney Douglas C. Tingey were recusing themselves 
from any participation in this matter as a result of the fact they had participated as Division 
Director, Division policy witness and Committee attorney, respectively, in earlier stages of this 
dispute. Accordingly, Chairman Campbell requested that Commissioner White act as Chair for 
purposes of these proceedings and informed the parties that he would request that the Governor 
appoint a Commissioner Pro Tern to hear the case along with the remaining two commissioners. 
After hearing the positions of the parties, including the Committee's request that 
its petition in Docket No. 03-057-05 be considered in the case, the Commission set a schedule 
for the parties to address jurisdictional and procedural matters arising from the 2003 Decision. 
Pursuant to that schedule, Questar Gas and the Committee filed opening briefs on September 25, 
2003. Those parties and the Division, UAE Intervention Group (UAE), successor in interest to 
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the LCG, and U S Magnesium LLC (US Mag), successor in interest to MagCorp, filed 
responsive briefs on October 23, 2003. Questar Gas and the Committee filed reply briefs on 
November 5, 2003. Questar Gas and the Division argued that the Commission had authority to 
proceed to consider whether the C02 removal costs were prudently incurred. UAE agreed that if 
the Commission determined it had not previously made a finding on whether or not Questar Gas 
was prudent in incurring the C02 removal costs, then the Commission had the authority to 
determine prudence. The Committee and US Mag argued that the Commission was barred by the 
2003 Supreme Court Decision from further proceedings, except to reduce rates going forward 
and order a refund of past amounts collected by Questar Gas pursuant to the C02 Stipulation. 
Governor Leavitt appointed W. Val Oveson to act as Commissioner Pro Tern in 
this matter. Commissioner Oveson was provided with the complete record in Docket No. 98-
057-12 and the portion of the record in Docket No. 99-057-20 relevant to the C02 removal cost 
issue. He was also provided with the complete record in this consolidated matter. From and after 
the date of his appointment, Commissioner Oveson has participated fully in all proceedings and 
deliberations in this matter. 
A hearing was held on December 11, 2003, at which the parties presented oral 
argument in support of their positions and responded to questions from the Commission. 
On December 17, 2003, the Commission issued its Order in the consolidated 
dockets (2003 Order), concluding that statements in the 2000 Order (Docket No. 99-057-20) that 
appeared to cause the Court to believe that the Commission had already determined that it could 
not find the C02 removal costs prudent were uan ambiguous use of dicta." The Commission 
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concluded that it "ha[d] not yet put Questar [Gas] to its burden of proof that its decisions were 
prudent and rates including some, if any, recovery of processing costs are just and reasonable." 
The Commission further stated: 
The Supreme Court's reversal of a portion of the August 2000 
[Order] places the case in the same position it was before the 
Commission's approval of the C02 Stipulation. . . . At that point in 
time, Questar [Gas] and other parties had put on their cases in chief 
and all that remained was final cross-examination of witnesses 
(Questar [Gas], at oral argument has said that this is no longer 
needed by the company), a marshaling of the evidence and final 
arguments. 
Wherefore, we conclude that the parties should now have the 
opportunity to marshal the evidence from the existing records in 
Dockets 98-057-12 and 99-057-20 relating to the prudence of 
Questar [Gas]'s actions and decisions. We will determine whether 
Questar [Gas] has met its burden to show that its actions were 
prudent and that inclusion of any costs relating to remedial actions 
affecting C02 levels in the natural gas delivered to customer results 
in just and reasonable rates. 
The Commission also set a conference for January 7, 2004, to set a schedule for 
the presentation of positions. The Division and Committee requested that the scheduling 
conference be delayed to allow the Committee to determine if it was going to seek interlocutory 
review of the 2003 Order in the consolidated dockets. On January 21, 2004, the Committee filed 
a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Supreme Court. The Commission, Division and 
Company responded on February 6, 2004. On March 22, 2004, the Court issued its order denying 
the Committee petition. 
Thereafter, pursuant to an agreed scheduling order issued March 26, 2004, 
Questar Gas, the Division and Committee filed briefs marshaling the evidence on May 7, 2004, 
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and responsive briefs on May 21, 2004. A hearing was held on May 27, 2004, at which the 
parties presented further argument and citations to evidence and responded to questions from the 
Commission. Questar Gas and the Division argued that the evidence in the record supported a 
finding that an unaffiliated, reasonable local distribution company (LDC) could have prudently 
incurred $5 million per year in costs in addressing the heat-content issue. The Committee 
maintained that the record did not support a finding of prudence for any C02 removal costs. 
In addition to considering the briefs of the parties and their argument and 
responses to questions during oral argument, the Commission has studied the entire record in 
Docket No. 98-057-12 and the portions of the record in Docket No. 99-057-20 relevant to the 
C02 issue. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline are subsidiaries of Questar Regulated Services, 
which is in turn a subsidiary of Questar Corporation. Questar Transportation Services is an 
unregulated subsidiary of Questar Pipeline. Questar Regulated Services, Questar Gas, and 
Questar Pipeline are managed by the same management team. Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline 
have no independent management, but are both managed by Questar Regulated Services.4 Prior 
to 1996, Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline did not share management personnel, but both 
companies' management teams reported to their corporate parent, Questar Corporation. 
Due to this unique management structure and the difficulties it can pose in distinguishing the 
precise business entity on whose behalf a manager takes a particular action, references throughout this 
Report and Order to "Questar management" are intended to refer to managers within Questar Regulated 
Services acting on behalf of Questar Regulated Services and/or one or more of its subsidiaries. 
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As early as 1989, recognizing a business opportunity, Questar Pipeline began 
entering into future capacity transportation contracts with the producers of coal-seam gas in the 
Ferron Basin in Emery County, Utah. In order to transport this gas, Questar Pipeline had, by the 
mid-1990s, invested approximately $1 million to expand its transportation facilities and 
promised further investment as production increased. By transporting the coal seam gas by 
displacement through its southern main line, Questar Pipeline ensured that this gas would enter 
Questar Gas's local distribution system at the Payson Gate. Because coal-seam gas is almost 
pure methane, its heat content is significantly lower than the heat content of the gas historically 
provided to Utah customers. Producers of this gas are required to process it to the three percent 
total-inert level required by the FERC-approved tariff specifications of Questar Pipeline. 
However, if not further treated or blended, this gas would pose a significant safety threat to Utah 
consumers whose appliances have historically been set to burn higher heat content gas. 
Questar Pipeline began transporting coal-seam gas in 1992. In 1994 and again in 
1995, the quantity of coal-seam gas transported by Questar Pipeline, and coincidentally entering 
Questar Gas's distribution system, accelerated significantly. We take notice that in its 1996 
annual shareholder report, Questar Corporation reported the increasing quantities of coal-seam 
gas being transported on Questar Pipeline's system. By 1997, these quantities of coal seam gas 
entering the system were increasing at dramatically accelerated rates. Throughout this period, 
Questar Pipeline blended the coal-seam gas with other gas on its transportation system in efforts 
to ensure that the gas ultimately reaching Utah customers complied with the heat content 
requirements of Questar Gas' tariff. Inexplicably, however, from 1992 to mid-1997, despite 
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clear indications that coal-seam gas would continue to account for an increasing percentage of 
southern system gas supply, we find no evidence Questar Gas took proactive measures to 
analyze the long term (including the potential safety) impact of this gas on its Utah distribution 
system. 
On April 25, 1997, Questar Regulated Services formed a Gas Quality Team to 
"Determine the operating and economic impact of the existing QPC [Questar Pipeline] gas 
quality specifications with respect to interconnecting pipelines and the MFS [Questar Gas] and 
QPC systems and suggest possible modifications to the specifications and other potential 
methods to deal with gas quality issues. (Consider enforcement mitigation issues.)" Initially, the 
team focused its attention on tariff specification issues. By May 26, 1997, it was suggested that a 
'Tariff Task Force" be created; however it was not. Indeed, the team's focus evolved and after 
three meetings, its draft mission statement read: "Develop and maintain safe and cost effective 
solutions to transporting natural gas of variable BTU values while improving customer 
satisfaction and maintaining Questar financial performance." Thus, we observe a shift in goal 
from considering the utilities' gas quality issues to explicitly include the maintenance of Questar 
Corporation's financial performance. 
In its investigation of the CO2 processing plant decision, the Division asked the 
Company to provide its review of FERC cases wherein the quality of gas being delivered to a 
marketing area was an issue. The Company could not identify where any review had been made. 
The Division also asked about any negotiations with producers or shippers over appropriate CO2 
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and BTU levels for coal bed methane gas being delivered to QPC. The Company said that 
negotiations with coal bed methane producers or shippers had not been conducted. 
Several comments in the Gas Quality Team minutes explain why the Questar 
Corporation Companies did not pursue changes to pipeline tariff specifications: 
If QPC raises its BTU requirement we will not be able to 
ship gas for anyone but MFS. We would ultimately be a 
"gathering" system for MFS. (12/31/97 Minutes) 
Under the discussion of "Southern System Options - Shut 
in River Gas" one bullet reads "Largest Development on 
QPC System".(Presentation made to Nick Rose, President 
of QGC and QPC latter part of November 1997) 
When we talk about shutting in coal seam gas it is always brought 
up that if we don't transport the gas someone else will my question 
is if someone else can build a pipeline to transport the gas and it is 
economically feasible why can't we? (12/3/97 Minutes) 
The Gas Quality Team's changing mission statement, the evolving focus of the 
team and these comments indicate the Company's divided concerns about the success of QPC 
and the safety of QGC retail customers. QGC, as one participant in this team, was not 
independent in searching for the cheapest way to permanently solve the low BTU safety 
problem. Said more forcefully, it appears that possible permanent solutions to the low BTU 
safety problem were not thoroughly analyzed because of potential adverse impacts on QPC. This 
divided allegiance of team participants highlights the need for vigilant scrutiny of affiliate 
transactions and the burden on a regulated utility affiliated with unregulated entities to prove the 
prudence of its actions when dealing with its affiliates. 
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This team did not focus on the issue of increased production of coal-seam gas 
until August 20, 1997, at which time team members were tasked to analyze alternatives to 
address the issue. At a meeting on September 25, 1997, the team reviewed alternatives and 
discussed the possibility of adjusting customer appliances and CO2 removal. By the end of 1997, 
Questar Gas finally recognized that, by the spring or early summer of 1999, the blending 
operations would no longer be sufficient to ensure the delivery of safe, tariff-compliant gas to 
Questar Gas's customers at Pay son Gate. 
In January 1998, Questar Gas informed the Commission, the Division and the 
Committee of the accelerating decline in the heat content of its gas supplies generally, as well as 
the issue specifically related to coal-seam gas. Prior to May 1, 1998, Questar Gas's Commission-
approved Utah tariff specified a heat-content operating range of 1020 to 1320 Btu/cf. Appliances 
are required by building codes to be set to burn gas within the tariffs specified range to ensure 
customer safety.5 Questar management concluded that the long-term solution to its coal-seam gas 
problem was to lower the Btu range specified in Questar Gas's Utah tariff and make a 
corresponding change to recommended appliance set points. We approved the amended tariff 
effective May 1, 1998, to reduce the heat content to an operating range of 980 to 1170 Btu/cf. 
However, Questar Gas had already determined that even an expedited appliance adjustment 
program would take at least four years and would cost over $100 million, meaning 
5
 If gas outside the specified range is burned potentially serious safety problems may arise. These 
include conditions known as flame liftoff and incomplete combustion. In moderate flame-liftoff 
conditions, elevated levels of the potentially deadly gas carbon monoxide are present in excess of 
accepted code requirements. In severe liftoff conditions, the flame burns above the burner surface or is 
extinguished entirely. Both flame liftoff and incomplete combustion cause significant safety concerns. 
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that the vast majority of customers would not be able to adjust their appliance set points before 
the level of coal-seam gas exceeded Questar Pipeline's blending capacity. 
From late 1997 through mid-1998 Questar management considered several 
alternatives to deal with the impending safety problem, including adjusting customer appliances, 
injecting higher Btu hydrocarbons into the gas stream at Payson Gate, and other pipeline 
projects. However, by February or March of 1998, Questar Gas had confirmed that by removing 
CO2 from the coal-seam gas so that the total CO2 level was one percent or less, it could provide a 
safe solution to the problem and that it could implement this solution by spring or early summer 
of 1999. Its rough analysis of this and other possible solutions led Questar management to 
determine that the other solutions cost more, were not as reliable, and likely could not be 
completed in time because of the need for FERC certification proceedings, environmental 
compliance and permitting. 
Questar Gas then entered into a contract with Questar Transportation, by which 
Questar Transportation would construct, own, and operate a CO2 removal plant between the 
Ferron field and Questar Pipeline's main southern line. Under the contract, Questar 
Transportation would provide CO2 removal services for natural gas tendered by shippers on the 
pipeline sufficient so that the commingled gas delivered to Questar Gas's delivery points was 
safe to burn. This was done without benefit of an open bid process and without having conducted 
a well-defined capital expenditure analysis to determine the most cost effective long-term 
structure by which to construct, own, and operate the plant. The contract provided for cost-of-
service pricing for the CO2 removal services. Since beginning operations in 1999, the CO2 
removal plant has produced gas that is safe to burn in customers' appliances at the set points 
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specified in Questar Gas's tariff. Although CO2 removal operations began in 1999, a majority of 
Utah customers have not replaced or reorificed their appliances, meaning that CO2 removal must 
continue to ensure customer safety. Indeed, customer modification of appliances may be at odds 
with Questar interests. Customer appliance changes or modifications obviates a need for CO2 
processing, perhaps eliminating any need for the CO2 plant before the end of it's asset life. 
The central question now before the Commission is whether Questar Gas has met 
its burden to show that the actions it took and the costs it incurred were prudent. 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
In deciding this case, we are guided by the Supreme Court's statements in 
reversing our 2000 Order: 
By accepting the CO2 Stipulation with no consideration of the prudence of the 
underlying source of the new costs (i.e., the contract between Questar Gas and its 
affiliate Questar Pipeline), the Commission abdicated its responsibility to find the 
necessary substantial evidence in support of the proposed rate increase in the 
record. We are far from certain, moreover, that the Commission could 
conceivably determine whether a rate increase is just and reasonable without 
examining whether the underlying cost-incurring activity was reasonable, which 
in turn seems to require some attention to the utility's decision making process, 
most particularly where negotiations with an affiliate are involved. Questar Gas's 
decision not to seek a cost allocation determination from FERC, given the 
possibility that FERC might have imposed the entire cost on producers rather than 
on ratepayers, raises further questions regarding the utility's fidelity to its 
obligations to its customers. . . . While the Commission correctly recognized 
Questar Gas's obligation to ensure the safety of its customers, it incorrectly 
concluded that this factor provides a near-automatic justification for a rate 
increase regardless of how the initial threat to safety arose or how the utility 
sought to alleviate it.6 
6 2003 Decision, pp. 486-87. 
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In our 1999 Order denying Questar Gas's request to include CO2 processing costs 
in its 191 Account, we stated that we "do not intend, by this Order, to make any judgment on the 
issues of whether [Questar Gas's] decision to enter into the agreement with Questar 
Transportation Services Company was prudent, whether the terms of the agreement are 
reasonable, or whether the expenses incurred under the agreement are legitimate and reasonable 
utility expenses that may be recovered from utility customers." With the reversal of our 2000 
Order, we now follow the Supreme Court's statement that, "the Commission [should carry] out 
its initial obligation to review the prudence of the CO2 plant contract and its terms, holding 
Questar Gas to its burden of establishing that its decision to enter into the contract and the costs 
it agreed to were prudent and not unduly influenced by it's affiliate relationship with Questar 
Pipeline."7 Having been instructed by the Supreme Court that safety considerations are not an 
adequate basis for departing from a prudence review, we now turn to that inquiry. 
A. Prudence Standard 
It is well established that in conducting a prudence review we must analyze the 
decision-making process in light of the circumstances and the facts that the utility knew or 
o 
reasonably should have known at the time of the decision. We do not substitute our judgment in 
hindsight for the reasonable decisions made by management,9 nor do we determine that a 
reasonable decision is imprudent merely because we conclude that a better, reasonable 
7
 2003 Decision, p. 486. 
8
 In the Matter of the Application of Mountain Fuel Supply to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service 
In Utah, Docket Nos. 91-057-11 and 91-057-17 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
9
 Logan City v. Public Utilities commission, 296 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1931) 
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alternative was available for consideration or action. However, neither do we presume affiliate 
transactions to be reasonable.10 We long ago put Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Questar 
Gas's predecessor in interest, on notice that, while we do not presume affiliate transactions to be 
biased, we view customers' interests as paramount and will require in all instances that those 
interests not be subordinated to the interests of corporate affiliates.11 
Therefore, in assessing the prudence of Questar Gas's actions, we simply ask 
whether an unaffiliated utility acting in the best interests of its customers, in light of the 
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge which Questar Gas had or should have had at 
the time, could reasonably have responded the way Questar Gas did to the increasing volumes of 
coal-seam gas entering its distribution system as a result of Questar Pipeline contracts to 
transport gas from coal seam producers or shippers in Emery County, Utah. 
This inquiry necessarily requires a thorough review of the facts precipitating 
utility action and the process by which the utility chose to act. Our review of the time line of 
events and decisions preceding utility action is critical, particularly in the context of affiliate 
transactions, because prudence cannot be determined without first determining when a 
reasonable, unaffiliated utility would have been expected to undertake action for the protection 
of its customers. Our emphasis on planning and process should come as no surprise to the 
10
 US West Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 901 P.2d 270 (Utah 1995). 
11
 E.g., In the Matter of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, Docket No. 91-057-09 (Sept. 26, 1994) (September 1994 Order), p.3. 
12
 With slight modifications, Questar Gas, the Committee, and the Division have each propounded 
similar prudence standards. See Docket No. 03-057-05, Response Brief of Questar Gas Company on 
Prudence, pp. 3, 8; Committee Proposed Order in C02 Docket, p.l; and DPU Draft Order, p.l. 
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parties; in 1994 we counseled Questar Gas that "all planning options that potentially benefit 
[Questar Gas's ] ratepayers shall be investigated, whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the 
1 T 
Questar Corporation." 
One would expect a prudent gas distribution company faced with the risk of 
safety issue of the magnitude faced by Questar's distribution customers to clearly identify its 
objective14; to identify alternatives to meet the objective, to define the method and criteria by 
which it would evaluate the alternatives and to record or document the process in support of the 
ultimate decision. A review of the prudence of the actions, inactions and decisions of Questar 
Gas as they relate to receiving low heat-content gas into its distribution system and the attendant 
safety problems presented, necessitates an analysis of a wide range of activity and/or inactivity. 
For example, was Questar Gas prudent in timely recognizing the safety issue; was it prudent in 
framing the problem (ie. "What is the lowest cost solution long term management of the safety 
problem?"); was it prudent in identifying possible solutions; was it prudent in thoroughly 
analyzing potential solutions; was it prudent in taking (or not taking) appropriate actions once 
possible solutions were identified; did it prudently place the interest of the safety of its 
distribution customers before the economic interests of affiliate entities; was it prudent in 
developing and implementing means of postponing delivery of the increasing volumes of low 
heat-content gas to provide sufficient time to retrofit customers appliances, thereby achieving a 
truly long term solution to the safety problem; was it prudent in selecting the processing plant; 
13
 September 1994 Order, pp. 3-4. 
14
 An objective from the viewpoint of the best interests of the customers, subjugating the interests 
of affiliates where necessary to protect those of the customers. 
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was it prudent in selecting an affiliate to build, own and operate the plant; was it prudent in not 
causing the completion of appliance retrofitting within a limited period so the plant would not 
have to run longer, incurring continuing operation costs; and, was it prudent in seeking cost 
recovery of all of the costs of gas processing from distribution customers? 
In making this determination, we believe that ratepayers are best served by 
reserving wide latitude to utilities' managerial experience and technical expertise. We therefore 
do not promulgate a checklist of actions which, if followed, might innoculate a utility's action 
against a finding of imprudence. Instead, we simply require substantial evidence that the utility's 
decision-making process, under the totality of the circumstances, was not the product of a 
conscious or unconscious favoring of affiliate over ratepayer interests. The utility's and its 
customers' interests must be paramount and affiliate interests subordinate. The utility's course of 
conduct need not, with benefit of hindsight, provide the best solution, but at the time the decision 
is made, knowing what that utility knew or should have known, the decision must provide a 
reasonable solution arrived at through a reasonable process. 
B. Burden of Proof 
The Commission and the utilities that we regulate have long been aware that "the 
burden rests heavily upon a utility to prove it is entitled to rate relief and not upon the 
Commission, the Commission staff, or any interested party or protestant, to prove the 
contrary."15 The utility bears the burden of supplying substantial evidence in support of its 
position that requested rates are just and reasonable; the Commission bears responsibility for 
15
 2003 Decision, p. 486 (citing Utah Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 
1242, 1245 (Utah 1980). 
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holding the utility to its burden. Failure to meet the burden or requiring adherence in applying 
the burden precludes a rate increase which seeks to recover claimed costs. 
The form and content of such evidence is necessarily case-specific, but we 
recognize that regulated utilities are sophisticated entities long accustomed to standard business 
practices such as forecasting, planning, budgeting, capital expenditure, record keeping and 
auditing. Therefore, we cannot allow after-the-fact summarization of a complex decision-making 
process to substitute for substantial contemporaneous evidence of timely, thorough evaluation of 
conditions that may impact ratepayer interests, including an evaluation of the costs and 
effectiveness of the reasonable alternatives that may be undertaken to protect those interests. 
Additionally, where affiliate transactions are involved, a utility seeking recovery of costs from its 
Utah customers must show that it placed the interests of itself and its customers first, as it 
explored its options and that it was not influenced by the impact of a resolution upon an affiliate. 
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
Application of this standard to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that 
Questar Gas has not met its burden of proving the prudence of its actions. 
Although coal-seam gas began to flow on Questar Pipeline's system in 1992, 
Questar Pipeline was signing future capacity transportation contracts with coal-seam gas 
producers as early as 1989, eventually investing $1 million in an initial expansion of its 
transportation system to accommodate projected coal-seam production. Particularly because of 
the affiliate relationship and shared management involved here, it is reasonable to infer that 
whatever Questar Pipeline knew, and whenever it knew it, Questar Gas knew as well, including 
16
 Id. 
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knowledge of Questar Pipeline's business plans and intentions concerning coal-seam gas 
transportation. The individuals making such plans and decisions were the same individuals 
managing the affairs of both companies. Thus, we find that, probably by 1994 and certainly by 
1996, Questar Gas knew or should have known about the impact coal-seam gas would have on 
its distribution system and immediately started planning how to cost-effectively manage the risk 
of this impact and ensure the safety of its customers. We also would expect that Questar Gas 
would have undertaken sensitivity analyses to evaluate the potential impacts if there were 
possible variations in the assumptions, estimates and evaluations used in the decision making 
process. We expect prudent utility planning to reveal the risks associated with the possibility of 
changing conditions. Questar management looked after the interests of its shareholders and 
Questar Pipeline, but Questar Gas has provided no evidence showing that it considered or 
undertook such planning anytime during the period 1989 to 1997. 
From its first entry into Questar Pipeline's system in 1992, the amount of coal-
seam gas being transported steadily increased. Questar Gas contends that it first recognized the 
imminent problem caused by increasing quantities of coal-seam gas in the latter half of 1997 
when it says coal-seam gas production increased at an unanticipated level. However, its own 
exhibit presented at hearing shows that the first substantial increase in the rate of coal-seam gas 
production occurred in 1994 and continued at an even faster pace throughout 1995. For example, 
if Questar Gas had simply extrapolated from the historic increases at the end of 1995, it could 
have easily identified the risk that by early 1999 coal-seam gas volumes could exceed blending 
capacities. While the Gas Quality Team eventually reached this same conclusion, it did so nearly 
two years later. These additional two years may have rendered some of the options 
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later discarded due to imminent safety concerns more desirable both financially and 
operationally. However, whether these options would have been chosen in 1996 rather than 
discarded in 1998 is not the point. The point is that we believe a reasonable, unaffiliated utility 
would have performed such analysis no later than early 1996, thereby affording all parties an 
additional two years within which to find and commence a workable solution. 
The record refers to several potential solutions. Unfortunately, while Questar Gas 
participated in the review of some of these in 1997 and early 1998, there is no evidence that 
Questar Gas conducted an independent, thorough, long-term cost-benefit analysis of these 
options prior to Questar management deciding upon its preferred CO2 removal solution. Its 
summaries and analyses conducted after-the-fact indicate that CO2 processing was the cheapest 
short-term solution (given the time remaining within which it could implement its CO2 plant 
decision), but there was apparently no discussion or analysis of whether there were cost effective 
ways of avoiding the coal-seam gas problem altogether or, alternatively, of providing a cheaper, 
long term solution instead of the expensive, temporary fix selected by Questar Gas. 
Notwithstanding the testimony of Company witness Snider that, "The best long term alternative 
is to reset all the appliances.. ." it should be noted that building and operating the processing 
plant merely postponed the date by which customer's appliances will have to be adjusted, 
retrofitted or replaced at the customer's expense, presumably at a cost of over $100 million 
dollars adjusted for inflation, based on the testimony of Questar witnesses. In the interim, 
customers have also been paying the majority of gas processing costs. 
Possible Alternative Solutions: 
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A. Invoke §13.5 of Questar Pipeline's FERC Tariff and Seek Tariff Change at FERC 
Faced in 1992 with the introduction of lower Btu coal-seam gas into Questar 
Pipeline's system that feeds Questar Gas's southern local distribution system, we expect that a 
reasonable, unaffiliated utility would have seriously considered any option to keep this gas out of 
its system entirely (or provided some delay to provide customers time to change appliance 
capabilities to utilize supplies containing coal-seam gas). Early in these proceedings, the 
Division indicated, and Questar Gas admitted, that one option not pursued by Questar Gas was 
going to FERC to address the coal-seam gas and remedial cost allocation issues. This FERC 
option actually consists of two different tracks. 
One track would have been for Questar Gas to push Questar Pipeline to invoke 
§13.5 of its FERC tariff which states, with respect to the pipeline: "Questar shall not be required 
to accept gas at any point of receipt that is of a quality inferior to that required by shipper or a 
third party at any point of delivery on Questar's system." Questar Gas, as the largest of Questar 
Pipeline customers, presumably would have had considerable standing to contest the 
introduction, on the pipeline, of 'inferior' gas which creates significant safety problems for 
customers throughout Utah. We would not expect FERC to have turned a deaf ear to the safety 
problems attendant to the introduction of coal-seal gas on the pipeline; significantly the prospects 
of death and property damage as raised by Questar Gas before us. By invoking this provision, it 
may have been possible to have kept coal-seam gas off of the pipeline system so that it would 
never enter Questar Gas's distribution system (or have delayed volumes sufficiently to allow a 
more reasonable time for Utah customers to change or reset their appliances). Such action could 
have resulted in a number of reactions: producers/shippers who had been shut in by this decision 
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may have complained to FERC, or they may have approached other pipeline companies about 
transporting their gas, or the producers/shippers might have built their own pipeline, or the 
parties may have agreed to some cost sharing to process the gas to Questar Gas specifications 
prior to placing it on Questar Pipeline's system. We cannot know what might have transpired, 
but it is reasonable to assume that an unaffiliated utility would have sought to protect its 
individual and customers' interests, even to the detriment of the pipeline and/or other shippers on 
the pipeline. If Questar Gas had set these events in motion, we would have been left with far 
fewer questions than we confront today. It is possible that the safety threat that confronted Utah 
ratepayers in 1999 might never have appeared. 
The second FERC track that Questar management could have pursued was for 
Questar Gas to complain directly to FERC, seeking a change to Questar Pipeline's tariffs quality 
standards, so that lower Btu coal-seam gas would be processed by producers to meet the 
modified pipeline quality standards before the gas could be tendered for shipment. Questar 
management argues that, based upon FERC precedent, the most that could have been hoped for 
was a FERC order requiring producers to reduce the coal-seam gas CO2 content from three 
percent to two percent -an amount that still would not have met Questar Gas's requirements. 
The Division speculates that had Questar Gas gone to FERC, the worst-case scenario may have 
been an order requiring Questar Pipeline to deliver the gas after processing in order to prevent a 
safety problem for Questar Gas's customers. In this view, Questar Gas, as Questar Pipeline's 
largest customer, may have been required to pay most of the processing costs. Alternatively, the 
producers and/or Questar Pipeline, as the beneficiaries of FERC s open access policies, may 
have been required to pay some or all of the processing costs. In either event, it appears that 
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Questar Gas's customers would have been placed in no worse a financial position than they are 
now i.e., at risk of bearing virtually all, if not all, costs to make coal-seam gas safe to use. These 
costs include the gas processing costs and costs to meet the remaining long term solution, 100% 
of the costs to adjust, replace or retrofit customer appliances. 
In general, Questar management challenges the proposition put forth by the 
Division and Committee that going to FERC would have been a viable option, claiming that the 
safety threat posed by the coal-seam gas was imminent, that proceedings before FERC can take 
years to resolve, and that FERC would likely not have decided this matter in favor of Questar 
Gas. Questar Gas's witness, Mr. Branko Terzic, testified that FERC would not have ordered a 
change in Questar Pipeline's tariff solely to benefit its affiliate, Questar Gas, and that Division 
and Committee witnesses misread §13.5 as a tool that Questar Pipeline could have used to keep 
coal-seam gas off its system. However, he also testified that he could not "state with certainty 
what conclusions FERC would have reached," nor did he know how long it would have taken 
FERC to resolve these matters. Unable to definitely opine on the time frame for resolution or its 
outcome, he confirmed the foundational point that one option open to Questar Gas was to 
petition the FERC. If addressing the safety issue was important and imminent for Questar Gas, it 
would also have been important and imminent to FERC. Indeed, Mr. Terzic's primary objection 
to Division evidence on this point was simply that, in his opinion, Division witness Dr. George 
Compton testified with too much certainty concerning the likely outcome of any FERC 
proceedings. 
While we cannot divine what the FERC would have decided, it is possible either 
invoking §13.5 or going directly to the FERC to adjust the pipeline tariff might have solved the 
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problem or delayed the introduction of coal seam gas for a period of time that would have 
permitted retrofitting of Questar distribution customer appliances, resulting in a long term 
solution to the safety issue. There is no evidence Questar management ever considered these or 
other methods to minimize the impact on Questar Gas and its customers of coal-seam gas or to 
buy additional time in which to modify the appliances. 
That we are left today to attempt to divine what may have happened had Questar 
management petitioned or complained to FERC only serves to highlight the fact that we can not 
know what would have happened because Questar management did not seek resolution from 
FERC. Moreover, there is nothing in the record - no contemporaneous legal memorandum, no 
meeting minutes, no email, no testimony - to indicate that, prior to 1997, Questar management 
conducted any sort of analysis - legal, financial, or otherwise - concerning the possibility of 
invoking §13.5 or seeking a change to Questar Pipeline's FERC tariff, or, indeed, consideration 
of other approaches to obtain sufficient time to retrofit customer appliances. 
Even when some options did finally come before Questar management, the 
minutes of the Gas Quality Team indicate a concern to protect Questar Corporation's financial 
interests rather than to do whatever was necessary to protect Questar Gas customers. According 
to these minutes, Questar management was concerned that changing Questar Pipeline's FERC 
Gas Tariff might effectively foreclose Questar Pipeline's ability to capture the coal-seam gas 
transportation business. This is not surprising - we would expect Questar Pipeline to voice its 
concerns about the potential loss of any business opportunity. However, we would also expect 
Questar Gas to have voiced with equal or greater force its concern about the impact Questar 
Pipeline's actions were having on its distribution customers, and its interest in mitigating that 
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impact. One suggestion in the minutes of the Gas Quality Team of a ". . .rule of thumb might be, 
if it affects our ability to serve our customers, we will not accept gas." was apparently rejected 
out of hand and never mentioned again. 
Because neither Questar Gas, Questar Pipeline nor their shared management at 
Questar Regulated Services approached the FERC on these issues, we can not know whether the 
problems posed by coal-seam gas were thrust upon Utah customers by Questar Pipeline's 
decision to pursue a potentially lucrative business opportunity or whether these problems would 
have inevitably reached Utah customers because of FERC open access requirements. We can not 
know how the costs associated with this coal-seam gas may have been allocated among 
producers, pipelines, distribution companies, and other customers. What we do know by Questar 
management's own admission is that there would be no need for CO2 removal or any other 
remediation efforts if the coal-seam gas were not entering the Questar Gas distribution system or 
if the customer appliances were retrofitted or replaced. We are satisfied that a reasonable, 
unaffiliated utility, recognizing the potential danger posed by increasing quantities of this gas, 
would have analyzed all options, including invocation of §13.5 or petitioning FERC, in an 
attempt to permanently avoid or mitigate this danger. 
B. Other Pipeline or Injection Options 
Other options considered by Questar management in late 1997, but apparently not 
considered prior to formation of the Gas Quality Team, included injecting higher Btu 
hydrocarbons (such as propane) into the gas stream at Payson Gate, constructing a pipeline from 
Kern River to introduce additional higher Btu gas at Payson Gate for blending, and looping 
Questar Pipeline's Main Line 40 to Kern River so that coal-seam gas could be transported on one 
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pipeline and the other used to transport higher Btu gas to Payson Gate for delivery to Questar 
Gas. The Division believes this looping would have effectively removed coal-seam gas from the 
Questar Gas distribution system, except during peak periods when limited quantities of coal-
seam gas could be delivered and blended as necessary. 
Questar management asserts that each of these options would have cost more than 
CO2 removal, but admits that rigorous financial analyses were not conducted and that Questar 
management quickly settled on its CO2 processing option primarily because of the time 
constraints posed by its customer safety concerns. However, just as with the FERC options 
discussed above, we are left to speculate whether any of these options would have presented a 
more reasonable long-term solution had Questar Gas begun analyzing them at some point prior 
to late 1997. For instance, Questar Gas estimates that looping ML 40 may have cost significantly 
more in up front capital expenditure and some undetermined, ongoing gas processing costs, but 
this estimate fails to consider that it may have eliminated entirely the need for Utah customers to 
re-orifice at an estimated cost of $100 million. In addition, while some options, such as propane 
injection, may have been more expensive on a short-term annual basis, they may well have 
solved the safety crisis during the four or five years needed to reorifice and therefore have 
proven to be less costly in the long-term than the envisioned ten-year operation of the CO2 plant. 
We do not know because that type of analysis was not undertaken. We posit these not as better 
solutions but as examples of some of the alternatives that we would expect a reasonable utility to 
analyze in thoroughly exploring every option. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to indicate that 
Questar management conducted anything but the most cursory analysis in ruling out potential 
long-term solutions in favor of its preferred shorter-term fix. 
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C. CO? Processing Plant Decision 
When examined in isolation, rapid construction and operation of the CO2 
processing plant may have been within the range of reasonable responses to a "safety crisis" first 
recognized in late 1997. However, even were we to ignore the many opportunities available to 
Questar Gas prior to 1997 to avoid or address the problems associated with coal-seam gas, and 
assuming that we would continue to view construction and operation of the CO2 processing plant 
to have been a reasonable course of action in 1998, we would nonetheless have difficulty 
concluding that the decision to contract with Questar Transportation for construction and 
operation of the plant was prudent. 
When this issue was originally before us in Docket 98-057-12, the Division 
concluded that a well-documented record demonstrating a reasoned, arms-length process by 
which Questar Gas decided to contract with Questar Transportation does not exist. Mr. Alan K. 
Allred, Manager of Regulatory Affairs for Questar Regulated Services, asserted at hearing in the 
consolidated dockets that decisions were made quickly because of the need to maintain customer 
safety and because of Questar management's knowledge that the cost-of-service contract with 
Questar Transportation provided the best financial deal for those customers. However, as the 
Supreme Court has made clear, safety concerns such as existed in this case do not trump Questar 
Gas's burden of demonstrating prudence. 
This burden rests heavily on Questar Gas, yet Mr. Allred admitted that Questar 
management conducted no in-depth financial analysis because management assumed Questar 
Gas would recover any costs from its ratepayers. While Questar Gas did provide after-the-fact 
analysis that, in the view of its witnesses, its arrangement with Questar Transportation resulted in 
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a lower cost to ratepayers than would have an open bid process, we would be hard pressed, 
solely on the weight of this evidence, to determine that Questar Gas has met its burden of 
proving it prudently analyzed the issues prior to entering into the contract. For example, there 
was no analysis of whether ratepayers would have benefitted if Questar Gas owned and operated 
the plant. 
Too many questions remain unanswered. For instance, Questar Gas maintains that 
it entered into its agreement with Questar Transportation because Questar Gas did not have the 
experience necessary to build and operate the plant, but Division witness Hanson indicates that 
Questar Corporation has a history of moving people within the company to meet specific needs, 
so why did Questar Gas contract with an affiliate rather than simply request and obtain the 
expertise it needed? Questar Gas further claims that any affiliate relationship was mitigated by 
the fact that Questar Transportation bid out the design and construction of the plant, but that 
simply leads us to ask why Questar Gas could not have bid this work directly, instead of through 
its affiliate? 
While we have previously recognized that under some circumstances our 
prudence review need not produce an all or nothing outcome,17 that reasoning does not apply 
here. Were we to focus solely on Questar management's decision to build the CO2 processing 
plant, assuming we had substantial evidence of its analysis of the project, we might determine 
that some benefit accrued to Utah consumers such that Questar Gas is entitled to some level of 
rate recovery. The Division notes that "where there were other alternatives, the question should 
17
 In re U.S. West Communications, Docket No. 95-049-05 (November 17, 1995), reconsideration 
granted in part, In re U.S. West Communications, Docket No. 95-049-05 (December 18, 1995). 
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be whether they were adequately reviewed without the decision-maker being inappropriately 
influenced by its affiliate. However, if there is some benefit, even with affiliate influence, 
complete disallowance could be inappropriate." Division Brief, at 8. The Supreme Court's 
opinion in the 2003 Decision, however, effectively requires us to deny recovery if Questar Gas 
fails to meet its burden of proving that its decision making process and decision to contract for 
the CO2 processing was prudent and unaffected by affiliate interests. As explained above, our 
decision is based on much more than the discrete decision to build the CO2 plant. On this record, 
we find that affiliate influence is clear. The degree to which it is "inappropriate," to use the 
Division's terminology, is unknown because explicit analyses by Questar management is absent. 
Because Questar Gas has not proven that the dangers posed by increasing amounts of coal-seam 
gas were inevitable and that it acted reasonably in perceiving and addressing those dangers, we 
are unpersuaded that any unique economic benefit has accrued to Utah rate payers to justify rate 
recovery. Despite years of analysis encompassing several dockets, and despite its continuing 
support for the CO2 Stipulation, the Division has never concluded that Questar Gas's decision to 
pursue CO2 processing was prudent. Neither can we. 
We find no indication that Questar Gas, independent from other Questar company 
considerations, ever bothered to ask itself "What is the lowest cost long term solution to this 
emerging problem?" We find no evidence, written or oral, to indicate that the best interests of 
distribution customers were the paramount concern of Questar management. Questar 
management effectively ignored the potential problems coal-seam gas posed for Questar Gas and 
it's customers until 1998, when its safety concerns were so overwhelming that the only option it 
viewed as workable involved assigning all of the cost of the gas quality problem to its 
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distribution customers. We find no evidence that Questar Gas acted as a reasonable, unaffiliated 
utility would have acted prior to 1997; to question, study, object to, or attempt to mitigate the 
gathering threat posed by the increasing presence of coal-seam gas in its distribution system. 
Furthermore, we find no evidence of the thorough financial and cost-benefit analysis that we 
would expect Questar Gas to have undertaken prior to acting upon a gas treatment option 
destined to impose significant expense on its distribution customers for the foreseeable future. 
Nor do we find any significant evidence of thorough analysis of other approaches that might 
have been taken to avoid or delay the introduction of coal seam gas into the distribution system 
until customer appliances could be adjusted. 
Instead, five years into the CO2 removal effort, Utah ratepayers are left with an 
imperfect, costly, and temporary solution to a long term problem. Meanwhile, Questar Pipeline 
has been able to pursue its interest in expanding its pipeline business opportunities with most of 
the costs of gas processing picked up by Questar Gas's distribution customers. We find that a 
reasonable, unaffiliated utility possessed of the knowledge Questar Gas had or should have had 
and acting prudently in the best interest of its customers would have acted much earlier to protect 
those interests and would have more thoroughly identified, evaluated and pursued alternative 
approaches to the problem. To the degree affiliate interests were present, these interests should 
have been explicitly recognized, efforts made to avoid and counter conflicted interests, and have 
been reflected in the decision making process. 
Despite the volume of documentation provided by Questar management in this 
case, it has been unable to pull from this mountain of paper the type of detailed, reasonable, and 
complete contemporaneous analysis we would expect of a utility to prove the prudence of its 
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actions leading up to this requested rate increase. We find that a reasonable, unaffiliated utility 
properly focused on the best interests of its customers would have produced such documentation 
in the normal course of its analysis and deliberations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Questar Gas has not met the 
burden of proving its actions constituted a prudent response to the introduction of lower Btu 
coal-seam gas into the Questar Gas distribution system. We conclude that, given the 
circumstances presented in the record, a reasonable unaffiliated utility would timely address 
growing risks to customers and perform an independent and documented evaluation of 
alternatives with the interests of those customers paramount and avoid being forced into crisis 
management to protect the safety of its customers with an ever diminishing choice of options. 
We therefore reject the CO2 Stipulation and deny recovery of the processing costs during the 
period from June, 1999, to May, 2004. 
ORDER 
Wherefore, pursuant to our discussion, findings and conclusions made herein, we 
Order: 
1. Questar Gas Company to file appropriate tariff revisions to reflect our 
determination that there be no cost recovery authorized for CO2 processing operations. 
2. The Division of Public Utilities shall review the tariff revisions for compliance 
with this Order. 
3. The Commission will conduct further proceedings to address the treatment of 
funds collected to recover the cost of CO2 processing. We will also address, in a separate docket, 
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how to craft a long term solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with natural gas 
containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and 
service to its customers. 
Pursuant to Utah Code 63-46b-12 and 54-7-15, agency review or rehearing of this 
order may be obtained by filing a request for review or rehearing with the Commission within 30 
days after the issuance of the order. Responses to a request for agency review or rehearing must 
be filed within 15 days of the filing of the request for review or rehearing. If the Commission 
fails to grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days after the filing of a request for 
review or rehearing, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the Commission's final agency 
action may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court within 30 
days after final agency action. Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of 
Utah Code 63-46b-14, 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of August, 2004. 
/s/ Constance B. White, Chairman 
/s/ Ted Boyer, Commissioner 
I si W. Val Oveson, Commissioner Pro Tern 
Attest: 
Is/ Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
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ORDER ON REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR 
CLARIFICATION 
ISSUED: October 20, 2004 
By the Commission: 
On September 30, 2004, Questar Gas Company (Questar) filed its Petition for 
Reconsideration or Clarification of our August 30, 2004, Order (Order). On October 14, 2004, 
the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) filed its Response to Questar's Petition for 
Reconsideration or Clarification. No other submissions have been made to the Commission. 
Questar seeks clarification on three issues and reconsideration of two. With 
respect to the clarification items, Questar first asks that the Commission clarify that it has made 
no finding on the quality of coal-seam gas. The Committee responds that it is not necessary that 
the Commission clarify that the Commission has made no finding of the quality of the gas. The 
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point raised by Questar arises from its concern deriving from Questar's view of the Committee's 
characterization of coal-seam gas and Questar views of how some media coverage of these 
proceedings has characterized coal-seam gas. The Committee's response is essentially to claim 
that Questar's view of how the Committee has characterized coal-seam gas is in error. 
We believe this issue is driven more by these two parties' clashes, during these 
proceedings, than by the language contained in our Order. The use of the word "inferior," in our 
Order, was limited to a quotation of FERC approved terms of the pipeline's tariff. We doubt that 
we can directly alter how Questar and the Committee may view each other. We are encouraged 
by all parties' efforts to cooperatively participate in Docket No. 04-057-09, where we are 
attempting to arrive at reasonable, long-term responses to the delivery of coal-seam gas to 
Questar's customers. We hope that solutions that may derive from those efforts receive non-
conflicting support from all of the participants. We only note that our Order was not intended to 
disparage or praise coal-seam gas in any way. The only quality aspect of coal-seam gas relating 
to our decision, was coal-seam gas' variance from Questar's gas standards, and the consequences 
which Questar identified if this gas were to be commingled with other natural gas transported in 
the natural gas pipeline and the mixture delivered to Questar customers for use in their gas 
consuming appliances. 
Next, Questar asks that the Commission clarify language in the Order which the 
company views as reflecting Commission determinations that Questar, to further Questar 
corporate interests, may have pursued delay of customer change-out or modification of 
appliances. The Committee argues that it is neither necessary or appropriate to make the 
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requested clarification as the Commission made no specific findings in this regard. The 
Committee views the company's concerns as overwrought. Again, we consider this point driven 
more by the parties' views of one another's actions and conduct rather than the language used in 
the Commission's Order. 
The language used in our Order's discussion was used as part of our expression of 
the regulatory concern of how affiliate interests and corporate relationships can present conflicts 
to the interests of a utility and its customers. These potential conflicts are why we need adequate 
evidence to show that these conflicts are recognized and appropriately addressed or dealt with in 
the utility's actions and course of conduct. We anticipate that where such conflicts can arise and 
a utility seeks recovery of costs affected with such potential conflicts, the utility understands its 
burdens of proof and persuasion and takes steps (which enable it to present evidence of its 
actions) showing how these conflicts were recognized, were minimized and how the utility 
prioritized its customers' interests and was not unduly influenced by its affiliate interests in the 
actions it took. We agree with the Committee; our Order is not intended to make specific 
findings that Questar actually took specific, calculated steps to delay customer actions with 
regard to their appliances, to the detriment of customer interests and to the benefit of corporate 
interests. Our difficulty was in finding substantial evidence that Questar recognized and 
addressed the conflicts presented by the developing circumstances and that Questar's actions 
were not unduly influenced by affiliate interests as it took the steps it did and did not consider 
and follow. 
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The third area of clarification sought by Questar, and the first point of 
reconsideration which we address, deals with the time period over which Questar could pursue 
recovery of CO2 processing plant expenses in other or future proceedings. Questar seeks 
clarification that the tariff revisions directed by the Order do not preclude future recovery of 
processing costs. Questar also seeks reconsideration of the Order, which Questar characterizes as 
precluding recovery of any processing costs incurred through May of 2004. Questar argues that it 
may be able to substantiate recovery of some processing costs incurred prior to May, 2004, and 
should not be precluded from seeking such recovery, in other dockets, by the Order issued in this 
docket. 
The Committee opposes the clarification and reconsideration requests. Relative to 
the clarification regarding the tariff language, the Committee notes that tariffs are subject to 
revision and Questar is not precluded from seeking future tariff revisions upon an appropriate 
showing and finding that changes are justified. The Committee argues that the Order language 
does not preclude future tariff changes and sees no need to make a clarification for something 
which is already permitted, vis future tariff changes. With regard to the reconsideration request, 
the Committee argues that Questar has not presented any new evidence which would permit 
recovery at this time and that it has some difficulty imagining a new factual setting which would 
warrant recovery of CO2 processing plant expenses given the Commission's Order. The 
Committee does not argue that it is impossible or impermissible, only that it may be difficult. 
The Order addressed only Questar's failure to substantiate approval of the CO2 
Stipulation in these proceedings and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation, which would have 
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permitted recovery of some processing costs through May of 2004. Our reference to the May, 
2004, end date was dictated by the Stipulation's terms and was not intended to have any other 
preclusive effect on recovery by Questar. In regards to Questar's requests for clarification and 
reconsideration, we state that our Order does not preclude Questar from seeking recovery of CO2 
processing costs in other dockets. We cannot opine, here, on the likelihood of success for rate 
recovery of CO2 processing costs coming in other dockets. However arduous or facile the task 
may be to support or oppose recovery in other proceedings, it will be that of the participants. We 
will not prejudge the outcome. We will need to wait for Questar to make whatever arguments 
and present whatever evidence it deems appropriate in seeking recovery of these costs, whether 
incurred pre- or post-May, 2004, in whatever dockets Questar may raise the issue. 
We now turn to the last item, Questar's request for reconsideration of our decision 
to deny recovery of any processing costs in our Order. Questar argues that the Commission 
could, and should, have allowed some level of recovery for CO2 processing costs incurred by the 
company. The Committee counters by arguing that Questar's request invites the Commission to 
commit the same or similar error upon which the Supreme Court overturned our August 11, 
2000, Report and Order in Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 203 
UT 29, 75 P.3d 481. It is clear from the Supreme Court's analysis and discussion, particularly 
that contained in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the opinion, supra, that Questar, and the Commission, 
must address Questar's "burden of establishing that its [Questar's] decision to enter into the 
contract and the costs it agreed to were prudent and not unduly influenced by its affiliate 
relationship . . . . " (Id., at 1[13), uhold Questar Gas to its burden of proof \id., at ^fl5) and "find 
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the necessary substantial evidence in support of the proposed rate increase in the record" (id) 
before any recovery can be considered. The denial of any recovery is the result of the Supreme 
Court's discussion of what the Commission should do where the utility is held to its burden and 
fails. Due to our conclusion that Questar failed to establish an adequate evidentiary basis upon 
which we could conclude that its decision to enter into the processing contract and incur the costs 
it agreed to were prudent and not unduly influenced by its affiliate relationships, we see no 
avenue for recovery, based on this record, while remaining compliant with the Supreme Court's 
decision. 
We conclude that we have provided the clarification sought where Questar has not 
fully apprehended the intent of our August 30, 2004, Order. In all other respects, and particularly 
with respect to the specific request for reconsideration of our conclusion denying any rate 
recovery for CO2 processing costs, based upon our discussion herein, we deny Questar's Petition 
for Reconsideration. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of October, 2004. 
I si Constance B. White, Commissioner 
Is/ Ted Boyer, Commissioner 
I si W. Val Oveson, Commissioner Pro Tern 
Attest: 
I si Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
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